People v Leddy

[*1] People v Leddy 2005 NY Slip Op 50703(U) Decided on February 15, 2005 Supreme Court, Suffolk County Mullen, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on February 15, 2005
Supreme Court, Suffolk County

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

against

BRIAN LEDDY, Defendant.



2031-2004



HON. THOMAS J. SPOTA

District Attorney, Suffolk County

By: Nancy Clifford, Assistant District Attorney

200 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

Attorney for Defendant

ALLEN and ADIPIETRO, ESQS.

By: Joseph A. Mucha, Esq.

100 Main Street, Suite 96A Hempstead, NY 11550

Michael F. Mullen, J.

A Huntley hearing was held in this case on February 1, 2005. The People called two witnesses and the defendant called one, and based upon their testimony, the Court finds the facts to be as follows:

Sergeant Kevin McKeon of the Second Precinct in Huntington responded to a call of a serious motor vehicle accident on the morning of June 18, 2004. He arrived at Eatons Neck Road and Essex Drive at about 7:15 AM. He observed debris in the road and a body lying nearby. He put a blanket over the body - the individual, a male, was obviously deceased - and called for a detective from the precinct. The scene was in front of the Eatons Neck firehouse. After securing the scene, and while waiting for a detective to arrive, McKeon was approached by two men. One of them, who appeared to be a fire officer, said something to the effect of: my friend wants to speak to you. The "friend" asked "can we talk," and when McKeon indicated yes, the friend (who turned out to be the defendant) stated: "Last night, I think I hit something," and when McKeon said "what," replied "I did hit something," and motioned toward the body.



McKeon asked defendant what he was driving, and defendant said a white Ram truck, which was at his home. McKeon then asked whether defendant would give a statement when a detective arrived. He indicated he would, and went inside the firehouse to wait.

Detective James Masterson arrived in about a half hour. McKeon told him of his conversation with defendant and then went inside the firehouse to get him. He found defendant upstairs in a room, alone. He asked defendant to come downstairs, and he did, a minute or two later.

As far as McKeon was concerned, the police at this point were investigating an accident and defendant appeared to be a witness. He was free to leave.

Detective Masterson arrived at Eatons Neck at about 8:50 AM. He was informed by Sergeant McKeon that a volunteer fireman wanted to speak to him, and was waiting in the firehouse. McKeon went inside to find him, and shortly thereafter defendant came out, alone, and approached. There were a couple of dozen firemen standing around, so Masterson asked defendant if they could talk in Masterson's police car. Defendant agreed. The two of them sat alone, and defendant began telling Masterson everything he did on June 17th, the day before. When he finished, Masterson took a written statement, which was finished at about 9:10 AM. Defendant read it and signed it. Masterson did not give defendant any Miranda warnings because he was merely investigating a fatal motor vehicle accident. They were in the police car about twenty minutes. Defendant was not under arrest. [*2]

After they finished talking, defendant gave Masterson his consent to search his vehicle which was parked nearby at his house. He also indicated he had no problem with going down to the police station. Masterson left the defendant at the firehouse and went to his house to take a look at his vehicle. When he saw the extensive damage to the grill, he decided to arrest the defendant. That happened when he arrived at the Second Precinct at about 11:45 AM. By that time, defendant had been joined at the precinct by his attorney, Joseph A. Mucha, Esq.

The witness who defendant called at the hearing was another attorney, Walter Zornes, Esq., who testified that at 7:46 AM on June 18th, he was at home getting ready for work when he retrieved a message on his cell phone from the defendant. He knew the defendant, having represented him in his heating and air conditioning business. The message essentially said that he (defendant) was looking at a dead body and he needed Zornes to call back right away. Zornes called back and eventually spoke to defendant at the firehouse. Defendant was upset and rambling on about a dead body. Zornes asked defendant whether the police were there, and defendant said no. Zornes was not able to represent the defendant and planned to contact another attorney. He eventually did, in fact, connect with another colleague (Mucha) who was able to meet defendant at the precinct. Zornes did not speak to the police at any time.

Conclusions of Law

Defendant does not dispute the admissibility of the "initial" statements he gave to Sergeant McKeon identifying himself as the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which McKeon went to investigate on the morning of June 18th. Also, the Court presumed that the testimony of attorney Walter Zornes was offered to show that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of his conversations with the police. However, the evidence did not support such a conclusion, and counsel has not addressed it in his memo of law.

However, defendant contends that everything else he said, to both McKeon and Detective Masterson, is inadmissible because he was in a custodial setting and should have been given his Miranda warnings. The admitted failure to do so, defendant argues, makes everything he thereafter said and/or was contained in the written statement involuntary, and therefore inadmissible.

The facts simply do not support defendant's position. The facts show that defendant was not in custody after the brief exchange with Sergeant McKeon. It is well to remember that defendant sought out McKeon and not vice versa. After their brief conversation defendant was asked whether he would speak to a detective when one arrived, and he indicated he would. He was not detained. He left McKeon and went inside the firehouse. There is no indication there were any police in there, and there is no indication McKeon even knew [*3]where inside the defendant was going to be waiting. One half hour went by before McKeon went inside to look for him. And even then, McKeon did not accompany defendant back outside. McKeon simply told Masterson that defendant would be along shortly. When defendant did come outside to meet Masterson, he was not handcuffed, confronted, or challenged in any way. There were dozens of firemen standing around, and no police. They got into Masterson's vehicle, and defendant began to tell him everything that he did the day before. He was not a "suspect," and he was not being questioned as such. They were in the police car about twenty minutes and when Masterson wrote down what defendant told him, he did so on a form normally used for witnesses, describing an incident, not suspects or those in custody giving a confession. When they finished, defendant was still free to go and in fact, he agreed to meet Masterson at the precinct. It was only after Masterson saw defendant's vehicle at his house that he decided to arrest defendant. He did so when he met defendant again back at the precinct. By this time, defendant had been joined by counsel. There was no further questioning.

Up until his arrest at the precinct, defendant's freedom was not restricted in any way, the questioning was not accusatory, and he had no reason to think he was not free to go or stop talking at any time. The oral statements he made to Sergeant McKeon and the oral and written statements he gave to Detective Masterson were not given in a custodial setting. There was no requirement that he be advised of his Miranda rights. The statements are admissible at trial ( see, People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29; People v Centano, 76 NY2d 837).

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

DATED: HON. MICHAEL F. MULLEN, J.S.C.