The People v. Jason D. Liggins
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
----------------------------------------------------------------No. 27
The People &c.,
Appellant,
v.
Jason D. Liggins,
Respondent.
Stephen G. Cox, for appellant.
Robert H. Kirchner, for respondent.
Decided February 10, 2011:
Appeal dismissed upon the ground that the reversal by
the Appellate Division was not "on the law alone or
upon the law and such facts which, but for the
determination of law, would not have led to reversal"
(CPL 450.90[2][a]). Chief Judge Lippman and Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.
Judge Pigott dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion.
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No. 27
People v Jason Liggins
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
My colleagues have determined that this appeal should
be dismissed on the ground that the reversal by the Appellate
Division was not "on the law alone or upon the law and such facts
which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to
reversal" (CPL 450.90 [2][a]).
I respectfully disagree and
therefore dissent from that decision.
And, since we were briefed
by the parties and heard oral argument on this case, I would
reverse the order of the Appellate Division and reinstate the
order of County Court, Oneida County.
The Appellate Division's reversal, although stated to
be on the law, involved the applicability of the emergency
doctrine, generally a mixed question of law and fact (see People
v Dallas, 8 NY3d 890 [2007]).
An examination of the court's
opinion, however, confirms that the factual determinations alone
would not have led to reversal.
Rather, it was the court's
conclusion, as a legal matter, that the rule of People v Mitchell
(39 NY2d 173 [1976]) prohibited the application of the emergency
doctrine, that led the Appellate Division to conclude that the
case must be reversed.
Thus, the order was made "upon the law
and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not
have led to reversal."
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No. 27
Turning to the merits, a brief recitation of the facts
is in order.
On the night of July 15, 2006, police responded to a
report of "shots fired" at 822 Oswego Street in the City of
Utica.
Upon arriving at the scene, the officers observed a
number of shell casings on the ground in front of the apartment
building.
A resident of the building told one of the officers
that she heard an argument in Apartment 9 just prior to the shots
being fired.
The officers proceeded to Apartment 9, knocked on
the door and waited several minutes until a "nervous and
distraught" Laura Jones, who was talking on a cell phone, opened
the door.
The officers then went inside the apartment to look
for the shooter or an injured victim.
While doing so, an officer
observed cocaine in plain view on a kitchen table.
The apartment
was then secured until another officer returned with a search
warrant.
A search of the apartment resulted in the seizure of
quantities of cocaine in the kitchen and bedroom. No victim or
perpetrator was found.
The suppression court sustained the warrantless search
but the Appellate Division reversed, basing their decision on an
interpretation of our decision in People v Mitchell (39 NY2d 173
[1976]), and finding that of the three elements necessary to
establish the emergency exception for warrantless entry into
someone's home, the People failed to meet two of them.
First, the Appellate Division reached the conclusion
that the suppression court erred in finding that exigent
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No. 27
circumstances served as an appropriate exception to the
warrantless entry rule to permit the officer to conduct the
minimally intrusive entry into the apartment.
It based its
determination on the fact that while the officer received a call
of "shots fired", "the People failed to present any evidence
concerning the source of the report, the timing of the report
vis-a-vis the incident, the identity of the perpetrator, or the
existence of a possible victim."
However, none of those factors,
in my view, erodes the undeniable fact that there were shots
fired in a residential neighborhood late at night and that it was
the duty of the police to respond to such a call.
The fact that,
at the time, the police were unaware of the perpetrator(s) or
victim(s) is the norm, not the rule in incidents such as this.
Rather, the facts that were known to the police, in my view,
clearly establish reasonable grounds to believe that there was an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for
the protection of life or property (see Mitchell, 39 NY2d at
177).
The Appellate Division also ruled, as a matter of law,
that the People failed to satisfy the third element of the
emergency exception; i.e., that there was a reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched.
Here again, the undisputed facts
are that the officers, confronted with shell casings just outside
the apartment building, relied upon the information supplied by a
tenant that there had been an argument in Apartment 9 moments
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prior to the shooting.
No. 27
The Appellate Division rejected the
People's contention that the officer had a reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, based on these facts because "apart
from the resident's vague undetailed report of an argument" there
was no basis for the officer to believe that the "trouble started
in" defendant's apartment.
In its view, the reported argument
does not established a "direct relationship" (Mitchell, 39 NY2d
at 179) between the defendant's apartment and the purported
emergency.
The court therefore concluded that "the warrantless
intrusion into defendant's apartment was not justified under the
emergency exception to the warrant requirement . . ."
As a
result, all evidence gained from the apartment was ordered
suppressed.
In my view this was error.
As the dissent at the Appellate Division pointed out:
"In recognizing the danger of delayed response, the law does not
require adherence to a standard which, made strictly in
hindsight, would preclude the police from all causes of conduct
but the least intrusive" (64 AD3d 1216 citing People v DePaula,
179 AD2d 424, 426 [1992]; quoting People v Calhoun, 49 NY2d 397,
403 [1980]).
As noted in People v DePaula (179 AD2d 424 [1st
Dept 1992]): "[I]t is difficult to conceive of what other action,
consistent with their belief that someone inside defendant's
apartment might be injured or threatened, could have been taken
by the officer to provide immediate assistance".
For these reasons, I believe this case is appealable to
this Court and upon appeal the order of the Appellate Division
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should be reversed.
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No. 27
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