People v O'Halloran (Matthew)

[*1] People v O'Halloran (Matthew) 2013 NY Slip Op 51142(U) Decided on July 8, 2013 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 8, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON and SOLOMON, JJ
2012-301 K CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Matthew O'Halloran, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Gilbert C. Hong, J.), rendered October 19, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of obstructing traffic.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with obstructing traffic is dismissed.

In May 2009, defendant was charged in a single accusatory instrument with driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]), and obstructing traffic (New York City Department of Transportation Traffic Rules and Regulations [34 RCNY] § 4-07 [I]). The count of driving while intoxicated was dismissed in January 2010. Thereafter, in April 2011, defendant moved to dismiss the remaining counts on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.20). The Criminal Court denied defendant's motion by order dated May 27, 2011. In October 2011, following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of obstructing traffic and acquitted of driving while ability impaired. On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied his statutory (CPL 30.30) and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. [*2]

We note, at the outset, that defendant's motion to dismiss the traffic infractions was not based on a denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30). In any event, defendant had no statutory right to a speedy trial as to the charge of obstructing traffic, the sole count of the accusatory instrument of which he was ultimately convicted, since it is a traffic infraction (see New York City Department of Transportation Traffic Rules and Regulations [34 RCNY] § 4-02 [d] [1]), to which no statutory speedy trial right attaches (see CPL 30.30; People v Graham, 39 Misc 3d 35 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; People v Thomas, 26 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50441[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; People v Ferreira, 22 Misc 3d 32 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Defendant, however, still maintained a constitutional right to a speedy trial with respect to this charge (see People v Thomas, 26 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50441[U]; People v Ferreira, 22 Misc 3d 32). A determination of a defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim requires consideration of the extent of, and the reason for, the delay, the nature of the charge, whether there has been a period of pretrial incarceration, and whether the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay (see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; see also People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51 [2009]). In our view, defendant has demonstrated that there was a protracted delay in the prosecution of the case and that he was prejudiced thereby. Consequently, defendant's motion to dismiss, on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (US Const 6th, 14th Amend; CPL 30.20), the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with obstructing traffic should have been granted.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with obstructing traffic is dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 08, 2013