Town of Amherst v Mead
2008 NY Slip Op 10316 [57 AD3d 1438]
December 31, 2008
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant
to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Town of Amherst v Mead
Town of Amherst, Respondent, v Brian Burns Mead, Defendant, and Power Up Manufacturing, Inc., et al., Appellants. (Appeal No. 3.)
—[*1] Chelus, Herdzik, Speyer & Monte, P.C., Buffalo (John N. Philipps, Jr., of counsel), for defendant-appellant Power Up Manufacturing, Inc.
Bivona & Cohen, P.C., New York City (Robert G. Macchia of counsel), for defendants-appellants GMAC Leasing Corporation, Vehicle Asset Universal Leasing Trust, Central Originating Lease Trust and General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
Demarie & Schoenborn, P.C., Buffalo (Joseph Demarie of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.
Appeals from a second amended order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph R. Glownia, J.), entered December 18, 2007. The second amended order, among other things, denied the motion of defendant Power Up Manufacturing, Inc. and the cross motion of defendants GMAC Leasing Corporation, Vehicle Asset Universal Leasing Trust, Central Originating Lease Trust, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation for summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the second amended order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking reimbursement pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (6) for the wages and medical bills of a police officer employed by plaintiff. The officer was injured when the police vehicle he was driving was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Brian Burns Mead and owned by defendant Power Up Manufacturing, Inc. (Power Up). Supreme Court properly denied the motion of Power Up and the cross motion of the remaining defendants-appellants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. Contrary to the contention of those defendants, General Municipal Law § 207-c (6) does not apply only to active tortfeasors. Rather, it applies both to active tortfeasors and to those who are vicariously liable. Indeed, [*2]the statute expressly provides that "a cause of action shall accrue to the municipality for reimbursement . . . as against any third party against whom the [police officer] shall have a cause of action" (id. [emphasis added]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Peradotto, Green and Gorski, JJ.