People v Wynder

People v Wynder 2007 NY Slip Op 05316 [41 AD3d 209] Decided on June 14, 2007 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on June 14, 2007
Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Nardelli, Malone, JJ.
1328
Ind. 6527/01

[*1]The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v

Gregory Wynder, Defendant-Appellant.




Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Elon Harpaz
of counsel), for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Jessica
Slutsky of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. McLaughlin, J.), rendered January 12, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of life without parole, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant's contentions regarding the court's sua sponte dismissal of a large number of prospective jurors are unpreserved since he failed to object at a time when the court could have corrected the claimed error (see People v Hopkins, 76 NY2d 872 [1990]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the court properly excused these panelists based on its own questioning that revealed that they were unqualified, and we would conclude that additional inquiry by counsel was unnecessary
(see e.g. People v Boozer, 298 AD2d 261 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 555 [2002]; People v Gayle, 238 AD2d 133 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 893 [1997]; People v Mitchell, 224 AD2d 316 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 968 [1996]).

The court properly received evidence that defendant was on parole at the time of the crime and stopped reporting to his parole officer immediately thereafter, since this evidence was relevant to his consciousness of guilt. The court also properly admitted another reference to defendant's parole situation that provided necessary context for a statement he made that tended to establish his intent to rob the victim. This evidence remained probative of contested issues at trial, notwithstanding defendant's concessions with regard to some aspects of the case. To the extent that the court received unnecessary detail about defendant's parole situation, the error was [*2]harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JUNE 14, 2007

CLERK