A.C. v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 
 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

A.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S

OFFICE, HIGHLAND PARK POLICE

DEPARTMENT and ATTORNEY GENERAL

FOR NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

_________________________________

December 1, 2016

 

Submitted April 25, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. C-175-14.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stefan J. Erwin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondents State of New Jersey and Attorney General for New Jersey (Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

Thomas F. Kelso, Middlesex County Counsel, attorney for respondent Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, join in the brief of respondents State of New Jersey and Attorney General for New Jersey.

Mason, Griffin & Pierson, attorneys for respondent Highland Park Police Department, join in the brief of respondents State of New Jersey and Attorney General for New Jersey.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nugent, J.A.D.

Plaintiff A.C. appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of his complaint challenging a 2013 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, the statute that requires sex offenders to register and periodically verify their addresses. Plaintiff argues on appeal: defendants have exceeded their statutory authority by requiring registrants to provide information not authorized by the Attorney General when verifying their addresses; the amendment at issue is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and the amendment is impermissibly vague. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The factual background is undisputed. Plaintiff is a registered Tier I sex offender. Tier I sex offenders have the lowest risk of re-offense and require the lowest level of community notification. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1). As a sex offender, plaintiff is subject to Megan's Law's registration requirements, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -5.

Sex offenders are required to initially register with the registering agency by completing a "form of registration statement" prepared by "the Superintendent of State Police, with the approval of the Attorney General[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4(a). The registration is required by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4(b) to include

(1) . . . the person's name, social security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, address of legal residence, address of any current temporary residence, date and place of employment; and any anticipated or current school enrollment, including but not limited to enrollment at or employment by any institution of higher education;

(2) Date and place of each conviction, adjudication or acquittal by reason of insanity, indictment number, fingerprints, and a brief description of the crime or crimes for which registration is required; and

(3) Any other information that the Attorney General deems necessary to assess risk of future commission of a crime, including criminal and corrections records, nonprivileged personnel, treatment, and abuse registry records, and evidentiary genetic markers when available.

Following their initial registration, sex offenders are required to verify their address with "the appropriate law enforcement agency" either "every 90 days" or "annually" depending upon certain statutory criteria. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(e). Verification is to be done "in a manner prescribed by the Attorney General." Ibid. The 2013 statutory amendment added to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(e), which provides: "In addition to address information, the person shall provide as part of the verification process any additional information the Attorney General may require." L. 2013, c. 214, 1 (effective July 1, 2014).

The Attorney General has not required, through its guidelines or otherwise, any information in addition to address information as part of the verification process. Nevertheless, on March 20, 2012 more than a year before the 2013 amendment became effective defendant Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office issued Directive #52, "Megan's Law Protocol," concerning the registration and verification process. The purpose of the directive is "to clarify and document the responsibilities associated with the law . . . with the purpose of maintaining and enhancing a cooperative working relationship between the various law enforcement agencies tasked with the enforcement of the current provisions of Megan's Law." The objective of the directive is "coordination of the registration/re-registration/address verification process amongst the responsible law enforcement agencies." For registrants periodically verifying their addresses, the Directive requires more than address information.

The Directive's Section F, entitled "REGISTRANT RE-REGISTRATION NO CHANGE OF ADDRESS," requires registrants to fill out the standard "Registration/Re-Registration/Address Verification" form in its entirety, take two new photographs, take two sets of photographs of any vehicles utilized on a regular basis if different from the last registration, and obtain two types of proof of residency. The two-page registration/re-registration/address verification multi-purpose form includes questions concerning, among other things, therapy, vehicles, and computer access. Plaintiff, one such registrant, was required to verify his address with defendant Highland Park Police Department.

On September 26, 2014, plaintiff filed this action, seeking to enjoin defendants from requiring him to provide information other than his address as part of the verification process.1 The trial judge entered an order to show cause on September 29, 2014, and denied plaintiff's request for temporary restraints on October 28, 2014. On October 23, 2014, Highland Park Police Department and Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. The court denied the motion. The parties filed summary judgment motions. On April 15, 2015, the court denied plaintiff's motion, granted defendants' motion, and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, plaintiff argues

[I]. Defendants' interpretation of the statute exceeds the authority delegated to them by the legislature.

[II]. This amendment is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an executive agency as the delegation is not bounded by some intelligible principle.

[III]. the statutory amendment is impermissibly

vague.

[A]. Facial Challenge.

[B]. As Applied Challenge.

Having carefully considered plaintiff's arguments, we reject them substantially for the reasons given by the Honorable Frank M. Ciuffani in his written opinions of May 1, 2014 and April 15, 2015. We have concluded plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.


1 Plaintiff filed a similar action before the 2013 amendment was enacted. With the exception of the 2013 amendment, he made in that action essentially the same arguments he raises here. The same trial judge dismissed that action on summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file an appeal. In his opinion granting summary judgment in this action, the trial judge referred to his previous opinion.


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