WILLIAM R. GEIGER v. NEW JERSEY PAROLE BOARD

Annotate this Case

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

WILLIAM R. GEIGER,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

___________________________________

April 20, 2015

 

Submitted February 11, 2015 - Decided

Before Judges Waugh and Maven.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

William R. Geiger, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner William R. Geiger appeals the final administrative action of the New Jersey Parole Board (Board) denying his application for parole. We vacate the Board's decision and remand for reconsideration.

I.

We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal and prior opinions involving Geiger.

Geiger is currently an inmate at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton. He is serving a term of life in prison for the murder of his wife, as well as a concurrent five- to seven-year term for unlawful possession of a weapon.

Geiger's wife filed for divorce during August 1976, three years after they were married. After she moved into her parents' home, Geiger began to harass, stalk, and threaten her and her mother. Also in August, Geiger cornered his wife in her employer's parking lot as she was leaving work. He placed a gun to her head and threatened to shoot her and then kill himself. He was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, threat to take a life, and possession of a revolver.1

Because the harassing and stalking behavior became very intense, the wife's employer gave her a special place to park at work, and she changed her telephone number. On December 25, 1976, Geiger followed his wife, her mother, and her grandmother to Midnight Mass. He had spent that day drinking heavily, but later claimed he was not intoxicated at the time. Unable to speak with his wife after Mass, Geiger followed her and her family to their home. Once there, she and her grandmother noticed her husband's presence. While the mother got out of the car and ran into their house, Geiger's wife and her grandmother remained in the car. He went into the garage, entered the car where his wife was sitting, fired five shots at her, reloaded his gun, and then fired two more rounds. She died almost instantly.

Geiger claimed that he killed his wife while he was in a "disassociated state." He also asserted that he "lost control" when her father took a swing at him with a broom or hoe when Geiger tried to enter the garage.

The police responded to the scene, and observed Geiger walking across the lawn from the garage area with his hands on top of his head. He dropped the revolver when the police ordered him to do so. Geiger was arrested, made bail, and two days later absconded. He was arrested again on June 29, 1977, in Florida and returned to New Jersey to stand trial.

Geiger was found guilty of murder and unlawful possession of a revolver. He was sentenced on December 9, 1977, at which time he was thirty years old. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, and certification was denied by the Supreme Court. State v. Geiger, No. A-1879-77 (App. Div. Apr. 22, 1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 113 (1980) (Geiger I).

Geiger has been considered for parole on six prior occasions: 1991, 1996, 2003-04, 2006, 2008, and 2011. The future eligibility terms (FETs) established after parole was denied the first five times were: ten years in 1991; twelve years in 1996; five years in 2003-04; five years in 2006; five years in 2008; and three years in 2011.

Geiger appealed the 1996 denial of parole and the twelve-year FET. Geiger v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-0483-99 (Mar. 21, 2001), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 606 (2001) (Geiger II). Initially, we remanded for reconsideration in light of Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 154 N.J. 19 (1998) (Trantino IV),2 "which set forth the test for parole fitness on Title 2A offenders as to whether there was a 'substantial likelihood the inmate will commit a crime if released on parole.'" Geiger II, supra, slip op. at 1-2. We noted that Trantino IV

clarified that rehabilitation was relevant "only as it bears on the likelihood that the inmate will not again resort to crime" and that it "need not be total or full or real rehabilitation in any sense other than there is no likelihood of criminal recidivism." [Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J.] at 31; see also [(Trantino VI), supra, 166 N.J. at 197].

In its initial decision the Parole Board found there was a "substantial likelihood" that Geiger would commit a crime if in fact released on parole based on the horrendous nature of the offense, the failure of the defendant to acknowledge his gambling problems, his projection of responsibility for his wife's death on her family, and his reluctance to participate in a halfway house program and in the annual review process. Following our remand, the Board reiterated these findings as well as its conclusion under Trantino IV of a substantial likelihood that Geiger would commit a crime if released on parole.

[Geiger II, supra, slip op. at 2.]

We then concluded that the Board's remand decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. Ibid. As a consequence, we affirmed. Ibid.

Geiger became eligible for parole for the fifth time on August 21, 2008. By that time, he had served approximately thirty-one years and five months in prison.

On June 23, 2008, a two-member Board panel considered Geiger's case, denied parole, and referred the matter to the full Board for establishment of an FET. The full Board denied parole on August 13. Geiger sought reconsideration.

On December 17, the Board voted to impose a sixty-month FET and again denied parole. The Board determined that there was a substantial likelihood that Geiger would commit a new crime if released on parole at that time. The Board issued a written decision on January 21, 2009.

Geiger appealed the Board's final decision. Although we affirmed the denial of parole, we remanded because we were

troubled by the Board's failure to secure a report from [Geiger's] treating psychologist, William Boyd. Dooley noted [Geiger] had been in counseling for twelve years and opined that he should remain in counseling until the psychologist was confident he was ready for release. With that information in hand, it was incumbent on the Board to secure a report from Boyd to consider with the reports of the examining psychologists. Because the Board did not consider this readily available information, we remand the determination of the extended FET for reconsideration in light of a report from Boyd to be secured by the Board.

[Geiger v. N.J. Parole Bd., No. A-3358-08 (App. Div. Sept. 17, 2010) (slip op. at 17-18).]

Following the remand, Geiger was denied parole.

Geiger became eligible for parole again on December 12, 2012. Prior to that date, a hearing officer referred the matter to a two-member Board panel, which denied parole on November 20. In its checklist decision, the panel cited "insufficient Problem(s) resolution," noting that Geiger "continues to say that he has regrets about his behavior and would apologize to [his wife]'s family describing his actions as 'having mistreated his wife' and taken [a] daughter/sister away [when] instead he shot her numerous times. It still appears to be all about his needs and wants." The panel checked off boxes to indicate it relied on "panel interview" and "documents in case file." The panel noted the following mitigating factors: no prior criminal record, remained infraction free, participated in programs specific to behavior, average to above-average institutional reports, and achieved/maintained minimum custody status.

Geiger filed an administrative appeal of the panel's decision to the full Board, which was affirmed on June 19, 2013. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, Geiger raises the following arguments

THE BOARD PANEL'S DECISION TO DENY PAROLE IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS WITH FAILURE TO SUPPORT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO COMMIT ANOTHER CRIME IF RELEASED ON PAROLE

THE STATE PAROLE BOARD'S RETROSPECTIVE UTILIZATION OF 1997 AMENDED PAROLE STATUTES SUBSTANTIALLY DISADVANTAGE APPELLANT'S PAROLE RELEASE HEARINGS AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. ART. I, 10, cl.1.

Our standard of review of administrative decisions of the Parole Board is limited, and it is "grounded in strong public policy concerns and practical realities." Trantino V, supra, 166 N.J. at 200. "The decision of a parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables . . . .'" Id. at 201 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1979)). "To a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid. Consequently, we may reverse the Parole Board's decision only if it is "arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. We do not disturb the Board's factual findings if they "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 172 (quoting Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 24) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In cases such as this, where the crime for which an inmate is incarcerated took place before August 19, 1997, "the Board panel shall determine whether . . . by a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of the State of New Jersey if released on parole." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) (part of the Parole Act of 1979). Thus, when an inmate becomes eligible for parole, there is a "presumption in favor of parole," Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. at 356, and the burden is on "'the State to prove that the prisoner is a recidivist and should not be released.'" Trantino VI, supra, 166 N.J. at 197 (quoting N.J. Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 205 (1983)).

Additionally, "the punitive aspects of a sentence may no longer be considered as an independent ground for denying parole[.]" Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. at 372. Rather, the seriousness of the crime may be weighed "as an element in determining whether the offender's punishment has been adequate to insure his individual progress toward rehabilitation," insofar as it reflects on his or her likelihood to recidivate. Id. at 373-74. "[T]he Board [must] focus its attention squarely on the likelihood of recidivism." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 565 (App. Div. 2002).

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11 provides as follows

(a) Parole decisions shall be based on the aggregate of all pertinent factors, including material supplied by the inmate and reports and material which may be submitted by any persons or agencies which have knowledge of the inmate.

(b) The hearing officer, Board panel or Board shall consider the following factors and, in addition, may consider any other factors deemed relevant

1. Commission of an offense while incarcerated.

2. Commission of serious disciplinary infractions.

3. Nature and pattern of previous convictions.

4. Adjustment to previous probation, parole and incarceration.

5. Facts and circumstances of the offense.

6. Aggravating and mitigating factors surrounding the offense.

7. Pattern of less serious disciplinary infractions.

8. Participation in institutional programs which could have led to the improvement of problems diagnosed at admission or during incarceration. This includes, but is not limited to, participation in substance abuse programs, academic or vocational education programs, work assignments that provide on-the-job training and individual or group counseling.

9. Statements by institutional staff, with supporting documentation, that the inmate is likely to commit a crime if released; that the inmate has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation; or that there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole.

10. Documented pattern of relationships with institutional staff or inmates.

11. Documented changes in attitude toward self or others.

12. Documentation reflecting personal goals, personal strengths or motivation for law-abiding behavior.

13. Mental and emotional health.

14. Parole plans and the investigation thereof.

15. Status of family or marital relationships at the time of eligibility.

16. Availability of community resources or support services for inmates who have a demonstrated need for same.

17. Statements by the inmate reflecting on the likelihood that he or she will commit another crime; the failure to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation; or the reasonable expectation that he or she will violate conditions of parole.

18. History of employment, education and military service.

19. Family and marital history.

20. Statement by the court reflecting the reasons for the sentence imposed.

21. Statements or evidence presented by the appropriate prosecutor's office, the Office of the Attorney General, or any other criminal justice agency.

22. Statement or testimony of any victim or the nearest relative(s) of a murder/manslaughter victim.

23. The results of the objective risk assessment instrument.

It is clear that the Board applied the wrong standard in affirming the panel's decision that Geiger should not be paroled. As noted above, the applicable legal standard for Geiger is "whether . . . by a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of the State of New Jersey if released on parole." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a). In contrast, the Board's decision specifically referred to the language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 as it appeared after its amendment in 1997, which requires a finding that "there is a substantial likelihood that [Geiger] would violate the conditions of parole." The Board's suggestion, found in its responding brief, that its language "was a mere oversight" is not particularly convincing.3

In any event, our review of the record in light of the applicable law convinces us that, even if the Board intended to find that there is a substantial likelihood that Geiger will commit a crime if released on parole, that decision is not supported by the record before us. In addition, the panel's and the Board's reasoning for its finding are not adequately explained. The panel's decision is cursory, consisting only of a check list which makes only fleeting reference to an interview and documents in the file, without making any effort to explain their significance. Instead, it dwells on problem resolution, a catchall phrase that has no specific content, especially in the context of the law governing the Board's decision. We conclude from the panel's check list that the panel failed to "focus its attention squarely on the likelihood of recidivism," McGowan, supra, 347 N.J. Super. at 565, and instead overly focused on "the punitive aspects" of Geiger's sentence for reasons found inappropriate by the Supreme Court in Trantino II, supra, 89 N.J. at 372.

We are particularly disturbed, in light of our 2010 remand, that neither the panel nor the Board discussed or evaluated the mental health issues related to the likelihood of recidivism or "[t]he results of the objective risk assessment instrument," both of which must be considered. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(13) and (23). In fact, N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b) provides that all of the enumerated twenty-three factors "shall" be considered, along with other factors deemed relevant. While we do owe deference to an administrative agency, we do not rubber stamp its decisions. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999). A mere statement that factors were considered, without any explanation of the related facts and their import in the decision-making process, precludes us from exercising our role to ensure that the Board's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

For the reasons outlined above, we vacate the decision on appeal and remand to the Board for immediate reconsideration of its decision, to be based on the facts and the governing law, which includes, as set forth above, (1) a presumption in favor of parole and (2) the burden on the State to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime if released on parole. The Board shall issue a complete and meaningful, rather than cursory, explanation of the reasons for whatever action it takes.

Vacated and remanded.

1 The outcome of those charges is not in the record on appeal.

2 The six Trantino appeals are State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358 (1965) (Trantino I), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993, 86 S. Ct. 573, 15 L. Ed. 2d 479, reh'g denied, 383 U.S. 922, 86 S. Ct. 901, 15 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1966); In re Application of Trantino, 89 N.J. 347 (1982) (Trantino II); Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 296 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 1997) (Trantino III), aff'd in part, modified in part & remanded, 154 N.J. 19 (1998) (Trantino IV); Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 331 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2000) (Trantino V), aff'd in part, modified in part & remanded, 166 N.J. 113 (2001) (Trantino VI), modified by order, 167 N.J. 619 (2001).

3 Although the panel did check the 2A box indicating "a substantial likelihood exists" that Geiger would commit a new crime on its decision form, it did not relate its findings to the applicable standard.


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.