STACIE D. WALKER v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3941-13T1

STACIE D. WALKER,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR, and MACY'S RETAIL

HOLDING, INC. C/O TALX

UCM SERVICES, INC.

Respondents.

__________________________________

May 20, 2015

Submitted May 12, 2105 Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Hoffman.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 423,810.

Comegno Law Group, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Kyle C. Allen, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Anthony DiLello, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Macy's Retail Holding, Inc. c/o Talx UCM Services, Inc. has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Stacie D. Walker appeals from a March 21, 2014 final agency decision by the Board of Review (the "Board") concluding that Walker is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to work. We affirm.

Walker worked for Macy's as a beauty consultant. On October 24, 2012, Walker had a conference call with her superior to discuss her attendance problem. Two days later, Walker resigned for "medical reason[s]." She then filed her claim for benefits.

The Appeal Tribunal conducted a hearing and took testimony from Walker and her manager. Walker testified about her recollection of when she missed work. The manager disputed Walker's recollection and testified that, at the conclusion of the October 24, 2012 meeting, Walker was to gather her records so that her attendance status could be clarified. The manager stated that Walker never provided her with any records, but instead called her and resigned for "health issues" on October 26, 2012.

The Appeal Tribunal disbelieved Walker's testimony that Macy's fired her on October 24. She appealed to the Board, which upheld the findings and conclusions of the Appeal Tribunal.

On appeal, Walker argues that the Board's decision was arbitrary and unsupported by sufficient credible evidence. We have considered Walker's contentions and find that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief remarks.

Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)).

A person is disqualified from receiving benefits

For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment[.]

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]

An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he or she "did so with good cause attributable to work." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218; N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c). "While the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause attributable to such work" as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."

N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d) provides that "[w]hen an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, medical certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause attributable to work." Here, Walker never presented Macy's with credible documentation of a medical condition at the time of her resignation. Absent such unequivocal medical evidence, an employee's decision to terminate employment is deemed to be without good cause attributable to the work. Wojcik v. Bd. of Review, 58 N.J. 341, 344 (1971). Even so, Macy's did not fire Walker; she resigned.

Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that there is no basis to interfere with the Board's decision that Walker was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. The Board's determination was supported by substantial, credible evidence, and we find no reason to disturb it.

Affirmed.