STEPHEN AZZOLLINI v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

(NOTE: The status of this decision is .)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2644-07T32644-07T3

STEPHEN AZZOLLINI,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

_____________________________

 

Submitted May 18, 2009 - Decided:

Before Judges Carchman and Simonelli.

On appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Stephen Azzollini, pro se.

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Stephen Azzollini appeals from the November 30, 2007 final decision of respondent New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) denying him parole and establishing an eighty-four-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.

In 1978, while in New York, Azzollini murdered the wife of his childhood friend, Dennis Raso, in exchange for $1500 and a partnership in Raso's florist business in Hoboken. After the murder, Azzollini returned home to New Jersey. His wife, who was eight months pregnant at the time, observed his bloody clothes and asked what had happened. Azzollini responded that Raso had killed his wife and that he had helped Raso dispose of her body. Azzollini's wife threatened to report this to the police. After advising Raso of the threat, the two men devised a plan to murder Azzollini's wife. Azzollini established an alibi, and Raso murdered Azzollini's wife.

In 1980, a jury convicted Azzollini of aiding and abetting the murder of his wife and of aiding and abetting murder while armed. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on the aiding and abetting murder charge and to a consecutive seven-year term of imprisonment on the aiding and abetting murder while armed charge. In 1979, a New York jury convicted Azzollini of second-degree murder of Raso's wife. He was sentenced twenty-five years to life imprisonment concurrent to his New Jersey sentence.

After serving approximately twenty-seven years of his New Jersey sentence, Azzollini became eligible for parole for the second time on November 4, 2006. A hearing officer held an initial hearing on November 3, 2006, and referred the matter to a two-member Board panel pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.15(b).

On December 29, 2006, a two-member Board panel considered the case, including mitigating factors, and determined that a substantial likelihood existed that Azzollini would commit a new crime if released on parole at that time. The panel denied parole based on the following reasons: Azzollini was presently incarcerated for a multi crime conviction; he had insufficient problem resolution and lack of insight into criminal behavior; he minimized his conduct; he often changed his explanations to find an appropriate answer; he presented as remorseful but his presentation indicated more potential hostility or self-preservation; and the programs he completed appear to have made minimal impact. The panel recommended that Azzollini participate in institutional programs geared toward criminal behavior and one-to-one counseling. The panel referred the matter to a three-member panel for establishment of an FET.

On February 21, 2007, a three-member Board panel considered the case, including mitigating factors, and established a eighty-four-month FET. The panel detailed its reasons in an extensive twenty-two-page decision. Specifically, the panel found that Azzollini failed to develop adequate insight into his violent criminal personality characteristic, he continued to lack any adequate display of remorse or empathy for his wife and her family, and he continued to minimize the maladaptive behavior that he demonstrated leading up to the offenses. Azzollini appealed to the Board.

On November 30, 2007, the Board affirmed the respective panels' decisions to deny parole and to establish an eighty-four-month FET. This appeal followed. On appeal, Azzollini contends that the Board's decision was not supported by the record below, was not in compliance with due process requirements and is arbitrary and capricious.

The actions of the Board, as an administrative agency, are presumed valid and reasonable. In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994); Alevras v. Delanoy, 245 N.J. Super. 32, 35 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 330 (1991). Parole Board decisions are considered "highly 'individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (Trantino VI) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359, certif. denied, 63 N.J. 583 (1973)). Consequently, "the Board 'has broad but not unlimited discretionary powers'" in reviewing an inmate's parole record and rendering a release decision. Ibid. (quoting Monks v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 242 (1971)). See also Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1979) ("[t]he parole release decision . . . depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.").

Our review of the Board's decision is limited to determining whether its findings could reasonably have been reached on the credible evidence in the record. N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988). We will not set aside the Board's decision unless we are convinced "'that the determination below went so far wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" Ibid. (quoting 613 Corp. v. N.J. Div. of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986)).

Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that Azzollini's contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The Board's denial of parole and establishment of an eighty-four-month FET are amply supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. The FET was appropriate under the circumstances and we perceive no basis for a downward adjustment. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)1; N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(c).

Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-2644-07T3

June 4, 2009