MARTIN GREENBLATT v. ROBERT W. GLUCK

Annotate this Case

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6490-04T56490-04T5

MARTIN GREENBLATT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT W. GLUCK,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________________

 

Submitted April 3, 2006 - Decided April 24, 2006

Before Judges Parrillo, Holston, Jr. and Gilroy.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. MID-L-

2249-05.

Martin Greenblatt, appellant pro se.

Robert W. Gluck, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Martin Greenblatt, appeals from a July 25, 2005 order of the Law Division dismissing his complaint against defendant, Robert W. Gluck, with prejudice. We affirm.

This matter has a long and tortuous history dating back to 1981 when plaintiff purchased a bar from Daniel Orenberg and John Scheller (sellers) and executed a promissory note to them. Plaintiff defaulted, and ultimately, in 1983, a judgment of $736,640 was entered in favor of sellers.

Since then, plaintiff has filed a total of nine complaints, third-party complaints, or counterclaims seeking to dismiss the judgment, but none were successful. Defendant became involved, representing the sellers on plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judgment in the eighth lawsuit, this one filed in the federal district court in New Jersey. That action was dismissed, and the Third Circuit not only affirmed, but awarded defendant counsel fees for the filing of a frivolous appeal. Plaintiff then filed the ninth action in the Superior Court, Middlesex County, seeking the defunct remedy of a Writ of Corum Nobis. This lawsuit was dismissed as well, and defendant awarded counsel fees for the frivolous filing, all affirmed on appeal.

To partially satisfy the 1983 judgment, an attorney then representing the sellers placed a levy on certain jewelry in a Somerset County store, Jay's Jewelers, alleged to be owned by plaintiff. This prompted a lawsuit by Jay's Jewelers and Martha Greenblatt, plaintiff's wife, (the "levy" suit) claiming the jewelry did not belong to plaintiff, but rather to the corporation owned by Mrs. Greenblatt. Defendant represented the sellers in defense of that action, which was ultimately settled by equally dividing the jewelry between Jay's Jewelers and the sellers. Plaintiff, though not a party to the suit, acted as the designee of Martha Greenblatt to examine and divide the jewelry. A settlement agreement was executed on or about September 30, 2002.

Only one month after the executed settlement, plaintiff, who originally claimed not to have an interest in the jewelry, filed a complaint against all parties to the "levy" suit, defendant, and others, in the federal district court in New Jersey, alleging theft of jewelry (the "theft" suit). On November 25, 2002, defendant wrote a "frivolous lawsuit" letter to plaintiff on behalf of defendant's clients and himself. Plaintiff responded to this letter, which is the basis for the present action, by suing defendant in the federal district court in New Jersey for defamation and demanding $18 million in damages. The defamation action was dismissed on January 2, 2003, for want of diversity or federal question jurisdiction.

Rather than file in state court, on January 27, 2003, plaintiff filed the same defamation complaint in federal court in the Southern District of New York, alleging that he now had offices in New York and, therefore, had diversity. Plaintiff also filed a "theft" suit against all of the other parties in the same court, and voluntarily dismissed the "theft" action in the New Jersey federal district court. The New York lawsuit was dismissed on March 17, 2003, for lack of jurisdiction, the court holding that all the events complained of occurred in New Jersey and that plaintiff and defendant live in New Jersey, and ordering the transfer back to the New Jersey federal district court of plaintiff's "theft" complaint.

Prior to this dismissal, however, on February 6, 2003, defendant filed an harassment complaint against plaintiff in the New Brunswick municipal court, alleging that plaintiff's defamation complaints were filed with the purpose to harass in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. Undeterred, plaintiff amended the Southern District of New York defamation action against defendant to include abuse of process based on defendant's harassment complaint.

After dismissal of his New York federal action, plaintiff, on July 25, 2003, filed the same defamation lawsuit against defendant in New York state court. This action was dismissed on April 8, 2004, on jurisdictional grounds. Almost one year later, on March 14, 2005, plaintiff filed the same defamation action in Monmouth County, although both parties resided in Middlesex County and the cause of action originated there. On its own motion, the court transferred the matter to Middlesex County. Because defendant was given no notice, plaintiff's motion to transfer venue back to Monmouth County was granted as unopposed, but later vacated. Plaintiff re-filed his motion, this time with notice to defendant, who cross-moved for dismissal. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. On June 24, 2005, the court denied plaintiff's motion to transfer venue. On July 25, 2005, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. In a comprehensive oral opinion, the motion judge reasoned:

[T]he cause of action here is libel. And libel must be commenced within one year after the alleged publication. The letter was sent to defendant's client -- was sent to defendant's clients and plaintiffs on November 25th, 2002. The complaint here is filed March 14th, 2005. Therefore, the defamation claims are barred.

Plaintiff's other alleged cause of actions are -- are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury matters. The basis for plaintiff's abuse of process, right to privacy action occurred with the filing of the harassment complaint by the defendant on February 6th, 2003. Thus, these cases are also time barred.

Now, both parties note -- in fact, Mr. Greenblatt in his opposition note there may be some debate in some cases where other actions are pending where the statute of limitation is tolled. And the question is an equitable . . . one.

As described . . . in Galigan vs. Westfield Center Services, Inc., 82 N.J. 188. A just accommodation of individual justice and public policy requires that in each case the . . . equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed.

Here, however, I'm going to find that the equities do not favor Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Greenblatt had a history of litigating the same matter.

. . . .

So, in essence, Mr. Greenblatt, by going through all the other jurisdictions, really was attempting -- in this Court's opinion -- to avoid Middlesex County, which is, in fact, where the matter should have been tried. And there wasn't anything in

. . . this Court finds, his decision to do it that way. And there is no reason why I should consider it equitable to allow him to again file this complaint in Middlesex County.

The Court is of the opinion that a person who chooses to file randomly in various jurisdictions -- and this Court is of the opinion that perhaps he was doing it in order to harass -- in fact, that ties in to my other reasoning -- he was doing it in order to harass the defendant. Certainly -- should not benefit by the fact that he, himself, chose these various jurisdictions when there was absolutely no reason why the matter should not and could not have been filed in Middlesex County.

. . . .

So, in essence, Mr. Greenblatt, through filing the same complaint in various different jurisdictions has -- has allowed the statute of limitations to run. And, therefore, his matter should be dealt with accordingly.

Now, the other issue whether or not the -- defendant's letter to plaintiff alleging frivolous lawsuit was ever libelous or actionable -- the Court has decided that, based on the tenor of the letter, . . . it was a letter addressed during litigation, which is privileged. And, therefore, that may be a second reason why this matter should not go forward.

Now, as to the harassment complaint. This Court also finds that the harassment

. . . is governed by the statute of limitations.

But in addition to that, the elements of abuse of process are first an ulterior purpose. Second, a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. This is . . . cited from Prosser's Law of Torts. Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to establish these elements in support of their abusive process claim.

As argued by Mr. Gluck, the result should be the same here in as much as the process was proper. Any claim of invasion of a right of privacy or violation in 1983 would also fall short on its face, the complaint does not allege wrong doings on the part of the plaintiff.

The fact of it is is that Mr. Greenblatt does not, in this Court's opinion, cite sufficient reasons why I should allow this aspect of the complaint to go forward either.

. . . .

The fact of the matter is I have an individual who is attempting -- and I will place this on the record -- to use the court system to constantly harass people in terms of -- in terms of litigation.

On appeal, plaintiff pro se raises the following issues for our consideration:

I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BY JUDICIAL FIAT, BEFORE IT RULED ON THE CHANGE OF VENUE OVERSTEPPED THE PROPER BOUNDS OF ITS AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.

II. THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT VIOLATED PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SUPPORT ITS BASIS FOR ITS RELIANCE ON RULE 4:6-4(b)(1) REGARDING THE COMPLAINT BEING IMPERTINENT.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

V. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO HONOR THE ORDER OF JUDGE HAPPAS WHICH CLEARLY STATED PLAINTIFF MAY REFILE HIS MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE INDICATING AFTER DEFENDANT WAS NOTICED OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT WAS NOTICED AND FILED HIS OPPOSITION BUT FAILED TO SUPPORT IT WITH CASE LAW.

VI. FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ADHERE TO RULE 1:6-2 "THE FORM OF ORDER SHALL NOTE WHETHER THE MOTION WAS OPPOSED OR UNOPPOSED".

VII. THE COURT FAILED TO ABIDE BY CANON 2A OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, A JUDGE SHOULD RESPECT AND COMPLY WITH THE LAW AND SHOULD ACT AT ALL TIMES IN A MANNER THAT PROMOTES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY.

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BEFORE IT RULED ON THE REHEARING OF THE MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE, AS THE LAW SUSPENDS THE POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ACT UPON ANY OTHER QUESTION UNTIL THE MOTION HAS BEEN DETERMINED.

IX. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH RULE 4:42-1(6).

X. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS REGARDING CHOICE OF VENUE.

XI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH RULE 1:7-4.

XII. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED, IN PLAINTIFFS OPPOSTIION TO THE MOTION, TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

XIII. THE TRIAL ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY MISAPPLYING THE TERM IMPERTINENT IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.

In a supplemental reply brief, plaintiff raises these additional issues:

I. THE COURT ERRED IN KEEPING THE MATTER IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY.

II. THE COURT'S RULING CONFLICTS WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE.

III. THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON GALLIGAN VS WESTFIELD SERVICE, IS MISPLACED AND ERRONEOUS.

We have considered each of these issues in light of the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of counsel and plaintiff pro se, and we are satisfied that none of them is of sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Stroumtsos, Jr., in his comprehensive and well-reasoned oral opinions of June 24, 2005, and July 25, 2005.

Affirmed.

 

The municipal court matter was transferred from New Brunswick to Highland Park because defendant served as the Public Defender in New Brunswick. Eventually, the Highland Park municipal court dismissed defendant's complaint, holding that the matter should have been brought in the Law Division.

(continued)

(continued)

10

A-6490-04T5

April 24, 2006

 


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