MARESCO INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. TIC ENTERPRISES

Annotate this Case

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4967-04T34967-04T3

MARESCO INTERNATIONAL CORP.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TIC ENTERPRISES,

Defendant,

and

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted December 20, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Coburn and Lisa.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, L-38-02.

Lindabury, McCormick & Estabrook, attorneys for appellant (Eric B. Levine, on the brief).

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, attorneys for respondent (Paul R. Rizzo, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Lucent Technologies, Inc. (Lucent), appeals from an unfavorable jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Maresco International Corp. (Maresco), on plaintiff's breach of contract claim. The claim arose out of the sale and lease of certain telecommunications equipment by Lucent to Maresco. On appeal, Lucent argues that the trial judge erred by denying its motions for involuntary dismissal and judgment notwithstanding the verdict because plaintiff failed to prove that Lucent breached any contract between the parties or that, if there was a breach, plaintiff failed to prove that the breach caused its damages. From our careful review of the record, we are satisfied that Lucent's arguments on appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and we affirm. We offer these brief comments.

After maintaining a business operation based in New Jersey for a number of years, Maresco expanded its operation by opening another office in Florida. Maresco determined that it would be beneficial and cost effective to link the two offices by telecommunications equipment so the offices could have a single telephone number, a single receptionist, and unlimited communication between the two offices without incurring long distance charges. Lucent's representative represented to Maresco that it could produce such a system and indeed had installed such systems around the country. The system would require the purchase and lease of extensive items of equipment to be installed in the New Jersey and Florida offices. It was represented that the equipment would provide the desired service over existing telephone lines between New Jersey and Florida.

Lucent determined the specific equipment required. The parties entered into two Business Product Purchase Agreements and several Lease Agreements, designating the specific items of equipment and corresponding charges for each. Lucent installed the system which it had designed and specified. The system did not function properly. Communications were often garbled, voice mail did not pick up, conversations were often "dropped," and difficulties were encountered communicating between the two offices. Lucent made many attempts to correct the problems, including the substitution of different equipment. The problems were not corrected and Maresco abandoned the system.

Maresco sued Lucent, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty and fraud. The latter two claims were dismissed, and the case was submitted to the jury only on the breach of contract claim. Although Lucent denied that it breached any contract, the parties stipulated that if Lucent was liable Maresco's damages were $110,000 for the amounts it paid or was obligated to pay for the purchase and lease of equipment. The jury was informed of the stipulated damage amount and was asked to determine the scope of the contract between the parties and whether Lucent breached the contract and caused Maresco's damage.

Lucent's contention was that the transaction involved a mere sale and lease of certain equipment and the burden was on Maresco to prove by competent evidence that the equipment was defective. Because Maresco did not present expert testimony or other evidence to establish that the equipment malfunctioned, Lucent contended that Maresco failed to prove any breach of contract or causative damage.

Maresco contended that the scope of the contract between the parties involved much more than the sale and lease of equipment. Lucent, with its expertise in communications equipment and systems, designed and specified a system to meet the expressed needs of Maresco. Based upon verbal representations, the course of dealing, written documentation, Lucent's expertise, and Maresco's reliance on that expertise, Lucent's contractual obligation was to provide Maresco with a telecommunications system which would perform in the manner desired by Maresco and represented by Lucent. Maresco performed its obligations by entering into the lease and purchase agreements, providing availability to Lucent to install the equipment, and making required payments. Lucent breached the agreement because it failed to deliver what it promised.

Lucent attempted to present evidence that the telephone lines between the two offices might be the source of the problem. It did not provide those lines and disclaimed responsibility for them. Maresco contended that the telephone lines functioned properly with equipment it utilized before and after the use of the Lucent-provided system. Further, Lucent was the expert in telecommunications equipment and it represented that the system it designed and sold to Maresco would function utilizing those lines. All of this information was before the jury.

By its verdict, the jury obviously accepted Maresco's version of the scope of the contract between the parties and that Lucent breached the contract, causing Maresco's loss. Lucent moved at the end of plaintiff's case for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) and after the jury verdict for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 4:40-2(b). With respect to both motions, the issue for the trial judge and the appellate court is the same, namely whether the evidence, together with legitimate inferences that can be drawn from it, could sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party. Thus, accepting as true all evidence supporting the non-moving party and according that party the benefit of all favorable inferences, if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied. Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969).

 
Viewing the evidence most favorably to Maresco, it is plain to us that the evidence supported a finding that the scope of the contract included the service provided by Lucent in designing, specifying and installing a system in addition to selling and leasing equipment, that the system failed to function as represented by Lucent, and that the failure was material and caused Maresco's damage. The trial judge did not err in denying Lucent's motions.

Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

6

A-4967-04T3

 

January 6, 2006


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.