IN THE MATTER OF ARTELLA RICHARDSON, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. v.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4555-04T3

IN THE MATTER OF

ARTELLA RICHARDSON,

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

_____________________

 

Submitted June 6, 2006 - Decided June 22, 2006

Before Judges Coburn and S.L. Reisner.

On appeal from the Final Administrative Decision of the Merit System Board, Department of Personnel, Docket No. 2004-1368.

Chance & McCann attorneys for appellant (Shirley A. Naylor, on the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Betty M. Ng, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Artella Richardson, an Assistant Supervisor of Recreation at South Woods State Prison, was terminated by the Department of Corrections (DOC) for conduct unbecoming a public employee. She appeals from a final determination of the Merit System Board upholding her termination. We affirm.

Richardson was a civilian employee of the Prison. From 1999 to 2003, inmate K.G., who was serving a sentence for insurance fraud, acted as her assistant. There is no dispute that on numerous occasions, Richardson discussed her personal life with K.G. and did favors for him. Most significantly, in 2002, at his request she obtained a brochure listing prices for aircraft rental time, and gave the brochure directly to K.G. She told an employee of the airplane rental firm that "she was calling on behalf of a criminal in a jail, and would pass on the information to him. She also told [the employee] that this individual was buying property in Hawaii and [Colombia]."

Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge found:

[Richardson] was working in a small office on an almost daily basis with inmate K.G. During that time, she shared personal information with the inmate, and placed a telephone call to Marquis Jet Partners to order a brochure for him. When the brochure came to her house, she brought it to the facility, and gave it directly to the inmate without checking with the facility. This conduct is in clear violation of [policies] "K" and "N" of the employee handbook.

There is no dispute that all of these actions were in violation of prison rules prohibiting employees from giving inmates or receiving from them "anything in the nature of a gift or promise of a gift or favor, however trivial." The rules also prohibit employees from conveying "to or from any inmate . . . any message, written or oral, or any article except such as is necessary and authorized by the Department/institution for the transaction of business of the Department/institution." Further, by communicating personal information to K.G., Richardson violated the institutional policy against undue familiarity with inmates. As explained by a DOC witness, the rule is intended to prevent inmates from manipulating employees:

Q. And so inmates do that - use civilian employees?

A. Every chance they get.

Richardson's defense was that she was suffering from psychological problems brought on when her husband developed cancer. He died of his illness in 2003.

The ALJ concluded that the prison had "clearly proven that the appellant has engaged in conduct unbecoming an employee, as well as engaging in improper or unauthorized conduct with inmates." But in light of her otherwise unblemished five-year employment record, her status as a civilian employee not responsible for maintaining prison security, and her personal difficulties, he recommended a six-month suspension in lieu of termination.

The Merit System Board accepted the ALJ's findings of fact but rejected his conclusion that Richardson should be suspended for six months instead of being terminated. The Board gave "significant weight" to the judgment of the DOC concerning the seriousness of the incident. The Board also concluded that

[A]ppellant's status as a civilian employee is not a mitigating factor, since all employees of correctional facilities are responsible, to some degree, for maintaining security and discipline in the facility. The appellant's conduct constituted a serious breach of rules and regulations and had the potential to subvert prison security and discipline. In particular, the fact that the appellant delivered items directly to an inmate, without the knowledge of prison officials, created a threat to the facility's security. Moreover, the extent and nature of the contact between the appellant and K.G. must be emphasized. In this regard, the appellant engaged in almost daily conversations with K.G. which disclosed extremely personal information regarding her family life and the emotional turbulence she was experiencing. The appellant's act of confiding such detailed information to K.G is especially dangerous and egregious in the environment of a correctional facility.

The Board agreed with the DOC that "appellant's conduct posed a serious threat to the safety and security of the facility," justifying her termination.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Board's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), and we affirm. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). We add the following comments.

We sympathize with Richardson's difficult personal situation. But we also appreciate the DOC's overriding concern with maintaining security. While civilian employees are not responsible for maintaining security in the same way that corrections officers are, they have an equal obligation not to contribute to breaches of security. The DOC could reasonably conclude that an employee who engaged in the types of security violations that Richardson committed should not be working in a prison.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-4555-04T3

June 22, 2006

 


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