STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MICHAEL BEAULEAUX

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3425-04T43425-04T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL BEAULEAUX,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

 

Submitted March 1, 2006 - Decided May 1, 2006

Before Judges Parker and Grall.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,

Indictment No. 96-08-1631.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellant (Thomas Menchin,

Designated Counsel, of counsel and on

the brief).

Jeffrey S. Blitz, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent

(Jack J. Lipari, Assistant County

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Michael Beauleaux appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm that decision substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Neustadter in his decision of December 14, 2004.

Defendant was indicted for murder and tried to a jury that convicted him of the charge. He was sentenced to a term of life, thirty years to be served without possibility of parole. The judgment of conviction was entered on June 25, 1998. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Beauleaux, No. A-342-98 (App. Div. Nov. 21, 2000) (slip op. at 33). On July 19, 2001, the Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification and summarily remanded for reconsideration of the trial judge's denial of a request to excuse a juror in light of the Court's then recent decision in State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551 (2001). State v. Beauleaux, 169 N.J. 602 (2001). This court again affirmed the conviction, State v. Beauleaux, No. A-342-98 (App. Div. Oct. 2, 2001) (slip op. at 3), and the Supreme Court denied defendant's subsequent petition for certification. State v. Beauleaux, 171 N.J. 337 (2002).

On April 29, 2002, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se. On May 6, 2004, assigned counsel filed a petition on his behalf. Judge Neustadter heard the petition on October 19, 2004, and filed a decision and order denying the petition on January 6, 2005. On January 12, 2005, on application by defendant's attorney, the judge issued an order reconsidering that portion of his decision that held that defendant's petition was barred as filed beyond the period authorized by R. 3:22-12. Because the decision addressed the merits of issue, the judge continued the balance of the decision and order. This appeal followed.

On appeal defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective. He contends that his trial attorney provided inadequate and conflicting evidence to support his claim that his confession was unreliable and his claim that he did not act purposely or knowingly, as required for conviction of murder, because of mental illness or intoxication. He also contends that trial counsel advised him to stand trial rather than accept a plea agreement offered by the State, which would have limited his sentence to a term no greater than thirty years, fifteen without possibility of parole.

We see no legal error in the judge's conclusion that defendant failed to establish the elements that were essential to his claim -- deficient performance by either attorney and a reasonable probability that the outcome at trial would have been different but for unprofessional error. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463-64 (1992) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984)); State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.) (discussing failure to present testimony), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999).

The evidence relevant to the issues on appeal follows. On January 3, 1996, Marie Goldberg, seventy-six years of age, was working in Mermaid Fashions, a souvenir shop on the boardwalk in Atlantic City. Beauleaux, supra, Nov. 21, 2000 slip op. at 2. Between 11:30 a.m. and noon, she called the owner and told him that "there was a kook in the lobby." Ibid. Goldberg described the man as a "big guy" wearing a red jacket and acting strange. Ibid. She told him that the man was walking toward Pier 21, where he was working. The owner took the cordless phone outside and saw a man who fit the description. Ibid. He interrupted his conversation with Goldberg to take another call. Ibid. When he called back, Goldberg told him that everything was alright and that she had not seen the man again. Id. at 3. At approximately 12:30, a couple who entered the shop found Marie Goldberg. Ibid. She was bleeding from her eyes and ears and had blood all over her hands and head. Ibid. Her face was swollen and she had a cut on the back of her head. Id. at 4. She was able to describe her assailant as a big white male wearing a red jacket or hat. Goldberg explained that she had been kicked and hit and had fallen or had her head slammed against the radiator. Goldberg died forty-five days later. The cause of her death was "orbital skull fractures due to blunt trauma to the head." Id. at 5.

"Three months after Goldberg's death, defendant [who was then living in Maryland in a Rescue Mission that provided treatment for substance abuse] called the Maryland State Police 'to report a possible murder which had occurred in Atlantic City.'" Id. at 5. Although defendant initially described himself as a witness and gave the perpetrator's name, he subsequently confessed and made a formal statement that was taped. Id. at 11. He explained that Goldberg called him a "bum," told him not to touch anything in the store and pushed him. Id. at 10. Subsequently, defendant confided in another inmate, whom he had known for many years. He described the crime and his reasons for selecting the person he initially identified as the perpetrator. Id. at 11.

The expert testimony about defendant's mental state at the time of the crime and his confession was as follows:

Defendant . . . offered the expert testimony of Dr. Matthew B. Johnson, a defense psychologist. Dr. Johnson evaluated defendant and testified that defendant had "a total of eight psychiatric admissions to inpatient hospitals," including several "involuntary commitments." According to the doctor's review of defendant's history, defendant had been hospitalized on three separate occasions since 1981 as a result of various interactions he had with law enforcement officials. In the aggregate, defendant only spent about four months in these hospitals during the seven periods of hospitalization prior to his stay at the State Forensic Hospital in Trenton. Defendant previously had been diagnosed as suffering from bipolar disorder, more commonly known as manic depressive disorder, but was more recently diagnosed as suffering from schizoaffective disorder during a six-week stay at the State Forensic Hospital in the summer of 1996, after his arrest. Results from testing performed at the State Forensic Hospital indicated that defendant possessed "serious symptoms of impairment."

Dr. Johnson testified with regard to defendant's account of the police interview of May 16, 1996, at which time defendant's statement was taken and tape recorded. Defendant told Dr. Johnson that he was aware that Goldberg had been assaulted. Defendant also told the doctor that the detectives said they had a videotape of him assaulting Goldberg and "promised him that they would take him to get psychiatric care if he cooperated with them."

Based on the detectives' interrogation techniques as conveyed by defendant, Dr. Johnson opined that "[t]he voluntary nature and characteristic of [defendant's] statement was undermined." In other words, the doctor concluded that defendant "was more likely to tell the police a statement that they wanted to hear because he thought that they would be willing to get him psychiatric treatment." However, the doctor could not form an opinion as to the reliability of defendant's statement because the detectives' May 16, 1996, interview was not completely recorded.

Defendant also offered the expert testimony of Dr. Robert Sadoff, a psychiatrist, who had also conducted an examination of him on August 2, 1999. Among the several reasons Dr. Sadoff was asked to examine defendant was to determine whether defendant was competent to give the detectives his statement in l996 and evaluate defendant's "state of mind at the time of the alleged offense." As to the voluntariness of defendant's statement to the detectives, Dr. Sadoff opined that "he had that capacity to give a voluntary statement at the time." As to defendant's state of mind at the time of the assault, Dr. Sadoff testified that defendant "was still suffering from his mental illness."

Based on the information Dr. Sadoff reviewed and his evaluation of defendant, it appeared to him "that at the time this [assault] occurred that [defendant] was acting out of his mental illness . . . in an impulsive manner, retaliating for an insult when the victim had called him a name that he could not tolerate and just acted out." The doctor did not believe that defendant "acted in an intentional manner . . . [or] with the purpose of killing her." It was the doctor's opinion that defendant acted impulsively in reaction to an insult.

However, he agreed that defendant had "the ability to know that he was inflicting serious bodily injury on the victim at the time" of the assault. Dr. Sadoff was unsure whether defendant formed the purpose to inflict serious bodily injury, but stated: "[H]e had the capacity to do so and based on what I read it seems that he did." Finally, as to defendant's drinking in addition to the medication he was taking, Dr. Sadoff agreed that nothing in his review indicated that defendant's "faculties were prostrated."

In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Daniel Paul Greenfield, a psychiatrist with a sub-specialization in addiction medicine, as an expert witness. Dr. Greenfield interviewed defendant on two occasions for a total of eight to nine hours, and conducted several tests as well. Based upon his review of discovery materials, transcripts of motion hearings, and the tape-recorded statement, Dr. Greenfield concluded that defendant "was able to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights." Having listened to the taped statement, the doctor believed defendant answered the detectives' questions logically and clearly, and stated that defendant "did not seem to be unusually fatigued." Dr. Greenfield shared Dr. Sadoff's opinion that defendant's faculties were not prostrated at the time of the offense as a result of his drinking.

As to defendant's state of mind on January 3, 1996, Dr. Greenfield opined that, although defendant was mentally ill, "he was able to engage in purposeful knowing behavior . . . with an awareness of the consequences of what he had done." The doctor stated further that defendant "was able to form the purpose in effect to punish Ms. Goldberg because she had offended him in his mind and he acted . . . with the intention of committing serious bodily injury on her."

Based on Dr. Greenfield's analysis of defendant's conduct as he portrayed it to the detectives, he identified twelve "separate and reasonable distinct behaviors" from the point in time in which defendant beat his victim, to the point in time that defendant gave his statement to the officers. For example, when the victim insulted him, defendant was aware of an encounter. His recollection of beating the victim was indicative "that he acted in a way to physically punish the woman because of the insult." Washing his hands following the assault indicated that he was aware "of what he had just done[,] . . . that he might be in trouble," and basically acted to cover-up his behavior, which "certainly reflected his awareness of the immediate past situation he was in, the present situation he was in and his future desire to avoid getting into trouble." In Dr. Greenfield's opinion, these twelve behaviors represented purposeful, logical, sequential, and goal-directed conduct that displayed defendant's capacity to undertake purposeful and knowing actions.

[Nov. 21, 2000 slip op. at 11-16 (footnote omitted).]

The argument presented to the trial judge on PCR and this court is that counsel erred by allowing Dr. Sadoff to testify because his testimony conflicted with Dr. Johnson's testimony about the reliability of defendant's confession and was ambivalent and confused on the question of defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. While Dr. Sadoff's testimony was not altogether helpful to the defense and the prosecutor made use of that testimony in closing argument, we fail to see how the presentation of that testimony could have harmed the defense. We find no basis for concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome at trial would have been different if the testimony had not been presented. See Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463-64. As Judge Neustadter noted, the evidence presented at trial was adequate to raise the issue and require an instruction on mental illness relevant to the elements of murder. Following his confessions, defendant's options were limited.

Judge Neustadter noted that the alternative defense of alibi was of limited utility under the circumstances. The potential alibi evidence was that members of defendant's family would have testified that he wore blue and not red clothing on the date of the crime, and that he did not exhibit any signs of having been in a struggle. Given the age of the victim and the injuries she sustained, testimony about defendant's lack of injuries had no apparent exculpatory value.

Defendant also contends that he rejected the State's plea offer because his trial attorney boasted that he would "beat the charges." On two occasions defendant rejected offers to plead guilty. In the first instance, the State, in return for a plea of guilty to murder, offered to recommend a term of thirty years with no possibility of parole. The second offer was put on the record at the request of defense counsel prior to jury selection. Counsel said:

I don't know whether I placed on the record before, but the record should reflect, Your Honor, that [the] Prosecutor has made a new plea offer in this case sometime I believe last week, that . . . they were willing to downgrade the murder charge to aggravated manslaughter and leave the sentence in the discretion of the court although they would argue for the maximum thirty year sentence with a [fifteen] year parole disqualifier. I've had a chance to discuss that plea offer with Mr. Beauleaux and I understand that he wishes to reject that plea offer and proceed to trial. Is that right, Mr Beauleaux?

Defendant responded, "Yes." Earlier during the same pre-trial conference, defendant had taken an active role. He asked to approach the bench and submit voir dire questions and a witness list. Even on the cold record it is apparent that defendant was involved in trial preparation, and that he was informed about the difference between the parole ineligibility term he received and the lesser term he could receive if he accepted the plea.

Judge Neustadter, who presided at the trial, assumed for the purposes of the PCR motion that defense counsel had advised defendant that he could win the case. See Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462-63. He concluded: "In this case there was certainly enough evidence to lead a reasonable attorney to believe that he could win this case." This finding is supported by the record, and we defer to this assessment of the evidence by the judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and develop a "feel" for the strength of the case presented. Cf. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964) (discussing "deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case," in stating the standard of review for factual findings of a judge sitting as finder-of-fact).

Affirmed.

 

Although the point heading in defendant's brief also indicates an argument based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the brief includes no argument on that point. On appeal defendant has not raised other issues that he raised below.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-3425-04T4

May 1, 2006