NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.C.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3254-05T43254-05T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.C.,

Defendant-Appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF F.D.C. and E.D.C.,

Minors.

__________________________________________

 

Submitted October 25, 2006 - Decided October 27, 2006

Before Judges Wefing, Parker and C.S. Fisher.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-244-05.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Bernado W. Henry, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mary Pat Baxter, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors F.D.C. and E.D.C. (Christopher A. Huling, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a trial, defendant J.C.'s parental rights to two of her children -- F.D.C., who was born on November 27, 1999, and E.D.C., who was born on November 13, 2001 -- were terminated. Defendant appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support that determination. We affirm.

Judge R. Benjamin Cohen presided over a non-jury trial in this matter on November 28 and 29, 2005, and set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law in a comprehensive and thoughtful oral decision rendered on December 21, 2005.

Judge Cohen observed that defendant had a long history with the Division of Youth and Family Services (Division) by the time this action was commenced. By the time of trial, defendant had given birth to nine children, none of whom were then, or now, in her custody.

In his findings, Judge Cohen noted that defendant's history with the Division began when she was the subject of abuse and neglect. In 1993, at the age of thirteen, defendant was hospitalized for approximately one month as a result of having taken an overdose of drugs. She attended counseling because of depression and suicidal ideation. A year later, defendant was hospitalized for a three-week period; when discharged, she was prescribed psychotropic medication. In November 1994, defendant gave birth to her first child, B.D. The record reflects that her relationship with the father of B.D. was abusive.

In October 2000, the Division received a referral regarding defendant. By this time, defendant's second child, F.D.C., was eleven-months old and the twins, J.D. and J.D., were approximately one-month old. The referral asserted that defendant was not complying with Division services regarding housing for the children. She and V.D., the father of F.D.C. and E.D.C., had refused to accept the Division's offer of shelter in the YMCA following their eviction from their apartment for failure to pay rent. As a result, F.D.C. was placed with a maternal aunt, and the twins were placed in foster care; the twins were medically fragile and, in January 2001, were placed by the Division with St. Clare's Home for Children in Elizabeth.

Defendant underwent a psychological evaluation in March 2001. In his report, Dr. Andrew P. Brown indicated that defendant left school during the eleventh grade and thereafter had a sporadic employment history. At the time of his evaluation, defendant was unemployed. Dr. Brown determined from a series of tests that defendant "presented with rather subtle indices of an antisocial personality, appeared to have a history of being unreliable and irresponsible and appeared to blame others for her own mistakes." He recommended that defendant enroll in parenting skills classes, and pursue a G.E.D. or job skill training in a chosen area. Dr. Brown opined that the children should remain in foster care until defendant demonstrated satisfactory compliance with his recommendations.

The Division received another referral in November 2001. The referral indicated that defendant was again pregnant but was not receiving prenatal care.

Another referral was received a few weeks later. By this time defendant had given birth to E.D.C. The hospital placed a hold on E.D.C.'s release pending an investigation into a suitable placement for the child with a family friend. The record is not clear as to what thereafter occurred, but the Division's records indicated that E.D.C. was released to defendant in December 2001, with a further indication that the Division would provide a parental aide to assist defendant.

In April 2002, Dr. Leslie Williams conducted a bonding evaluation regarding the twins and determined there was then no bond between defendant and the twins. He found defendant to be "passive and ineffectual, demonstrating inadequate parenting skill." He further observed that defendant "probably functions in the borderline range of intelligence," that defendant "would have difficulty caring for more than one child let alone a child with developmental or behavioral problems," and, in the final analysis, he concluded that he did not believe defendant would ever be able to raise the twins.

Judge Cohen also referred in his findings to a Division caseworker's description of what occurred when she brought defendant to a psychologist's office on May 16, 2002. The Division worker advised that when defendant was waiting in the psychologist's office with V.D., and also with the then two-year old F.D.C., that F.D.C. became unruly and, after telling the child to stop, defendant began yelling at F.D.C. and then spanked her. The child continued to be disruptive and ultimately defendant refused to be evaluated by the psychologist. On the way home, defendant said to V.D. that she could not handle F.D.C. The caseworker expressed her concern about defendant's low tolerance, uncontrollable anger and lack of parenting skill, and further expressed a fear that defendant could, as a result, harm one of her children.

The Division received another referral which indicated that on May 21, 2002 defendant was "disciplining" F.D.C. in the street in such a manner as to warrant a neighbor to call the police.

Judge Cohen also referred to the views of Dr. Frank J. Dyer, who opined in his June 17, 2002 report that defendant had refused to participate in the evaluation scheduled the same day that defendant disciplined F.D.C. in the waiting room, which we mentioned earlier. Dr. Dyer observed in his report that defendant was "extremely upset" and refused to complete the examination, stating to V.D. and in front of the child for him to "come the fuck on . . . I ain't taking it." Dr. Dyer drew a negative inference from defendant's refusal to participate in the evaluation. He also mentioned that during J.D.'s visit to her home defendant had been so overwhelmed by the presence of three of her young children that she contacted the Division for assistance. Based upon his observations, and expressed to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, Dr. Dyer concluded that because of defendant's "attitudinal problems" she would pose "a significant risk to a medically fragile child in her care."

Dr. Dyer was later able to complete a psychological evaluation of defendant. His September 3, 2002 report provided defendant's explanation for being overwhelmed and for seeking the Division's assistance when three of her children were in her home at the same time. He observed that defendant said that her daughter "has issues," is hyperactive and tried to beat up J.D. With E.D.C. also in her care, defendant explained that she had become overwhelmed. She also complained that the home aide provided by the Division had left early, "which she wasn't supposed to do," and that she called the caseworker to pick up J.D. because V.D. had not come home and F.D.C. was acting out.

Dr. Dyer concluded that defendant was "currently psychologically stable" but was "entrenched in a rigid position of denial" in regard to "any and all problems" even those that were well-documented in the Division's records. Dr. Dyer administered the MCMI-3 test and concluded that defendant responded to the questions in such a defensive manner as to render the test record un-interpretable. He also administered the House-Tree-Person test; defendant's responses were "strongly suggestive" of a degree of "personal immaturity" that causes defendant to function "sometimes at the level of an adolescent and sometimes at a less mature level and to rely excessively on a crude denial system to filter out unpleasant or inconvenient aspects of reality." He concluded that defendant was "an extremely defensive and guarded young woman who appears psychologically stable at the present time" but that questions remained about her having "serious personality pathology." He also observed that defendant is "rather insensitive to the needs of the children" and again referred to defendant's crude denial system which she used "to filter out negative or inconvenient aspects of reality"; this, Dr. Dyer predicted, suggested the likelihood of "future adjustment problems." He also expressed concerns about defendant's "attitude of approval" toward V.D.'s drug use; she expressed an ambivalence in that regard "so long as he doesn't do it around me and the children." Dr. Dyer concluded that this psychological profile was negative and that although defendant, in his view, did not appear to pose an imminent danger to the two children currently in her custody, that she did seem "taxed to the limits of her coping resources by that responsibility." He also labeled as "dubious" defendant's capacity to provide consistent nurturing, structure, stimulation and physical protection for the twins, and concluded that defendant could not be considered as a viable candidate for custody of either or both twins.

On November 21, 2002, the Division received another referral, which indicated that F.D.C. had arrived at school a few days earlier with bruises and marks on her face and chest. No abuse was substantiated at that time.

On March 11, 2003 another referral asserted that defendant put clothing in a light fixture, causing a fire in her apartment. No abuse or neglect was substantiated at that time as well.

However, on August 4, 2003, a referral was received from the Essex County Sheriff's Department. A sheriff's officer had observed defendant, on July 31, 2003, roughly handling S.D., who was then eight months old. The officer also witnessed defendant "smacking" F.D.C. and E.D.C. on the head and repeatedly knocking them to the ground. According to Judge Cohen's findings, defendant admitted the incident but asserted that she had become overwhelmed. The Division, in conducting a Dodd removal, found the children to be unclean, disheveled and hungry. The children smelled bad, requiring the Division worker to bathe them and give them new clothes. F.D.C. exhibited both new and old scratches, and E.D.C. had a suspicious mark that appeared to be a healing burn. The children were then placed in foster care.

Dr. Dyer conducted another psychological evaluation and rendered a report on August 21, 2003. He observed that while defendant was speaking with V.D. and a Division case worker in his office, that E.D.C. ran into an elevator and was returned to defendant by another individual. In response, V.D. said that the children are "bad" and that they (V.D. and defendant) could not be expected to watch them every minute. During this episode, defendant became hostile and got into a disagreement with a Division worker regarding bus tickets and a court order that had recently been entered and which had then been provided to her. Defendant tore the bus tickets and the court order into little pieces and threw them in the face of the Division worker.

During the evaluation, Dr. Dyer asked defendant about the allegation that she had struck F.D.C. and E.D.C., and roughly handled S.D., as witnessed by a sheriff's officer. Defendant, according to Dr. Dyer, spontaneously responded that "I'm not going to hide the fact that I chastise my kids, the Bible says chastise your children." She denied the allegation that she had slammed the children to the floor at that time but did not deny the other allegations of physical abuse.

Dr. Dyer observed in his report that defendant "is currently going through an adjustment reaction with depressed mood precipitated by the removal of her children. She appears to see herself as being a victim of circumstances and projects all of the blame and responsibility for the children's removal onto" the Division. He found that defendant "does not appear to possess adequate insight into any of her problems and relies on a rigid denial system to filter out anything contradictory to her belief that she is an excellent mother."

In his report, Dr. Dyer drew the following conclusions and made the following recommendations:

[Defendant's] attitude in regard to the most recent incident [that which was witnessed by the sheriff's officer on July 31, 2003] is particularly troubling. In spite of the fact that a sheriff's officer witnessed her striking her nearly two-year-old son and three-year-old daughter and repeatedly knocking them to the ground, [defendant] denies any wrongdoing. She presents her behavior as legitimate and necessary chastising of the children. She presents herself as being caught in a bind subject to criticism by personnel in the DYFS office building if she were to allow her children to run wild and unsupervised and yet attacked for applying appropriate discipline in order to get the children to behave in a public place. It is [defen-dant's] view that DYFS scrutinized the behavior until they found "something minor" that they could then use as a pretext for removing her children.

. . . .

I have serious concerns as to the safety of any child placed into the subject's care. This is particularly true in the case of young children who do not possess well developed verbal skills and whose behavior is hyperactive, disorganized and taxing to a caretaker. One wonders what the outcome of the August 4, 2003 incident might have been had not [defendant] acted out against the children in a public place where there were adults available to intervene, but rather acted out against them at home where she would've either been alone with them or in the presence of [V.D.]. The behavior that [defendant] displayed toward the DYFS caseworker and supervisor on the same day also reflects her tendency to become disorganized, hostile and aggressive in response to frustration.

Further, there's a very disturbing discrepancy between [defendant's] represen-tation of herself as an excellent parent and the condition in which the children were found on their removal. The children were found filthy and exuding a very strong odor. The children also complained of being hungry at that time.

[Defendant's] capacity to provide a physically safe, hygienic, nurturing, stimulating and adequately structured environment for her children is something that should receive a good deal of attention.

Given the above considerations it is clear that the three children cannot be returned to [defendant] at the present time. It is evident that [defendant] has failed to profit from the parenting skills class that she completed and she needs to go through this process again with a particular emphasis on developing some understanding of the physical and emotional needs of young children.

As a result of the Dodd removal, S.D. was placed with a family friend on September 15, 2003. F.D.C. and E.D.C. were returned to defendant's physical custody on February 25, 2004. By this time, defendant had separated from V.D. as the result of an act of domestic violence; a restraining order barred V.D.'s return to defendant's residence.

On March 25, 2004, however, only a month later, E.D.C. and F.D.C. were once again removed from defendant's custody pursuant to court order based upon her failure to comply with the Division's services and for allowing V.D. back into the residence. These failures included: defendant's neglect in making or keeping the children's medical appointments; parenting problems observed by a home aide; a failure to attend a court hearing; difficulties the Division had in making contact with her; and defendant's refusal to cooperate with a Division home aide. Defendant told the home aide that she "better not get her in trouble" by telling the Division that V.D. was there. On one occasion, the home aide observed V.D. sitting in the dark alone talking to himself. The home aide also observed V.D. "yell" at defendant that "she doesn't get off her ass" and that is why "he beats on her." On that occasion, V.D. whispered in the home aide's ear, asking if she was "FBI," and that when defendant came into the room as this occurred defendant "kicked [the home aide] out of the house."

According to a case worker's certification that was in evidence, the Division went to defendant's apartment accompanied by the police on March 23, 2004. V.D. was present and stated that defendant was not at home. V.D. initially refused their entry but eventually relented. As they entered, V.D. was heard to "mutter under his breath, 'you're dead man.'" Defendant was found asleep in a bedroom with the children. The Division worker observed that defendant had trouble walking; defendant stated that she was not feeling well and that with the pain and pressure (she was then a few months away from giving birth to the twins, M.D. and M.D.) she had difficulty taking care of the children. As a result, E.D.C. and F.D.C. were again removed from the home.

Dr. Elizabeth Sierri conducted a psychological evaluation of defendant on January 15, 2005. Her report concluded that defendant needed to be in long-term therapy with a doctoral level clinician who works with personality disordered clients and with clients that have a history of abuse; that defendant would benefit from a domestic violence group where she could learn the pathological aspects of her relationships and gain support in setting limits and moving away from V.D.; that defendant should receive counseling from Planned Parenthood or a similar organization regarding effective birth control; that defendant should receive counseling in pursuing her educational and vocational advancement; that she should join a community group because isolated parents are more likely to become abusive; that Dr. Dyer's recommendations regarding reunification should remain in place, but that defendant has much work to do before reunification could be considered.

Along with these observations about the evidence that had been presented, Judge Cohen took judicial notice of the termination of defendant's parental rights to five other children.

Judge Cohen also heard testimony regarding the birth of S.N. on September 30, 2005. Custody of S.N. was placed with defendant upon his discharge from the hospital. Only two weeks later, however, S.N., Sr. called the Division to advise that defendant had given him custody of S.N., advising him that she could not handle the then two-week old baby. The evidence indicated that defendant had not advised the Division of her unilateral decision to turn S.N. over to S.N., Sr. On November 7, 2005, a paternity test excluded S.N., Sr. as the child's father; notwithstanding her learning of the results of the paternity test, defendant indicated to the Division that she wanted S.N., Sr. to take custody of S.N. Learning that he was not the father, although he was then married to defendant, S.N., Sr. refused.

In evidence, as well, was the November 15, 2005 report of Dr. Donna LoBiondo. Despite the fact that the trial was scheduled (and, in fact, occurred) only a short time later, the report indicates defendant's breaking of appointments with Dr. LoBiondo in November 2005. In addition, based upon what had been learned from earlier appointments that defendant had kept, Dr. LoBiondo indicated that throughout the treatment period defendant withheld information that might otherwise have been used to assist in a therapeutic context; she observed in her report that "this offers additional evidence of [defendant's] disturbed and distorted internal object relations and character deficits contributing to her instability" and that given "her recent low motivation for treatment, inability to comply with the DYFS home health aide and repeated entrusting of her infant to the care of a man she knew was not his father, the utility of continued therapy with [defendant] is highly questionable."

Dr. Dyer provided another report shortly before the commencement of the trial in this matter. He again recited the history of abuse and defendant's troubled teen years, which, in Dr. Dyer's view, posed an extremely negative influence on defendant's ability to adequately parent a child. He emphasized that she needed counseling and that "great caution" should be exercised before considering the possibility of a return of "any of her children to her care." He expressed his concern about her relationship with V.D. and his "violent, abusive, bizarre behavior," as well as defendant's "inability to protect her children from a person such as [V.D.]." Dr. Dyer also expressed a great concern for defendant's own physically abusive behavior toward her children, as indicated by the example witnessed by a sheriff's officer on July 31, 2003. And Dr. Dyer's opinions were also influenced by the abysmal failure in parenting exhibited by defendant between the time of the return of the children in February 2004 and their subsequent removal only one month later. His testing of defendant demonstrated to him that defendant "had a childlike personality organization" and was a young woman "who saw herself as helpless and powerless, the subtle indications of a tendency to rely excessively on denial to cope with her problem filtering out unpleasant or inconvenient aspects of reality." Dr. Dyer found the results of his examination as indicative of "a very severe maladjustment and suggestive of spottiness in her reality testing, all of which reflected adversely on her parenting ability." Based also upon his bonding evaluations of defendant and E.D.C. and F.D.C., Dr. Dyer found there is "extremely little" in defendant's current presentation that "inspires confidence that she will be able to tolerate the stresses and frustrations of day-to-day parental management and discipline of young children without responding in the inappropriate and sometimes violent manner that she has demonstrated in the past" and that while this "may not be so much of a problem in parenting [F.D.C.], it would certainly be a significant risk factor in the case of [E.D.C.], who is hyperactive and difficult."

Also in evidence was a report from Family Connections dated November 21, 2005. It incorporated the view of Desiree Mitchell, M.S.W., who had previously provided positive statements regarding defendant but who now expressed serious concerns regarding defendant's poor judgment, which posed a risk of exposing her children to harmful individuals. She also indicated that it appeared defendant would be unable to parent her children independently without a support system in place.

The judge found credible the testimony he heard from Division caseworkers as to the considerable services provided and offered to defendant over the years.

Judge Cohen lastly heard the testimony of defendant who acknowledged that none of her nine children were then in her care.

In determining that the parental rights of defendant and V.D. should be terminated, Judge Cohen correctly applied N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1, which mandates that, in order to terminate parental rights, the Division is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

(1) The child's health and development have been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

See also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-05 (1986). Judge Cohen found the Division's proofs regarding each of these factors to be clear and convincing.

In summarizing his findings regarding the first prong of this test, Judge Cohen concluded that "the safety, health and welfare of [F.D.C. and E.D.C.] have been and would continue to be endangered" by defendant. He based this on defendant's eviction from her apartment in October 2000 and subsequent refusal of shelter obtained by the Division at the YMCA, thus necessitating the removal of F.D.C. and the twins, J.D. and J.D.; on defendant's failure to separate from V.D.'s abusive influence; on defendant's well-documented history of failure to cooperate with many of the services offered by the Division; on defendant's unemployment and failure to effectively pursue a G.E.D. or job skill training; on defendant's failure to obtain prenatal care prior to E.D.C.'s birth, "evidencing [that] her neglect of [him] began even before [his] birth"; on defendant's use of corporal punishment, which was mentioned in Dr. Dyer's May 16, 2002 report, which was the subject of a May 21, 2002 referral, and which was witnessed by a sheriff's officer on July 31, 2003. All this, as Judge Cohen found, supported Dr. Dyer's credible expressions of "serious concerns as to the safety of any child placed into [defendant's] care," as further revealed by the fact that the children were found to be unclean, disheveled and hungry when the Dodd removal was effected on August 4, 2003; on defendant's failure to properly care for the children during the one-month period between the children's return in February 2004 and the second Dodd removal on March 26, 2004, which included defendant's exposing the children to V.D.'s abusive and bizarre conduct; on defendant's turning over physical custody of the two week-old S.N. to S.N., Sr., without advising the Division; on defendant's persistence in having S.N. stay with S.N., Sr. even after it was learned that S.N., Sr. was not the father of the child, because of her acknowledgement that she could not handle the child; and on defendant's failure to cooperate with Dr. LoBiondo, as well as the therapist's expression of "serious concerns" about defendant's poor judgment and decision making. All this evidence, which Judge Cohen found to be credible and persuasive, fully supports the finding of the presence of the first prong of the statutory test.

As for the second prong, Judge Cohen found that defendant was unable or unwilling to eliminate the harm to F.D.C. and E.D.C., and unable or unwilling to provide a safe, stable home for them. Judge Cohen based this conclusion on all of the same findings of fact and conclusions of law as noted in his discussion of the first prong and, in addition, he cited "the unrefuted credible expert opinions" of Dr. Dyer, which caused him to conclude that defendant's "traumatic, violent, troubled upbringing are not conducive to her internalizing a positive parental image and have had an extremely negative influence on her ability to parent her own children." Judge Cohen found that there was no likelihood that defendant would become able to even "minimally adequately parent [F.D.C. and E.D.C.] in the foreseeable future." This finding is also fully supported by the evidence Judge Cohen found credible.

As for the third prong, Judge Cohen found that the Division established by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts were made. He also indicated that he had "considered all the alternatives to termination of parental rights here, including long term foster care and kinship legal guardianship and has concluded that none of those other alternatives [is] appropriate and feasible under the circumstances of this case." Again, this finding was amply supported by the credible evidence.

As for the fourth prong, Judge Cohen found by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of defendant's parental rights would not do more harm than good. He found that defendant will not "become fit to parent [the children] within the foreseeable future"; that although F.D.C. had expressed a preference for returning to the home of defendant, and that she "would suffer a significant loss if [defendant's] parental rights were terminated, this loss could be mitigated by the positive, affectionate attachment to her foster mother with whom she has lived since March of 2004, the last one year nine months, and with whom she's flourishing"; that a change of custody from the foster mother "might be the proverbial last straw in terms of [F.D.C.'s] resilience"; and that "another failed reunification . . . with [defendant], [the failure of] which the court concludes is virtually inevitable, would have disastrous consequences in all likelihood"; that E.D.C., who was described as "a hyperactive, defiant, difficult child whose behavior would be trying for even the most mature, even tempered and competent caregiver," is a child "who is at high risk for future emotional and behavior problem" and that, according to Dr. Dyer's opinion, which the judge found credible and persuasive, if E.D.C. were returned to defendant's custody "his hyperactive, defiant, difficult behavior would prove so stressful for her that it would provoke a grossly inappropriate reaction"; that there is a "substantial likelihood that [defendant's] reaction to this behavior would involve some form of inappropriate physical discipline"; and that there is no "realistic possibility of a successful reunification with" defendant. In short, Judge Cohen concluded that a return of E.D.C. to defendant would be "a disaster" and that he agreed with Dr. Dyer's opinion in that regard. As a result of these and his other findings, not all of which we have described in this opinion, Judge Cohen concluded that the termination of parental rights regarding both children would not do more harm than good. The evidence Judge Cohen found credible overwhelmingly establishes that conclusion.

The applicable standard of appellate review requires that we defer to a trial judge's factual findings when they are based on credible evidence in the record and unless we are convinced those findings are "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). After careful review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial judge's findings and that the judge applied the correct legal standards in terminating defendant's parental rights.

In the final analysis, as well-stated by Judge Cohen, the termination of parental rights presents "our system of justice with a very difficult dilemma" -- a choice between an individual's "right to conceive and raise one's own children," which is an essential civil right, with society's right to place limits on that right when the physical or emotional well-being of children are placed in jeopardy. Judge Cohen concluded that "clear and convincing evidence has demonstrated that the termination of the parental rights of [defendant] is mandated here, it's imperative." The judge's findings and conclusions are well-grounded in the evidence he found credible and was more than sufficient to warrant the termination of parental rights. And we lastly reject any contention that this determination should await defendant's future efforts to alleviate the problems that brought the matter to this point. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 contains a strong public policy in favor of permanency. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 357-58 (1999). Children have a "paramount need" for permanent and defined parent-child relationships. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 26 (1992). The decision to terminate defendant's parental rights was by no means premature.

We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Cohen's comprehensive and thoughtful oral decision.

Affirmed.

 

Defendant's oldest child, B.D., was born on November 20, 1994. B.D. has long been in the care and custody of defendant's mother and was so at the time this action was commenced. Defendant gave birth to twins, J.D. and J.D., on September 14, 2000; by way of an earlier guardianship action (Docket No. FG-07-25-04), defendant surrendered her parental rights to them. Defendant also gave birth to S.D. on December 29, 2002 and to another set of twins, M.D. and M.D., on June 19, 2004; defendant surrendered her parental rights to those three children as well. Her ninth child, S.N., was born on September 30, 2005; our opinion, also filed today, in N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.C., Docket No. A-3284-05T4, discusses S.N.'s circumstances. The record reveals that defendant is pregnant and shortly due to give birth to her tenth child.

A Dodd removal is an emergent removal of children from the home, subject to a later hearing in the Family Part. It refers to the Dodd Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. Huggins, 148 N.J. Super. 86, 88 (Co. Ct. 1977), aff'd o.b., 160 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1978).

V.D. did not appeal.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-3254-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

October 27, 2006