CRAIG DIEFENBACH v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2973-05T12973-05T1

CRAIG DIEFENBACH,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR and LOCKHEED MARTIN

SERVICES, INC.,

Respondents.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted November 1, 2006 - Decided November 30, 2006

Before Judges Winkelstein and Baxter.

On appeal from the Final Decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor, 94,329.

Craig Diefenbach, appellant, pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for Respondent, Board of Review (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, attorney; John C. Turi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Craig Diefenbach appeals from the denial of unemployment compensation benefits, contending that the Board of Review (Board) decision was erroneous because he had good cause for resigning his position as a security guard. He further appeals from the Board's decision directing him to refund the sum of $1,972 received as benefits for the weeks ending October 1, 2005 through October 22, 2005, as provided by N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). We affirm.

I.

Diefenbach was employed as a security guard at Lockheed Martin Services, Inc., from July 2001 until September 22, 2005, when he resigned his employment claiming that he was forced to do so because of job-related anxiety and headaches. A claims examiner determined that Diefenbach was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because he had resigned his position without good cause attributable to his employment, rendering him ineligible for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).

Diefenbach filed a timely appeal. After conducting a telephonic hearing on December 7, 2005, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the claims examiner's denial of benefits, finding that Diefenbach's reason for quitting "was personal and unrelated to the work itself." Thereafter, Diefenbach filed an appeal of that decision with the Board, which on January 24, 2006, rendered a final decision affirming the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, again finding that Diefenbach was disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), and was obligated to refund the sum of $1,972.

On appeal, Diefenbach claims that he was entitled to leave his employment due to problems with his health and incessant schedule changes. In particular, he points to his testimony before the Appeal Tribunal, where he stated that "health reasons" necessitated his resignation. He testified that "changes to [his] schedule" had caused him to suffer "anxiety" and "real bad headaches." As a result, he "couldn't function right." The anxiety and headaches resulted in Diefenbach initially choosing to go on temporary disability for three months. When he returned to work in September 2005, he learned that his supervisor had re-assigned him to work a "swing shift," which is apparently a shift other than the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift that he preferred. At that point, because he "could not handle the [constant] pressure [and] stress of the job," he resigned his employment and moved to Arkansas.

During the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal, Diefenbach acknowledged that he had been taking anti-anxiety medication both before and after he resigned his position at Lockheed Martin, adding that he was still suffering from anxiety three months after he had left the stressful work environment. He conceded that he had never presented any medical documentation to his employer to establish that constant shift changes had resulted in headaches and anxiety, nor had he complained about his working conditions to his employer because he didn't "think that they would really care." When asked whether a doctor had advised him to leave his job, Diefenbach responded, "Uh no he did not," adding, "I felt it would be in my best interest to quit and relocate because I could not handle the constant pressure [or] stress of the job." After the telephonic hearing concluded, but before the Appeals Examiner rendered a decision, Diefenbach submitted to the Appeal Tribunal a portion of a form prepared by his doctor on June 30, 2005, in which the doctor had written that Diefenbach's "stressor issues" were due to "frequent changes in work schedules (day/nights)" and a "recent breakup with a girlfriend." The doctor opined Diefenbach could return to full-time work on July 13, 2005.

From this testimony, the Appeals Examiner concluded that Diefenbach had "left the work voluntarily to relocate to another area." She further concluded that Diefenbach was disqualified for benefits because he terminated his employment "without good cause attributable to such work."

Finally, the Appeals Examiner determined, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d), that the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, was entitled to a refund of the benefits paid to Diefenbach because Diefenbach should not have received them.

II.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether, as the Board determined in its decision of January 24, 2006, Diefenbach should be disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), as of April 24, 2005, and obligated to refund the benefits received.

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that a claimant is disqualified for benefits:

[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works four weeks in employment . . . and has earned at least six times the individual's weekly benefit rate . . . . (emphasis added).

While the statute does not define "good cause," it has been construed to require more than vague and unsubstantiated allegations that health reasons have forced an employee to quit:

In scrutinizing an employee's reason for leaving, the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence. Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily. The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones. . . . [I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.

[Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983).]

When an employee claims that illness or physical infirmity have been caused by his employment and are sufficient to constitute "good cause attributable to such work," the burden is on the employee to so demonstrate through "adequate competent evidence." Brown v. Bd. of Review, 117 N.J. Super. 399, 404 (App. Div. 1971). "Conclusory statements [from the employee] to that effect" are insufficient. Ibid.

The Board's determination must be affirmed unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable" or is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). In determining whether an agency decision is supported by substantial credible evidence, the reviewing court is obligated to accord deference to the administrative agency's expertise. Associated Util. Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 131 N.J. Super. 584, 588 (App. Div. 1974).

The Board's conclusion that Diefenbach's reason for quitting work was "personal and unrelated to the work itself," and was the result of Diefenbach's decision to leave work "voluntarily to relocate to another area" is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. That conclusion is supported by the absence of any evidence in the record that a doctor had advised Diefenbach to leave his job due to his health, and by Diefenbach's acknowledgment that he resigned because he could no longer handle the stress that his job was causing.

We agree with the Board's argument on appeal that Diefenbach's unsubstantiated testimony--that his job caused him to suffer from headaches and anxiety to the point where he was forced to quit, take medication and relocate--is precisely the type of vague evidence that this court has found to be insufficient proof that an individual had good cause to leave work for health reasons. See Brown, supra, 117 N.J. Super. at 403-04 (a claimant's conclusory statement that his work aggravated his medical condition is not sufficient to show statutory good cause for leaving his job).

Additionally, we agree with the Board's determination that because Diefenbach was disqualified for unemployment benefits he must repay $1,972, which represents the total amount of benefits he received. Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 675 (App. Div. 1997).

The New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law provides that when a determination is made by the Division:

[t]hat any person, whether (i) by reason of the nondisclosure or misrepresentation by him or by another of a material fact . . . or (ii) for any other reason, has received any sum as benefits . . . while he was disqualified from receiving benefits, or while otherwise not entitled to receive such sum as benefits, such person, unless the director . . . directs otherwise by regulation, shall be liable to repay those benefits in full.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d).]

In Bannan, supra, we held that full repayment of benefits is required from anyone "who, for any reason, regardless of good faith, was not actually entitled to those benefits." Bannan, 299 N.J. Super. at 674. We reasoned that the recovery of such benefits "furthers the purpose of the unemployment compensation laws" and emphasized that the Unemployment Trust Fund must be preserved "for the payment of benefits to those individuals entitled to receive them." Ibid. The refund demand was timely and the Board's conclusion that Diefenbach is liable for a refund of the benefits he collected is correct.

Accordingly, the Board's finding that Diefenbach's reasons for leaving his work were personal and did not constitute "good cause attributable to such work" when he terminated his employment, is based on substantial, credible evidence in the record, as is the Board's determination as to the refund. Affirmed.

 

The Appeals Examiner conducted the telephonic hearing, and thereafter filed the written opinion of the Appeal Tribunal.

N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1) requires a claim for reimbursement to be asserted within four years from the date such benefits were paid.

(continued)

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A-2973-05T1

November 30, 2006