I/M/O DOROTHY P. BROWN v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2938-04T22938-04T2

I/M/O DOROTHY P. BROWN

________________________________

DOROTHY P. BROWN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent-Respondent.

________________________________

 

Submitted December 5, 2005 - Decided February 7, 2006

Before Judges Rodr guez and Alley.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, HWP-4653-04

Appellant filed a pro se brief.

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Dennis J. Conklin, Senior Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Dorothy Brown appeals from a final decision dated December 8, 2004, of the Director of the Division of Family Development, adopting the October 18, 2004 decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The decision of the ALJ which the Director adopted found that the Middlesex County Board of Social Services had established in a hearing "by clear and convincing evidence" that appellant had engaged in an intentional program violation in the Work First New Jersey/ General Assistance Program, see N.J.S.A. 44:10-34 et seq and N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.1 et seq, and the Food Stamp Program, see N.J.A.C. 10:87-1 et seq, which is federally funded. The agency had contended that appellant was receiving child support which she did not report in several applications, and in the decision under appeal the Director excluded her from participation in the Work First Program for six months, and she also was excluded from the Food Stamp Program for a period of twelve months.

The ALJ found it had been established by clear and convincing evidence that appellant failed to properly disclose an income source. He found that the evidence against her was credible, without any reason to fabricate. The decision was adopted by the Director.

The agency having developed an adequate record which contains substantial evidence to undergird its determination, we have no occasion in this instance to interfere with this decision or to require further proceedings.

Our scope of review of the final decision of an administrative agency is circumscribed, and the action of an administrative agency is presumed to be valid and reasonable. In re Amendment to Recreation and Open Space Inventory, 353 N.J. Super. 310, 327 (App. Div. 2002), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630 (2005). We normally will reverse the decision only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999).

Indeed, our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the agency's conclusion. Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988). We will only reverse the agency's decision when it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).

As we did in Gerber v. Board of Review, 313 N.J. Super. 37, 39 (App. Div. 1998), we conclude here that the agency's finding "is sufficiently supported by credible evidence in the record to require our deference." Ibid. (citing Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)).

In our view, then, the decision issued in this case by the ALJ and adopted by the Director was rational, supported by substantial evidence, and entitled to our deference. In light of the foregoing, and having carefully considered the record before us in light of the applicable law and our scope of review, we affirm. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

Affirmed.

 

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A-2938-04T2

February 7, 2006