A.L. v. ESSEX COUNTY DIVISION OF WELFARE

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2766-04T52766-04T5

A.L.

Appellant,

v.

ESSEX COUNTY DIVISION OF WELFARE,

Respondent.

_______________________________________________________________

 

Submitted January 30, 2006 - Decided February 15, 2006

Before Judges Cuff and Holston, Jr.

On appeal from the final agency decision of the Department of Human Services, Docket No. HPW 10838-04.

A.L., appellant pro se.

Nancy Kaplen, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Michael Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Dennis J. Conklin, Senior Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant, A.L., appeals the January 28, 2005 final agency decision of the Division of Family Development (DFD) of the Department of Human Services (DHS), that adopted and affirmed the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), denying A.L. Work First New Jersey/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (WFNJ/TANF), Temporary Rental Assistance (TRA), and Emergency Assistance (EA) benefits. We affirm.

A.L. was a recipient of benefits in the WFNJ program, a welfare assistance program established under N.J.S.A. 44:10-55 to -70, and implemented by county welfare agencies pursuant to regulations of the DHS, N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.1 to -20.13. In addition to her monthly cash grant, appellant was receiving TRA, an ancillary housing subsidy benefit, available to WFNJ recipients under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.31(a).

WFNJ is a needs-based program, and a person or family does not qualify for the program if their "countable income" equals or exceeds the maximum benefit allowed for such person or family. N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.1(c). "Countable income" refers to gross earned income, N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.9(c), of which fifty percent is "disregarded" in calculating income for eligibility purposes. N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.8(a).

In October and November 2004, A.L., a college graduate with a bachelor's degree in chemistry, was employed as a substitute school teacher with the Patterson Public Schools. Her earnings records showed a monthly gross income of $1,517. Because her gross income, reduced by the regulatory fifty percent "disregard" applied to earned income, or $758.50, exceeded the maximum allowable income for her WFNJ assistance unit, on November 18, 2004, the Essex County Division of Welfare (DOW) issued a notice to A.L. advising her that her WFNJ benefits would be terminated. The termination action extended to all benefits ancillary to WFNJ, including the TRA she had been receiving.

A.L. requested an administrative "fair hearing" to contest the termination. On January 14, 2005, a plenary hearing was conducted before ALJ Cohen as a contested case. A.L.'s pay records for the months of October, November and December 2004, introduced into evidence at the hearing, confirmed a total gross income of $4,400 for these three months.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.1(c),

as long as the total countable income of a WFNJ/TANF . . . assistance unit (with benefit of the appropriate disregards at N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.8 for earned income) is less than the maximum benefit payment level for the appropriate eligible assistance unit size in accordance with Schedule II at N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.3, . . . financial eligibility shall exist until such income equals or exceeds the maximum benefit payment level for the appropriate unit size . . . .

The schedule set forth in N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.3 fixes the maximum monthly benefit payment level for a family of five, which is the size of A.L.'s family, at $552 per month. The DOW had terminated A.L.'s benefits upon its finding that her income exceeded the stated standard. At the OAL hearing, the only material factual issue was whether A.L.'s monthly gross income, adjusted for the fifty percent "disregard" of N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.8(a), was in excess of the $552 standard set by N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.3. The undisputed evidence conclusively established that A.L.'s countable income did exceed the $552 standard by a substantial margin during each of these months.

A.L. asserts that as a substitute teacher her income fluctuated since she did not work during the summer or school vacations. A.L. also claims that she has had unusual expenses as a result of a domestic violence family court dispute between her and her mother, requiring her to submit to a court ordered psychological examination at a cost of $1,300 and to pay attorney fees in the amount of $600 for representation of her in connection with that matter. A.L. contends that she was unable to obtain a job in her field of chemistry for a substantial period of time, having been laid off from her last permanent position in June 2002. She also claims lost income as a substitute teacher and expenses for car repairs caused by her involvement in an automobile accident on February 25, 2005, in which her car was "totaled."

According to A.L.'s brief, she has accepted as of May 2005, a permanent position as a chemist. Her new position has enabled her to make a payment of $2,904 in attorney fees to "recapture my home" from foreclosure, although she continues to be in arrears on her mortgage. A.L. contends that the above asserted emergencies should entitle her to a "hardship exception" enabling her to get continuing benefits. A.L. submits that if her TRA were extended, that the TRA combined with child support from her children's father and her salary will soon enable her to be self-sufficient.

The ALJ concluded

that [A.L.] is not eligible for TANF benefits and as a result, she is not eligible for TRA benefits. [A.L.'s] average income of $1,517 per month is well in excess of the maximum benefit payment level. The fact that [A.L.] had unusual expenses does not affect the regulations, which allow for only a certain amount of income in order to be eligible for benefits. If [A.L.] is not eligible for TANF benefits, then she is not eligible for TRA benefits.

However, the ALJ also noted

that [A.L.] may be eligible for an increase in her food stamp amount. It appears that the food stamp amount was based on the payment of TRA mortgage payments by the agency. Since the agency will no longer be responsible for the mortgage payment, the respondent may be entitled to an increase in her food stamp amount. Secondly, since [A.L.] and her family will not be eligible for Medicaid payments and the respondent's job is temporary and does not provide medical coverage, the respondent should be advised to apply for Kid's Care, or other medical programs that might cover her children.

A.L. contends that her countable income should be reduced by the amount of the various expenditures she was obligated to make. We are convinced, however, that "countable income" contained in N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.9(c) refers to gross earned income, and the only deduction permitted under the regulations is the fifty percent "disregard" provided by N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.8(a).

It is well established that the conclusions reached in an administrative agency's final decision must be upheld on review if they are supported in the record by sufficient credible evidence giving due regard to the factfinder's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575 (1988); Philadelphia Outdoor v. New Jersey Expressway Auth., 221 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1987), appeal dismissed, 114 N.J. 470 (1989).

Accordingly, "[o]ur function is to determine whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Burris v. Police Dep't, Twp. of W. Orange, 338 N.J. Super. 493, 496 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1980)). The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the administrative action. McGowan v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); Barone v. Dep't Human Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987).

Additionally, "[i]t is settled that '[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'" Wnuck v. New Jersey Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)). "Absent arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious action, the agency's determination must be affirmed." Ibid. (citing to R & R Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999).

The final agency decision by the DFD was clearly supported by sufficient credible evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We are likewise convinced that the ALJ and DFD properly interpreted the applicable regulations in determining A.L.'s ineligibility for continued benefits. N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.1(c) establishes the eligibility for WFNJ benefits. N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.3 fixes a maximum monthly income level for a family of five at $552 per month. A.L.'s monthly gross income adjusted for a fifty percent disregard provided for by N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.8(a) was in excess of the $552 standard set by N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.3 by $206.50. Although A.L. contends that her countable income should be reduced for the amount of various expenditures that she was obliged to make, we are convinced that the existence of those enumerated expenses does not create an exception to the DHS administrative regulations, which permit a fifty percent disregard, but no more. Eligibility for WFNJ benefits is need based, with need determined by income not expenses. Therefore, A.L.'s income, when reduced by one-half, is substantially in excess of the maximum eligibility for the benefits she seeks. Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

8

A-2766-04T5

RECORD IMPOUNDED

February 15, 2006

 


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