STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DEREK SAMPLE

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2477-04T42477-04T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DEREK V. SAMPLE, SR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted September 27, 2006 - Decided October 12, 2006

Before Judges Lefelt, Parrillo and

Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County,

Indictment No. 02-09-1269.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellant (Abby P. Schwartz,

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of

counsel and on the brief).

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent (Mary E. McAnally, Deputy

Attorney General, of counsel and on the

brief).

PER CURIAM

A Burlington County jury found defendant Derek Sample Sr. guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3); first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1); and first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1). Judge Thomas S. Smith, Jr. merged the two murder convictions and imposed a forty-five-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act. The judge also merged the two robbery convictions and imposed a fifteen-year concurrent term, again with application of the No Early Release Act. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed his "custodial statement because the State failed to prove that he was competent to waive his Miranda rights," his murder and felony murder convictions should be reversed "because the State failed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt," and Judge Smith imposed a "manifestly excessive" sentence. We reject each of these arguments and affirm.

Defendant killed Pickett Durham, who was fifty-seven years old and medically fragile. Durham suffered from heart disease, diabetes, successfully treated prostate cancer, and a transplanted kidney. Just prior to Durham's death, defendant was living in an apartment with him and his niece, who was defendant's girlfriend. On October 25, 2001, defendant had been out drinking and smoking crack cocaine. He returned to the apartment hoping to steal Durham's money to purchase more crack. A verbal altercation ensued, and defendant stabbed Durham in the back with a ten-inch kitchen knife. Defendant then stole Durham's jeans, because he believed that Durham's wallet, containing the money he was looking for, was in them.

Durham called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that defendant had stabbed him. Paramedics and police officers from Mount Holly and Lumberton responded. After Durham was stabilized, paramedics transported him to Cooper Hospital Trauma Center. As one of the officers was leaving the scene, he noticed defendant in the back of the building attempting to hide. Defendant was arrested and brought to headquarters.

Later, a sergeant and detective awoke defendant and brought him from his cell to the interview room in order to talk with him. As the sergeant escorted defendant, he noticed that defendant was able to walk without assistance and that his eyes were not bloodshot or glassy. He did not appear to be drunk or under the influence of any substance. The officers provided defendant with a blanket and coffee.

The sergeant advised defendant of his constitutional rights and defendant signed the Miranda card waiving those rights. Defendant articulately answered all questions and admitted stabbing Durham in the back. Defendant also disclosed the location of the wallet, knife, and jeans. Defendant then agreed to have his statement audiotaped. At no time during the interview did defendant request the assistance of counsel or request that the interview be discontinued.

Meanwhile, a doctor in the hospital performed surgery on Durham to stop the bleeding, repair the holes in his colon and diaphragm, re-expand his lung, and wash his abdomen in an attempt to remove fecal material from the area. The next day, Durham experienced breathing problems which required that he be placed on a respirator. That evening, Durham suffered a heart attack. The doctors suspected that Durham had a blood clot on his lung. The hospital moved him to Intensive Care where he began to suffer from peritonitis, which was caused by the "spillage" of fecal matter from his colon into the abdominal cavity. Durham's condition deteriorated and several days later, pursuant to his wishes, the hospital removed him from life-support. He died within forty minutes.

On appeal from his murder and robbery convictions, defendant challenges his confession, sentence, and the State's proof of causation. We address these issues in turn.

We agree with Judge Smith that defendant's statement was voluntarily provided. There was no question that defendant verbally indicated to the sergeant that he understood each of his rights as they were read to him from the Miranda card. Defendant signed the card, which indicated that he was waiving his rights. The reading of his rights as well as the taking of the confession were fairly brief, lasting less than an hour, and were witnessed by another officer.

The sergeant was aware that defendant was potentially under the influence of drugs at some point before the confession. The officer admitted that he knew defendant was possibly engaged in drug use not only because another individual placed defendant "in the gardens getting high," but also because defendant admitted such behavior. That said, the officer did not believe defendant to be under the influence of either drugs or alcohol. In reaching this conclusion, the officer drew upon his training and experience as a narcotics officer. Indeed, defendant provided a lucid, coherent explanation of the series of events surrounding the stabbing. The officer's testimony was corroborated when the judge listened to the audiotaped confession provided by defendant.

The evidence fully supports Judge Smith's conclusion that defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), were fully protected and that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's confession was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and not made because his will was overborne. See State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993).

With regard to defendant's excessive sentence contention, we see no reason to disturb the court's sentence. The prison term, though lengthy, was imposed for murder, our most serious crime, and was well within the bounds of the law. See State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 502 (2005); State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 504 (1996); State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80, 96 (1987). The judge followed the correct statutory sentencing guidelines, the record contained sufficient support for the judge's application of the guidelines, and the judge's sentence was reasonably reached based upon the relevant factors. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364 (1984). Defendant well deserved the sentence he received.

Regarding defendant's contention that the cause of Durham's death was the heart attack and not the stab wound, we note that the relevant statute states that "criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death . . . . " N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a. Thus, the crime of purposeful or knowing murder applies not only to the actor that intends death, but also to the actor who intends to cause "serious bodily injury," and unintentionally causes death. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 83 (1988). By way of definition, "serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b).

"For the prosecution to prevail in a purposeful murder case, it must show that the defendant intended to cause death and that his or her conduct caused the death of another." State v. Cruz, 163 N.J. 403, 417 (2000) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)). The State prevails on a charge of purposeful substantial bodily injury murder if it "prove[s] that it was the defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, [and that defendant] knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result." Id. at 417-18. For a conviction of knowing substantial bodily injury murder, the prosecution must "prove that the defendant knew that his or her conduct was practically certain to cause death and that such conduct caused the death of another." Id. at 417 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2)).

Alternatively, the State prevails on a charge of knowing substantial bodily injury murder, if it "prove[s] that the defendant was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result." Id. at 418.

Finally, felony murder is "committed when the actor, . . . is engaged in the commission of . . . robbery [or several other offenses] . . . and in the course of such crime . . . causes the death of a person other than one of the participants . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3).

To find causation, there must first be a finding that the actor's conduct was "an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3a(1). "Under this 'but-for' test, the defendant's conduct is deemed a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred without that conduct." State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 11 (1990). On the other hand, "a defendant's conduct is not considered a cause if the event would have occurred without it." Ibid.

In regards to knowing or purposeful murder, the actual result must either be within "the [actor's] design or contemplation," or involve "the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense". N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3b.

In this case, there is ample evidence from which the jury could rationally have concluded that defendant caused Durham's death. First, there is the 9-1-1 call by Durham himself disclosing that defendant had stabbed him. Second, the medical examiner testified that the primary cause of Durham's death was the stab wound to his back because it necessitated surgery and led to medical complications such as peritonitis that aggravated Durham's pre-existing heart disease, and eventually resulted in a heart attack and death. Third, defendant lived with Durham and the jury could have found that defendant must have known Durham was in fragile medical condition. Fourth, the jury could have reasonably found that defendant should have known that stabbing someone with a ten-inch knife not only causes serious bodily injury but also creates a substantial risk of death. Fifth, the jury could have also found that defendant should have known that stabbing someone in Durham's fragile condition made it highly probable or practically certain that death would result. After all, one of the State doctors testified that a stab wound like that inflicted on Durham would create a substantial risk of death in a normal healthy person. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury rationally to find causation beyond a reasonable doubt and, there was therefore, no basis to dismiss the charges for murder and felony murder at the end of the State's case. See State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458 (1967).

The causation element is satisfied here because death would not have resulted but for defendant's antecedent conduct and the conduct and result are not too remote. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3b; State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 11 (1990). The fact that intervening circumstances may arise, such as surgery, medical complications, or aggravation of pre-existing physical conditions, does not negate the causative significance of the antecedent conduct where the intervening circumstances are foreseeable or closely related to the antecedent conduct.

In any event, it was for the jury to determine whether intervening causes or unforeseen conditions make it unjust to find that defendant's criminal conduct was the cause of Durham's death. Id. at 13. Here, the jury found criminal liability after being given proper instructions on the law of causation, which instructions this defendant does not and cannot challenge.

Accordingly, we see no merit in any of the contentions defendant advances on appeal. We do note that defendant's judgment of conviction indicates his sentence was "negotiated." Thus, we remand solely for the correction of this typographical mistake.

Affirmed in all respects, remanded to correct the Judgment of Conviction.

 

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A-2477-04T4

 

October 12, 2006