WILLIAM ROBERT HALL v. CBA INFORMATION SERVICES, et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1732-05T21732-05T2

WILLIAM ROBERT HALL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CBA INFORMATION SERVICES,

Defendant,

and

CARCO RESEARCH,

Defendant-Respondent.

_______________________________________________________

 

Argued July 24, 2006 - Decided August 15, 2006

Before Judges C.S. Fisher and Grall.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. ATL-L-2019-04.

H. Robert Boney, Jr. argued the cause for appellant.

Norman W. Briggs argued the cause for respondent (Frey, Petrakis, Deeb, Blum & Briggs, attorneys; Mr. Briggs and Christina M. Hughes, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff commenced this action, claiming that defendants Carco Research (Carco) and CBA Information Services (CBA) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the Act), 15 U.S.C.A. 1681, by negligently performing a financial background check regarding plaintiff for Prudential Securities, which was then considering employing plaintiff. The case reached its present posture after CBA settled its differences with plaintiff, and after Carco successfully moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff did not commence suit within the time frame set in the Act's statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C.A. 1681p. Plaintiff argues that his claim was not time-barred and that the trial judge erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Carco. We disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Steven P. Perskie's oral decision of October 7, 2005. We add only the following.

The evidence before the trial judge at the time he granted summary judgment suggests no dispute about the fact that Carco purchased the consumer information pertaining to plaintiff from Trans Union. In addition, there is no dispute that Carco's report, which contains information that plaintiff claims to be false, was sent to Prudential on April 10, 2002 and that, soon thereafter, Prudential informed plaintiff that he was no longer being considered for employment. As a result, plaintiff contacted Carco by telephone on May 30, 2002 seeking a copy of his credit report; a copy was sent to him that same day. Plaintiff, however, did not file suit until July 1, 2004, more than two years after he became aware of what he claimed to be the report's false contents, more than two years after Carco's dissemination of this allegedly false information, and more than two years after plaintiff was aware that the credit report had apparently been a cause of Prudential's decision not to employ him.

These facts reveal that plaintiff was aware of all the circumstances that would suggest he had an actionable claim against Carco by May 30, 2002 and that he did not commence suit until more than two years thereafter. Even if the time to commence suit was triggered by the discovery of the existence of a cause of action and not from the date of dissemination, which is not so, see TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 524 U.S. 19, 122 S. Ct. 441, 151 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2001), plaintiff's claim would be time-barred since plaintiff was aware of all material facts regarding Carco's alleged liability under the Act. However, plaintiff also argues that the alleged misinformation had an impact upon him at later times that fell within the two-year period that preceded the filing of the July 1, 2004 complaint, and, for that reason, his complaint should be viewed as having been timely filed. Assuming the factual predicate to this argument to be true, we conclude that such a later event cannot re-trigger the time to file a suit based upon the Act. The Act as then constituted did not incorporate a discovery rule, as observed above, except with regard to the type of malicious acts by a defendant that are not suggested by the record on appeal. Nor was 15 U.S.C.A. 1681p intended to permit the re-triggering of the two-year period for filing suit every time an earlier dissemination impacts upon the plaintiff. Accordingly, the undisputed fact that the dissemination of allegedly inaccurate information about plaintiff's credit occurred more than two years prior to the commencement of suit required dismissal of this suit regardless of the possibility that Carco's actions may have had a later impact on plaintiff.

Affirmed.

 

Plaintiff argues that the time period set forth in the statute of limitations was re-triggered when plaintiff received a May 9, 2003 letter from another potential employer. This letter indicated that the potential employer would not hire plaintiff because of a consumer report it received from ChoicePoint Services, Inc. (ChoicePoint). Carco argued that this potential employer gave no indication that it relied upon information disseminated by it and that what was reported to this potential employer by ChoicePoint is irrelevant; plaintiff responded that there may be a relationship between ChoicePoint and Carco -- a possibility that he ought to be permitted to pursue in further discovery. We note, however, that discovery was closed when the summary judgment motion was filed. Accordingly, plaintiff's contention that the motion was premature is without merit. He had a full and fair opportunity to investigate and discover whatever facts he deemed relevant, including the significance of the letter regarding ChoicePoint.

15 U.S.C.A. 1681p has since been amended, but that amended version did not become effective until all the factual circumstances alleged by plaintiff had occurred and thus has no relevance here.

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-1732-05T2

 

August 15, 2006