RHONDA L. HOLLAND v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0100-05T50100-05T5

RHONDA L. HOLLAND,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR and SEA OAKS COUNTRY CLUB

and MS. AMY LOMBARDO,

Respondents.

___________________________________________________________

 

Submitted August 29, 2006 - Decided October 24, 2006

Before Judges R. B. Coleman and Holston, Jr.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor.

Rhonda L. Holland, appellant pro se.

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Michael J. Haas, of counsel; John C. Turi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant, Rhonda L. Holland, appeals from a Final Decision of the Board of Review which adopted the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, concluding that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work and is disqualified for benefits as of October 3, 2004, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The decision also concluded that claimant is liable to refund the sum of $298, which was received for the weeks ending November 20, 2004 and November 27, 2004, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). We affirm.

Claimant was hired to work part time for banquets, as needed, at Sea Oaks Golf and Country Club from September 17 to October 3, 2004. The Appeal Tribunal and the Board found that claimant was scheduled to work four additional shifts after her last day of work on October 3, 2004. As a bartender, claimant's job included lifting boxes and setting up a portable bar. Claimant called the employment manager, Amy Lombardo, to inform Lombardo that she had an injury to her shoulder that "had acted up" in early October. Claimant testified in the hearing conducted via telephone on March 3, 2005, that she sustained the injury during the winter of 2003 when she slipped and fell on ice. It was not a work related injury, but it affected her ability to lift heavy objects.

Claimant and the banquet manager had different recollections of what was said when claimant first informed the manager of her injuries. Claimant testified:

[Lombardo] was very generous in the fact that she took me off the last two banquets that I was scheduled to work because I was injured and she felt it was more appropriate to have someone who wasn't injured that could do the work and move the bars and she replaced me on those last two banquets. I was only scheduled to work three shifts the month of October.

Claimant's recollection was that she told the banquet manager that she would come in but the manager said she thought it was a better idea for claimant not to come in, that she would rather have someone who she knew could do the job and who was not going to have a problem or get injured further. The banquet manager testified that "we both thought it was best she not come in and work and that she was to call me when she was feeling better."

Claimant did not call again except to question the amount paid to her for the days she did work. At the hearing, she acknowledged, that "I kinda don't know if there's a miscommunication." She further acknowledged that:

the portable bar thing . . . wasn't feasible for me . . . [because] at the last function I worked I had to set up and move the whole bar by myself. So I just kinda assumed that she knew which function[s] . . . [had] the main bar and those would be the ones that I would be asked to work and I would have called her if my shoulder was better[,] which it is not.

"Although 'good cause' is not statutorily defined, New Jersey courts have construed the phrase to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 214 (1997) (citations omitted). Based upon our review of the testimony presented at the hearing and the applicable law, we are satisfied that claimant failed to satisfy her burden of showing that she left work for good cause attributable to the work. In Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962), we noted the limited scope of our review:

The statutory scheme entrusts the determination of the question whether a claimant quit work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, in the first instance, to the administrative agency and its appeal tribunals. In reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether we would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was ours to make, but rather whether the fact-finder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.

[Ibid. See also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999); Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.]

We will not upset the determination of an administrative agency absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated legislative policies. In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996); Campbell v. Dep't. of Civil Service, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). We may not vacate an agency's decision because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. See generally, Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); De Vitis v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 202 N.J. Super. 484, 489-90 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 102 N.J. 337 (1985). An appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency unless the agency's determination is "so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction[.]" Clowes v. Terminix Int'l Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

Applying these well-established standards to the facts of this case, we are constrained to affirm.

Affirmed.

 

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A-0100-05T5

October 24, 2006