HARRY DE LA ROCHE v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6652-03T26652-03T2

HARRY DE LA ROCHE,

Appellant,

vs.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE

BOARD,

Respondent.

__________________________________

 

Submitted: September 12, 2005 - Decided:

Before Judges Cuff and Lintner.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the State Parole Board.

Harry De La Roche, appellant pro se.

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa A. Puglisi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On May 1, 2002, the Parole Board issued a Notice of Decision that denied parole to appellant Harry De La Roche and established a ten-year future eligibility term (FET). Appellant is serving four concurrent life terms for the 1976 murders of four family members. Appellant appealed and, in our March 19, 2003 opinion (A-2138-01), this court found that there was an inadequate factual record to support the Parole Board's conclusion that De La Roche's failure to acknowledge that he also killed his parents and a brother demonstrates a substantial likelihood that he will commit another crime if released on parole. This appeal follows that remand.

Dr. Leland Mosby evaluated appellant over four days from May 21 to June 10, 2003. His evaluation was limited to the question of whether appellant's failure to admit that he killed four rather than one family member indicated a likelihood of recidivism. On July 23, 2003, the Parole Board interviewed Dr. Mosby and on February 24, 2004, a panel of the Parole Board affirmed its prior decision to deny parole and establish a ten-year FET. On June 16, 2004, the full Parole Board affirmed the disposition of the panel.

In its decision, the Parole Board referred to the psychological history elicited by Dr. Mosby that shows that appellant has suppressed his anger and rage for twenty-seven years and that he has never resolved his grief over the death of his family. He has never addressed the underlying issues of anger, repression and denial present at the time he murdered his family. Dr. Mosby opined that he is at risk of similar behavior if confronted with similar stressors on parole.

Judicial review of parole determinations is limited to an evaluation of whether the Parole Board acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion in rendering its decisions. The actions of the Parole Board are presumed valid and reasonable. In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994). Our review is also limited to a determination whether the agency's findings could reasonably have been reached on the credible evidence in the record. Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965). An agency's decision can be set aside only "'if there exists in the reviewing mind a definite conviction that the determination below went so far wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" N.J. Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988) (quoting 613 Corp. v. State, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986)).

Parole Board decisions are considered highly "'individualized discretionary appraisals,'" Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (Trantino VI) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). Consequently, "the Board 'has broad but not unlimited discretionary powers'" in reviewing an inmate's parole record and rendering a release decision. Trantino VI, supra, 166 N.J. at 173 (quoting Monks v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 242 (1971)).

Measured by this standard, we discern no basis to disturb the decision of the Parole Board to deny parole. The agency decision is founded on expert testimony based on an intensive focused evaluation of appellant. It also reflects the application of the expertise of the agency to an individual application for parole. We, therefore, affirm the June 16, 2004 agency decision denying parole.

 
Affirmed.

Appellant informs us that his appeal is confined solely to the denial of parole. In other words, he does not contest the FET.

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A-6652-03T2

September 28, 2005