TRACY CHANOUX v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2823-04T32823-04T3

TRACY CHANOUX,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

and CENDANT MORTGAGE,

Respondents.

 

Submitted October 19, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Weissbard and Francis.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 49,230.

Tracy Chanoux, appellant pro se.

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ellen A. Reichart, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Tracy Chanoux appeals a decision of the Board of Review, New Jersey Department of Labor affirming an Appeal Tribunal decision holding her disqualified from unemployment compensation. The Appeals Examiner found that Chanoux left work as a sales consultant at Cendant Mortgage (Cendant) without "good cause attributable to the work." Chanoux argues that the work environment was so detrimental to her mental, emotional, and physical well-being that she had no alternative but to resign. We disagree and affirm the decision of the Board.

Appellant filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits on August 22, 2004 and was held unqualified by a deputy claims examiner. The Appeal Tribunal held Chanoux disqualified for benefits as of August 15, 2004, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board of Review affirmed the decision.

Chanoux was employed by respondent Cendant from March 12, 2001 to August 18, 2004. After returning from vacation in early August 2004, Chanoux was advised by her supervisor that, in July 2004, she had mishandled a telephone call by failing to return a call to a customer who had been disconnected. She received a written reprimand. Within a week, she received a second written reprimand for failing to meet the budget target. Believing that the company was planning to terminate employees and that she was being "personally targeted" by her supervisor, Chanoux applied for a transfer to another position at Cendant, but was advised none were available. She tendered her resignation on August 19, 2004.

Donna Levin testified on behalf of Cendant and stated that even though Chanoux had received two warnings concerning her job performance, she was not in immediate danger of losing her job. Levin also testified that there was continuing work available for Chanoux at the time that she quit her job. Levin further testified that appellant's exit interview, a part of this record, indicated that Chanoux was leaving because she was going to return to school and seek other employment.

In light of Levin's testimony, the Appeal Tribunal found that Chanoux was not in danger of losing her job, despite the two written reprimands. Additionally, the Appeal Tribunal found that "the employer's criticism did not exceed the bounds of reason," and Chanoux "voluntarily chose to leave her position and join the ranks of the unemployed."

The New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), provides, in pertinent part, that an individual shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits:

For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works four weeks in employment . . . and has earned in employment at least six times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as determined in each case.

An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that she did so with "good cause attributable to such work." Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962). "While the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean cause ''sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.''" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)).

In scrutinizing an employee's reason for leaving, the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence. 'Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.' The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones . . . it is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.

[Id. at 288 (citations omitted).]

The statutory scheme envisions that unemployment compensation benefits be paid only to those individuals who have become unemployed through no fault of their own. Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 340 (App. Div. 1961). It is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed. Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288 (citing Condo, supra, 159 N.J. Super. at 175). The Board found the testimony of the employer's representative credible that Chanoux was not in immediate danger of losing her job, and that continuing work was available for her at the time she resigned. Thus, it found that Chanoux voluntarily left her gainful employment.

Chanoux argues that it was medically necessary for her to leave her employment because she suffered from a "racing" heart due to stress. When leaving work for health reasons, the burden is on the claimant to provide a medical certification "to support a finding of good cause attributable to the work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d). Moreover, a "[c]laimant's hearsay testimony as to what his doctor advised" and his conclusory statement "that his work aggravated his [medical condition]" are not sufficient to find that medical problems are work-related. Brown v. Board of Review, 117 N.J. Super. 399, 404 (App. Div. 1971). Chanoux did not provide sufficient, credible evidence establishing the medical necessity for her to leave her job.

Appellate courts have a limited role in reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies. "Unless a Court finds that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We also recognize that decisions of administrative agencies carry with them the "presumption of reasonableness." City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980). We will yield to an agency's expertise even where the evidence supports more than one conclusion. Ibid.

This record contains substantial, credible evidence supporting the determination of the Board of Review.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-2823-04T3

December 21, 2005