LAURIE J. RIEGER v. GLEN D. JOHANSON

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2489-04T12489-04T1

LAURIE J. RIEGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GLEN D. JOHANSON,

Defendant-Respondent.

_______________________________________________

 

Submitted October 24, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges C.S. Fisher and Yannotti.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County, Docket No. FM-21-237-03.

Laurie J. Rieger, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Sebastian Ferrantell argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Ferrantell, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this appeal, plaintiff seeks our review of an order that denied her motion for enforcement of certain provisions of a judgment of divorce. We affirm.

The parties were married in 1995. The record indicates that, upon reaching a settlement of their outstanding disputes, the parties were divorced by way of a judgment entered on September 27, 2004. Because no children were born of their union, the judgment of divorce contains provisions that relate mostly to marital property. Indeed, much of the judgment is dedicated to the turnover to plaintiff of a 1996 Jeep then in defendant's possession. The judgment also required the turnover to plaintiff of certain unidentified personal property contained in a barn. Defendant was to place this personal property into the Jeep and then turn the Jeep over to plaintiff.

On October 5, 2004, defendant gave possession of the Jeep to plaintiff's attorney, as directed by the judgment, apparently because of an extant domestic violence restraining order. The odometer of the Jeep stated that it had been driven 207,530 miles. Dissatisfied with the condition of the Jeep, and maintaining that defendant had not included within the vehicle the personal property mentioned in the judgment, plaintiff filed a motion in the Family Part seeking relief. Defendant filed a cross-motion, seeking an award of the counsel fees incurred in responding to plaintiff's post-judgment motion.

The trial judge denied plaintiff's motion, and granted defendant's, for the reasons expressed in a brief written decision attached to the judge's order of December 10, 2004 order. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by not granting the relief she sought.

In her motion, plaintiff certified that defendant was ordered by the judge to turn over the Jeep in "pristine condition." In response to the judge's questioning during oral argument, plaintiff conceded that, in this regard, her certification was not accurate and that the judgment of divorce did not impose that requirement. In fact, the judgment gave no indication as to the condition of the Jeep thus demonstrating that defendant was only obligated to turn it over as it was. Plaintiff argued to the trial judge that defendant sabotaged the Jeep, requiring that she expend funds to put it in usable condition. The trial judge concluded, however, that the record contained no coherent information that would support this contention:

[T]here is not any evidence that the court ordered or that the husband agreed to turn over the subject car in "pristine condition." In fact, the wife conceded on the record during oral argument that the court never made such a statement. Furthermore, the wife has not shown by competent evidence that the husband damaged the car, let alone that he caused $8,000 worth of damages.

Plaintiff also argued in the trial court that defendant failed to turn over certain personal property. The judgment of divorce, however, contains no description of this personal property and defendant denied that the property identified in plaintiff's enforcement motion was ever in their possession. The trial judge denied this aspect of plaintiff's motion, finding the claim was inadequately supported.

After carefully reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

 
Affirmed.

On its surface, the December 10, 2004 order in question appears not to be a final order because it leaves to be decided the quantification of defendant's counsel fees. That is, the order contains a provision that directed defense counsel to submit an affidavit of legal services so that the amount of fees could be determined. However, we were advised by plaintiff at oral argument, without contradiction from defendant, that defendant did not submit such an affidavit and we thus assume that defendant abandoned his right to this relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the December 10, 2004 order did resolve all outstanding issues.

(continued)

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4

A-2489-04T1

November 3, 2005