ROBERT CRUZ v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Annotate this Case

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0654-04T50654-04T5

ROBERT CRUZ,

Defendant-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

__________________________________________

 

Submitted December 7, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Conley and Weissbard.

On appeal from the Department of Corrections.

Robert Cruz, appellant pro se.

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa A. Puglisi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant, an inmate at the East Jersey State Prison, appeals a final administrative determination by the Department of Corrections (DOC) upholding a hearing officer's conclusion that on two occasions appellant had violated N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a) *.259 ("failure to comply with an order to submit a specimen for prohibited substance testing"). We reverse.

Of course, our scope of review is limited to determining whether DOC's action was arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. E.g., In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). Here, appellant raises a number of contentions but we need focus on only one - whether the evidence supported the alleged infractions. The record before DOC must contain "substantial" evidence to support a finding of guilt. Jacobs v. Stephen, 139 N.J. 212, 222-23 (1995); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 530 (1975). Our inquiry is "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility . . . and . . . with due regard also to the agency's expertise where such expertise is a pertinent factor." Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 92-93 (1973) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)).

Here, there is no particular agency expertise involved and, in light of the prison's own evidence, credibility is really not a critical factor. Moreover, our review must be more than perfunctory. It requires a "'careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'" Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., supra, 64 N.J. at 93).

The incidents here occurred on July 11, 2004, and July 19, 2004. On both occasions, appellant's behavior was such as to warrant an order by a corrections officer to submit a urine sample to test for possible illegal drug use. On July 11, appellant appeared to be confused, disoriented, weak, staggering and sleepy. The order to void was given at 8:35 p.m. A minimum of thirty milliliters of urine was required and appellant was given two hours to provide it. When he did not provide a sample within that time period he was charged with the first infraction. On July 19, appellant, who was alone in his cell, was observed to be talking and chattering. When asked who he was talking to, he pointed upward and replied, "those guys." His speech was slurred, his eyes glassy, his motions were slow and uncoordinated, his gait was unsteady. He appeared to be intoxicated. An order to void was given at 4:45 p.m. When he did not provide the necessary thirty milliliters within two hours, he was charged with the second infraction.

Both failures would seem to be clear violations of *.259. But during the first hearing on the July 11 infraction, appellant denied refusing to provide the sample, instead saying he could not provide the sample because of the medications he was taking. And, in fact, at the time appellant was taking a number of prescribed medications, including two psychotropic drugs.

As a result, the hearing office postponed completion of the hearing for "more medical info." At that time, the hearing officer filled out a "Request for Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluation" form for the "medical doctor," which asked whether "'prescribed' medications prevent this IM from providing a urine sample." In reply to this, the prison doctor wrote:

After a review of the chart, it is noted that he is prescribed two psychotropic medications that can have an effect of slowing down the urinary system. While in extreme cases a person can cease to urinate, it would become a medical emergency for a person to stop urinating that would have come to the attention of the medical department. No such diagnosis is documented in this inmate's chart. Given enough time, a person should be able to provide a urine sample. However, the courtline process may request medical input as writer is aware that some form of urination/kidney problem is being investigated.

In conclusion, from a purely mental health perspective, although highly unlikely, certain prescribed medications have produced decreased urination ability in persons taking them. Even more unlikely is the worsening of the urine slow down to the point of preventing someone from urinating, as it becomes a medical emergency not noted in this inmate's chart.

[Emphasis added.]

Thus, while the doctor essentially rejected a complete loss of the ability to urinate, he acknowledged the medications appellant was taking "can have an effect of slowing down the urinary system." It was his opinion that "given enough time," a urine sample could be produced. He did not quantify what would be "enough time." He also suggested appellant might have "some form of urination/kidney problem" and offered the thought that "courtline process may request medical input."

Clearly, rather than provide evidence to support the charge of refusing to provide the sample, the doctor's reply did quite the contrary. Nonetheless, without any further medical inquiry, the hearing officer concluded as to the July 11 infraction,

Summary of Evidence relied on to reach decision: There was sufficient probable cause for order; No Medical/Medication, nor psychiatric reason to explain IM's symptoms, nor to excuse IM's non-compliance with order; IM's statement at courtline indicates indifference-insubordination onto order. Credible charge. Evidence is sufficient to substantiate.

As to the July 19 infraction, the hearing officer concluded:

Summary of Evidence relied on to reach decision: Inmate was acting in odd manner which prompted probable cause for an order to void; Inmate did not; Admits he did not. Defense is insufficient; no medical, psychiatric, medication related cause. Charge is credible and sufficient to hold inmate accountable for violation.

These conclusions are so unsupported by the record that we are convinced we owe them no deference. First, there was a reason offered by the prison doctor to explain appellant's claimed inability to provide the sample within the two hours allotted. And, if the medications appellant was taking did "slow down" his urinary tract such that he could not produce the necessary amount of urine within two hours, his statement that he could not "pee" would not reflect "indifference - insubordination onto order." Second, the hearing officer in the second infraction seems to have placed the burden upon appellant to disprove the impact of the drugs upon his ability to urinate. But that is not his burden. Simply put, there is not substantial evidence in this prison disciplinary record to support a finding of guilt as to either infraction.

 
Reversed and remanded to DOC to remove the findings of guilt from appellant's institutional record and take such other corrective action as is appropriate.

(continued)

(continued)

6

A-0654-04T5

December 20, 2005

 


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.