Justia.com Opinion Summary: At issue in this appeal was whether an alleged victim of child sexual abuse may claim a privilege against testifying in the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1210, which provides, "When the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, the witness is not compelled to answer...." The district court found the privilege against exposure to public ignominy did not apply to the victim because her testimony was highly material to the crimes charged. The victim appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds after noting that section 25-1210 does not include a materiality exception, holding that public ignominy privilege cannot be asserted by a witness in a criminal case, regardless of the materiality of the testimony.
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• Spitz presented no documents that showed she and McCannon
had signed them as husband and wife.
• n July 2003, Spitz and McCannon filed a “Subordinate
I
Deed of Trust,” in which they represented that they were
single persons.
• n October 2003, Spitz executed a “Deed of Reconveyance”
I
as a single person.
• rom 2003 to 2005, Spitz represented in deed documents that
F
she was single, and the documents described the property as
Spitz’ sole property.
• Spitz’ tax returns for 1995 through 2005 show that she did not
represent herself as married: “In fact, by stating she was the
head of the household, the filing of [Spitz’] tax returns actually shows that [she] held herself out to be unmarried.”
• cCannon’s obituary identified Spitz as a “longtime
M
companion.”
We conclude that the court was not clearly wrong in finding that the vast majority of objective evidence showed that
Spitz and McCannon did not intend to create a commonlaw marriage and did not conduct their affairs as though
a common-law marriage existed. Under Colorado law, we
review the trial judge’s conclusion for abuse of discretion. We
find none here.
Affirmed.
Wright, J., not participating.
State
of
Nebraska, appellee, v. Glen E. R iensche,
H.M., alleged victim, appellant.
appellee, and
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed May 11, 2012. No. S-11-280.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
2. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from
which the appeal is taken.
3. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. An order is final for purposes of appeal if it
affects a substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment,
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(2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application
in an action after judgment is rendered.
4. Witnesses: Contempt: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A civil contempt order
against a nonparty witness is a final and appealable order.
5. Criminal Law: Witnesses: Testimony: Case Disapproved. Insofar as it recognizes a public ignominy privilege, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1210 (Reissue 2008) does
not apply to a criminal case. To the extent that State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379, 303
N.W.2d 741 (1981), and State v. Bittner, 188 Neb. 298, 196 N.W.2d 186 (1972),
can be read to suggest otherwise, they are disapproved.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Paul
D. Merritt, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Randall Wertz, John F. Recknor, and Susan L. Kirchmann,
of Recknor, Wertz & Associates, for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and James D. Smith for
appellee State of Nebraska.
Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, and
Miller-Lerman, JJ.
Stephan, J.
The issue in this appeal is whether an alleged victim of child
sexual abuse may claim a privilege against testifying in the
criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1210 (Reissue 2008), which provides, “When
the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, the witness is not compelled to answer . . . .” The district
court for Lancaster County found the privilege against exposure to public ignominy did not apply to the victim because
her testimony was highly material to the crimes charged. The
victim appeals. Although our reasoning differs from that of the
district court, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sometime prior to August 2010, law enforcement authorities learned that Glen E. Riensche may have sexually assaulted
H.M., his stepdaughter, when she was approximately 7 years
old. H.M. was born in August 1986 and currently resides in
another state. When questioned by law enforcement in 2010,
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H.M. discussed the allegations and participated in a recorded
telephone call with Riensche. In November 2010, the State
charged Riensche with first degree sexual assault and sexual
assault of a child.
Pursuant to a subpoena, H.M. appeared with counsel in
Nebraska on March 7, 2011, the day Riensche’s trial was
scheduled to begin. H.M. participated in a deposition in which
Riensche’s counsel attempted to question her about the charges
filed against Riensche. Before H.M. answered, her counsel
stated, “My client’s going to refuse to testify.” He explained
the testimony “would render her infamous, would disgrace
her to the public and [would] expose her to public ignominy
pursuant to Nebraska statutes and [the] Nebraska constitution.”
Counsel stipulated that H.M. had previously spoken to law
enforcement officers, but stated that H.M. did not want “to
get into the specifics of the allegation” because she was the
mother of three young children and did not want them or her
“to be exposed to any criminal proceeding.” After confirming
that H.M. would refuse to testify about the criminal charges,
Riensche’s counsel discontinued questioning. When the prosecutor sought to clarify the basis for H.M.’s refusal by asking
if her testimony would subject her to potential prosecution,
her counsel replied, “Not that we know of” and confirmed
that H.M. was refusing to testify only because she believed
her testimony would expose her to public ignominy. On crossexamination by the prosecutor, H.M., through her counsel,
again asserted the privilege against exposure to public ignominy and refused to answer substantive questions about the
criminal case.
The deposition was then concluded, and the parties appeared
before the district court. The prosecutor made an oral motion
to compel H.M.’s testimony, and the court scheduled a subsequent hearing on that issue. Riensche’s trial did not take place
as scheduled.
At the subsequent hearing, H.M.’s counsel confirmed H.M.
was asserting the privilege codified in § 25-1210. Counsel
explained that H.M. had started a “new life” in another state
and did not “want to testify about an alleged incestuous
assault that happened many, many years ago.” The prosecutor
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argued that the privilege against exposure to public ignominy did not apply if the testimony was material to a criminal prosecution.
In an order dated March 14, 2011, the district court opined
that a witness could “be compelled to testify, notwithstanding
the privilege created by § 25-1210,” if “the witness’ testimony
is material to the issue to which the testimony is addressed.”
In finding H.M.’s testimony could be compelled, the court reasoned H.M. was “the alleged victim of the allegations against
the defendant” and noted it was “difficult to imagine a more
material witness under the circumstances.” The district court
ordered H.M. to appear at Riensche’s trial on April 4.
H.M. moved to stay the order compelling her to testify
pending her appeal. At a March 31, 2011, hearing, H.M. testified that despite the court’s order, she would refuse to testify
if she were called as a witness at trial. The prosecutor asked
the court to hold H.M. in contempt and to impose an appropriate sanction. After finding by clear and convincing evidence
that H.M.’s conduct was “willful and contumacious,” the court
found H.M. “to be in willful contempt of court.” The court
committed H.M. to the county jail “for a period of 90 days or
until such time as she testifies as ordered, whichever occurs
first.” The court granted H.M.’s motion to stay execution of
the sentence pending her appeal. H.M. perfected this appeal
on April 1, and we moved it to our docket on our own motion
pursuant to our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of
the appellate courts of this state.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
H.M. assigns that the district court erred in interpreting
§ 25-1210, (1) to preclude her from asserting a privilege against
testifying and (2) in a manner that violates public policy.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] In this appeal, we are asked to determine the scope
of the public ignominy privilege set forth in § 25-1210.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
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an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
court below.
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction
[2,3] Because it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, we note
the reasons for our agreement with the parties that we have
jurisdiction over this appeal. Generally, for an appellate court
to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order
entered by the court from which the appeal is taken. An order
is final for purposes of appeal if it affects a substantial right
and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is
made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary
application in an action after judgment is rendered.
We apply these principles of finality to an order affecting a
party to a case. But here, H.M. is a nonparty witness charged
with civil contempt for refusing to testify in a criminal case
based upon the assertion of an evidentiary privilege. The contempt order requiring her to either testify or spend up to 90
days in county jail does not fit neatly within our standard analytical framework for finality, although we have no doubt that
it seems very final to H.M.
As we have recently noted, federal courts permit nonparties to appeal from interlocutory, civil contempt orders. This
policy is based upon recognition that while such orders may be
interlocutory with respect to the parties to an action, they are
State v. Jimenez, ante p. 95, 808 N.W.2d 352 (2012); State v. Parks, 282
Neb. 454, 803 N.W.2d 761 (2011).
State v. Yos-Chiguil, 281 Neb. 618, 798 N.W.2d 832 (2011).
StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 281 Neb. 238, 795 N.W.2d 271
(2011), modified on denial of rehearing 281 Neb. 978, 802 N.W.2d 420.
Id.; Schropp Indus. v. Washington Cty. Atty.’s Ofc., 281 Neb. 152, 794
N.W.2d 685 (2011).
Schropp Indus., supra note 5; Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier,
279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010), disapproved on other grounds,
Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, ante p. 369, 808 N.W.2d 867 (2012).
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final from the perspective of the nonparty witness found to be
in contempt. In an early recognition of this principle, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that in “cases in which the [contempt] proceedings are against one not a party to the suit, and
cannot be regarded as interlocutory[,] we are of opinion that
there is a right of review.” In another early case, the Court distinguished between an interlocutory order requiring a nonparty
witness to produce certain evidence and an order holding the
witness in contempt for failure to do so, noting that the “power
to punish being exercised[,] the matter becomes personal to
the witness and a judgment as to him.” More recently, the
Court has stated, “The right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be questioned. The order finding
a nonparty witness in contempt is appealable notwithstanding
the absence of a final judgment in the underlying action.”10
Another federal court has noted that “[t]he contempt order
effectively transforms the ‘interlocutory’ into the ‘final’ by giving the [nonparty] witness a distinct and severable interest in
the underlying action.”11
[4] We conclude that this approach is sensible and fair. The
rule that only final orders are appealable is designed to prevent
piecemeal review, chaos in trial procedure, and a succession of
appeals granted in the same case to secure advisory opinions to
govern further actions of the trial court.12 That purpose is not
advanced by requiring a nonparty witness who has been held
in contempt to await the eventual resolution of the underlying
case by the parties before obtaining appellate review. By that
10
11
12
See, Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 487 U.S. 72, 108 S.
Ct. 2268, 101 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1988); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S.
117, 26 S. Ct. 356, 50 L. Ed. 686 (1906); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997 (1904).
Bessette, supra note 7, 194 U.S. at 338.
Alexander, supra note 7, 201 U.S. at 122.
Catholic Conf., supra note 7, 487 U.S. at 76.
U.S. v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 628 (3d Cir. 1988).
See, Smith v. Lincoln Meadows Homeowners Assn., 267 Neb. 849, 678
N.W.2d 726 (2004); State v. Meese, 257 Neb. 486, 599 N.W.2d 192
(1999).
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time, such review may be meaningless if the nonparty witness
has completed the term of imprisonment imposed as a sanction
for contempt. Accordingly, we adopt the principle set forth in
federal cases and hold that a civil contempt order against a
nonparty witness is a final and appealable order.
Scope of Public Ignominy Privilege
The Nebraska Rules of Evidence13 apply generally to all
civil and criminal proceedings14 and include provisions relating to privileges,15 which provisions “apply at all stages of all
actions, cases, and proceedings.”16 Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of
the United States or the State of Nebraska or provided
by Act of Congress, or the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, by these rules or by other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court of Nebraska which are not in conflict
with laws governing such matters, no person has the
privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing
any matter or producing any object or writing.
The privileges set forth in article 5 of the rules of evidence17
do not include a public ignominy privilege. Thus, we must
look to other state or federal statutes, or the state or federal
Constitution, for the source of the privilege claimed by H.M.
The parties agree that the sole source of the public ignominy
privilege is § 25-1210, which actually identifies two distinct
privileges. Under § 25-1210 and subject to an exception not
applicable here, a witness may not be compelled to testify
“[w]hen the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render
13
14
15
16
17
Neb. Evid. R. 101 to 1301, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-101 to 27-1301 (Reissue
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
Neb. Evid. R. 1101(2).
Neb. Evid. R. 501 to 513.
Neb. Evid. R. 1101(3).
Neb. Evid. R. 503 to 510.
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the witness criminally liable” or tend “to expose him or her to
public ignominy.” The word “ignominy” is generally defined
to mean “[p]ublic disgrace or dishonor.”18 Long ago, the Iowa
Supreme Court concluded that the term “was not intended to
apply to all acts which might justify public censure or disapproval, but those of a more serious nature, which would tend
to expose the perpetrator to public hatred or detestation or
dishonor.”19 Although we acknowledge a Georgia appellate
opinion to the contrary,20 and with due respect to H.M.’s reasons for asserting the privilege, we question whether a victim’s
truthful testimony about a crime perpetrated upon him or her
would subject that person to “public ignominy.”21 But the State
did not challenge the assertion of the privilege on that basis,
the district court did not address the issue, and we need not do
so in order to resolve this appeal.22
As noted, § 25-1210 refers to two separate and distinct
privileges: a privilege against self-incrimination and a privilege against exposure to public ignominy. The latter is not a
part of the former. In Brown v. Walker,23 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination was not intended to shield a witness from giving testimony which would expose the witness to disgrace
or disrepute. The Court noted that the “extent to which the
witness is compelled to answer such questions as do not
fix upon him a criminal culpability is within the control of
the legislature.”24
The Nebraska Legislature has exercised such control by
its enactment of § 25-1210. Although this is an appeal from
a civil contempt order, it originates from the assertion of a
18
Black’s Law Dictionary 814 (9th ed. 2009).
Mahanke v. Cleland, 76 Iowa 401, 405, 41 N.W. 53, 55 (1888).
20
Wynne v. State, 139 Ga. App. 355, 228 S.E.2d 378 (1976).
21
See § 25-1210.
22
See, State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 760 N.W.2d 35 (2009); State v. Sommer,
273 Neb. 587, 731 N.W.2d 566 (2007).
23
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896).
24
Id., 161 U.S. at 598.
19
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privilege by a witness testifying in a criminal case. Section
25-1210 is included in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised
Statutes, entitled “Courts; Civil Procedure.” Chapter 29,
entitled “Criminal Procedure,” includes no similar privilege.
Chapter 25 and chapter 29 do not include general scope
provisions.
Some statutes found within chapter 29 specifically incorporate statutory procedures from chapter 25. For example,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1905 (Reissue 2008), pertaining to
depositions in criminal cases, provides that “[t]he proceedings in taking the examination of such witness and returning
it to court shall be governed in all respects as the taking of
depositions in all civil cases.” And Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1206
(Reissue 2008) provides that applications for continuances
in criminal cases “shall be made in accordance with section
25-1148,” subject to certain modifications. The parties have
directed us to no provision in chapter 29 which incorporates
the public ignominy privilege found in § 25-1210, and we
have found none.
On several occasions, this court has specifically declined
to apply a civil procedure statute in a criminal case. We held
long ago in Hubbard v. State25 that a defendant could not rely
upon a statute governing motions for new trials in civil cases
in order to file a motion which was time barred under the
corresponding criminal procedure statute. We noted that “the
provisions of the code [of civil procedure], as indicated by
its title, refer only to new trials in civil actions.”26 In Huckins
v. State,27 we held that a witness subpoenaed to testify in a
criminal case could not insist on advance payment of his fees
as a condition precedent to his appearance pursuant to a civil
procedure statute. Noting the absence of any provision of law
imposing a prepayment requirement in criminal cases, the
court concluded that “[i]t would require a very plain provision of law to justify the belief that the legislative branch of
25
26
27
Hubbard v. State, 72 Neb. 62, 100 N.W. 153 (1904).
Id. at 67, 100 N.W. at 154.
Huckins v. State, 61 Neb. 871, 86 N.W. 485 (1901).
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the government intended to interpose such obstacles to the
prosecution of crime.”28 More recently, in State v. Merrill,29 we
held that the State could not rely upon civil procedure statutes
as legal authority for an appeal in a criminal case. We noted
that the statutes upon which the State relied were “statutes
of general application found in chapter 25 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes relating to civil procedure”30 and did not
provide authorization for the State’s attempted appeal in a
criminal case.
In other cases, however, the line of demarcation between
the scope of civil and criminal procedural statutes is less
distinct. In State v. Micek31 and State v. Mills,32 both criminal appeals, we held that copies of prior judgments used to
prove that the defendants were habitual criminals were properly authenticated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1285
(Reissue 1995) and 25-1286 (Reissue 1979). And in State v.
Bittner33 and State v. Ellis,34 we referenced § 25-1210 without
specifically addressing its applicability to a criminal case. In
Bittner, a prosecution witness refused to answer certain questions on cross-examination on the ground that the answers
would incriminate her. We noted that the privilege against
self-incrimination was based upon the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and on § 25-1210. While the opinion
includes a survey of cases dealing with whether “impeachment
on moral grounds is permissible,”35 that discussion is largely
dicta because the witness asserted only the privilege against
self-incrimination. The dispositive issue was whether assertion
of the privilege deprived the defendant of his right to confrontation. We concluded that it did not, because the restricted
28
Id. at 872, 86 N.W. at 485.
State v. Merrill, 273 Neb. 583, 731 N.W.2d 570 (2007).
30
Id. at 586, 731 N.W.2d at 573.
31
State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
32
State v. Mills, 199 Neb. 295, 258 N.W.2d 628 (1977).
33
State v. Bittner, 188 Neb. 298, 196 N.W.2d 186 (1972).
34
State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379, 303 N.W.2d 741 (1981).
35
Bittner, supra note 33, 188 Neb. at 300, 196 N.W.2d at 188.
29
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questioning dealt only with a collateral matter unrelated to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.
In Ellis, we addressed a defendant’s contention that his crossexamination of a prosecution witness was unduly restricted by
her assertion of the privileges against self-incrimination and
public ignominy in response to questions about prior sexual
conduct. We concluded without further analysis that the ruling
sustaining the witness’ right to assert the privilege was “fully
in accord with . . . § 25-1210.”36 Again, we did not explain
the basis for applying that civil procedure statute in a criminal case.
Recognizing a right of a recalcitrant witness to assert a public ignominy privilege in a criminal case would pose an obstacle to the prosecution of crime. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observed more than 100 years ago, the danger of recognizing
this privilege in a criminal case
is that the privilege may be put forward for a sentimental
reason, or for a purely fanciful protection of the witness
against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of
securing immunity to some third person, who is interested
in concealing the facts to which [the witness] would testify. Every good citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement
of the law, and has no right to permit himself, under the
pretext of shielding his own good name, to be made the
tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind
[the witness’] privilege.37
We conclude here, as we did in Huckins, that “[i]t would
require a very plain provision of law to justify the belief that
the legislative branch of the government intended to interpose
such obstacles to the prosecution of crime.”38
[5] We find no such provision. Had the Legislature intended
to permit a witness in a criminal case to assert a public ignominy privilege, it could have included the privilege in article
5 of the Nebraska Rules of Evidence, enacted a criminal
p
rocedure statute specifically recognizing the privilege, or
36
37
38
Ellis, supra note 34, 208 Neb. at 395, 303 N.W.2d at 751.
Brown, supra note 23, 161 U.S. at 600.
Huckins, supra note 27, 61 Neb. at 872, 86 N.W. at 485.
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enacted a criminal procedure statute incorporating § 25-1210
by reference. It did none of those things. While we acknowledge that some of our prior cases imply that § 25-1210
is applicable to a criminal case, we specifically reject that
implication with respect to the public ignominy privilege. We
further note that the privilege against self-incrimination recognized in § 25-1210 has an independent constitutional basis,
whereas the public ignominy privilege does not. We therefore
hold that insofar as it recognizes a public ignominy privilege,
§ 25-1210 does not apply to a criminal case. To the extent
that Bittner39 and Ellis40 can be read to suggest otherwise, they
are disapproved.
We do not hold or suggest that a provision of chapter 25 of
the Nebraska Revised Statutes must be specifically incorporated by a provision of chapter 29 to apply to a criminal case.
We acknowledge that some procedural and evidentiary statutes
found in chapter 25 may harmoniously apply to a criminal
case. And we acknowledge that “[t]itle heads, chapter heads,
section and subsection heads or titles . . . in the statutes of
Nebraska, supplied in compilation, do not constitute any part
of the law.”41 But because the public ignominy privilege would
impose an obstacle to the prosecution of crime, it is not available to a witness in a criminal case absent a clear indication
that the Legislature intended that it should. And as we have
noted, we find no such indication of legislative intent.
The district court concluded that H.M. could be compelled
to testify because the public ignominy privilege did not apply
to testimony concerning a material issue in a criminal case.
We disagree with this reasoning because § 25-1210 does not
include a materiality exception. But because we conclude that
the public ignominy privilege cannot be asserted by a witness
in a criminal case, regardless of the materiality of the testimony, we affirm the district court’s ruling.42
39
Bittner, supra note 33.
Ellis, supra note 34.
41
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-802(8) (Reissue 2010).
42
See, Doe v. Board of Regents, ante p. 303, 809 N.W.2d 263 (2012); Tolbert
v. Jamison, 281 Neb. 206, 794 N.W.2d 877 (2011).
40
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the district court
did not err in ordering H.M. to testify and in exercising its contempt power to enforce its order. We observe that the fact that
the State may compel H.M. to testify does not necessarily mean
that it should. But that question must be left to the judgment
and discretion of the prosecutor.
Affirmed.
Wright, J., not participating.
Brian Shipley,
appellant, v.
Department of Roads,
State of Nebraska, and Cass
County, Nebraska, a political subdivision
of the State of Nebraska, appellees.
K enneth E. Stoddard and Sondra K. Stoddard, Guardians
of Jamin L. Stoddard, an incapacitated person, appellants,
and Nebraska Department of H ealth and Human
Services, an agency of the State of Nebraska,
appellee, v. Department of Roads, an agency
of the State of Nebraska, and Cass County,
Nebraska, a political subdivision of the
State of Nebraska, appellees.
an agency of the
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed May 11, 2012. Nos. S-11-293, S-11-294.
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and
evidence admitted at the hearing disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
3. Administrative Law: Judgments. Interpretation of the Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices presents a question of law.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate
court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the conclusion
reached by the trial court.
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