STATE v ROOT
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No. 01-315 IX Till3 SL7PRELfI: COliRT 01: THE ST,-ZTE OF MON-riINA 2003 "~rr 28 L. RON;\L D J ROOT, Deknda~it i\ppcllant. and APPEAL FROM: District Court of tile Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-00-933 Honorable Do~iglas t-larkin, Judge Presiding G. Far i2ppellant W~lltarn t-fooks. Attorney at Lam. tlclena, Montana F For Respondent: I-lonorablc Mike McCrath, Attor~iey General; Carol I. Sch~nidi. Assistarlt Attor~iey (;cneral, Helena, Montana Fred Van Valltenburg, County httoriley, RZissoula, Monta~ia Decided: ikbruarj 20; 200.3 Just~cc iirrl Ricc delivered the Opinion of the Coon. $1 Ronald J. Xoot (Roo:) appads :?om ihc order entered by ihc Foirrih .iudici:ii District Court, Missoilla Couniy, dismissing his pirtition for postconviction relict 'We afinn. " I /Although Root raises several issues on appeal, we find the follo:\.ir~g issric to he iiispositive: Did the District Court err in dismissing the petition or1 the ground that it was time barred' BACKGROUND 13 The facts relating to the tin~elinessof Root's second petition are undisputed. On March 12, 1097. Root was found guilty of the c h a r ~ of sexual intercourse x\-ithout consent. e a felony, following a jriry trial. He appealed, and this C o u ~affirmed his conviction in an l opinion issued on August 30, 1999. See Sftrte 1'. Roof,1999 MT 203,296 ktont. I : 987 P.2d 1140. 54 On January 18: 2000, Root, then proceedingpro se, filed apetition for postconviction relief, asserting several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finding that the petition conclusi\~ely demonstrated that Root was not entitled to relief, the District Court distiiissed the petition on March 3, 2000: without ordering a response fiorn the State. Root appealed that dismissal to this Court. 55 On %lay23.2000, we issued an interlocutory ortier appointing counsel on appeal fix [toot, noting that Root was incarcerated in a correctional facility that did not have an adcqiiatc legal library. On .June 21, 2000, Root, through h i s appointed counsel, 111oved to voluntarily dismiss his appeal, which w a s granted by this Court. -. Koor, by his appointed counsel, t'hcr~ filec?a second petition fur postconviction relief ej i6 itr rhc District court on Dcccmber 4 2000, again claiming that he had rcceil~ed . i?effi:-i'i:ciii-c assistance of counsel during his trial. After ordering tllc Slate to respond. the ilistrict Coiir: dismissed Root's second petition, concluding, on the basis of 55 46-21- 102 and -105, i\'lC:.A9 that thc petition vias time barred. mas barred under proxxsrons gcnerning ~ccortdoi subseqcitt petitions; and was procedurally barred because lioot could have raised his c!aims iii earlier proceedings. Because cve find the timeliness issue to be dispositiue, cvc do not idd dress the other grounds upon which the District Court dismissed Root's petition. STANDARD OF RE\ IEN 77 This Court re~~iems a district court's denial oTa pctilion for postcoi~vietlonrclicfto dctern~inc whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of !an are correct. Stutc~ fVrlgitt, 2003 MT 282,307 Vont. 340.42 P 3d 753. v 1 (ere, the 1)istnct Court's findings of fact are not challenged. and our re\ le\r 1s confined to the correctness of the 1)istrict Court's conclusions of I:LU 1 '8 Section 46-21-102. MC 2, states as f o l l o ~ s . (1 ) Except as provided in subsection ( ) a petition forthc rclicfrcfcrrcd 2; to in 46-21-101 may he filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becornes final. :2 conviction becomes final for purposes ofthis chapter when: (aj the time for appeal to the MonVana supreme court cxpires; (b) if an appeal is taken to the bionta~~lua supreme court, the tinie for petitioning the Gnited States supreme court for review expires; or (cj if review is sought in the United States supreme court. on the date titat that court issues its final order in the case. (2) A claim that al'?egcsthe cxistencc of newly discovered e\~idcricc that, ifproved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for wllich tire petitioner was convicted. may bc raised in a petition filcd within I year of the (fate on which the conviction beeo~i~es or the date on which the petitioner final should have discovered3the existence ofthc cvidencc. discovers, orrea~ttnably -~vhichever later. is The Distr~ct Court noted that pursuant to L'ntted States Supreme Court Rules, Root " j had 00 dajs from the entry of our decis~onin hts appeal. or until Nokember 30, 1999, to petttton for wnt of certlorart rn the Cn~ted States Supreme f ourt. See Rule 1 1, Rules of the Supreme Court of tlre llnited States; Stnte v. Ahc, 2001 M7' 260. 7, 307 Mont. 233. j' 7.37 P.3d 77, ' i 7. Then, in accordance with 4 46-21-1 02(l j(b), MC.4, which deems convictioiis to be final ivhen tile tirnc expires for petitioning the United Siatitcs Supreme Court, and pursuant to the one-yea, limitacton pcrlod problded In 4 46-21-l02(1), MCA. rhc Dtstrrct Co~irt found that Root had until Xovember 30, 2000, to file his petition for postconviction relref. The Dtstrlct Court concl~ided therefrom that Root's first petttton, filed on January 18, 2000, was timely, but that his second petition, filed December 4. 2000, was untimcly, and therefore barred under the statute.' 10 In Root's view. the District Court erred in applying the one-year limitatioii period to his second postconviction petition because the onc-year period applies only to an initial or original pctition. His brief statcs: , . fhc District Court erred slightly- in its calculation of the 90-day period. Sineiy days ilom i\ugust 30, 19W'i;is not Xo\reniber 30. 1999; but rather Xove17iher28. 1999. I h e one-ycar pcriod for tiling a pctition for postconviction relief thus ran until November 28>2000. Ilo\vever. this error ai'fcctc neithcr tlrc Diitrici C'our:'~ decision 110s thc outcome on appeal -I .hc one-year liniitations pcriod docs not apply to an~enbecl petitions or second or successivc petitions for relief. Phese petitions are not mentioned in $46-2 i102, XZC-A; and are addressed in 446-21-105, MCA. This latter statute contains express provisions for the setting of a deadlinc for f%ng an amended petition. In short, nothing in the provisions of these statutes suggests, let alone re~~ircs, the one-year limitations period applies to anything other rltan the that initial petition for relief. This does not mean that a petitioner can file petitions utl nrrusenm. A second or successive petition is subject to the waiver and "good cause" exception doctrines addressed in $46-21-105. %'LCA4. 711 1 The pro.r~siorl relied upon by Root, 3 46-21-105(1), AICA, proc~des: ( I )(a) All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under 46-2 1 - 10 1 must be raised in the original or amended original petition. The original petition may be amended only once. At the request of the state or on its own n~otion, court shall set a deadline for the filing of an amended original the petition. If a hearing will be held, the deadline must be reasonably in ildvance , of the hearing but may not be less than 30 days prior to the date of the hearing. (b) The court shall dismiss a second or subsequent pctition by a person xvl~o has filed an original petition unless the second or subsequent petition raises grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an amended original petition. 711 2 In his argument quoted above, Root incorrectly ltnnps amendedpetitions together with second or subsequent petitions. "Amended" petitions and "subsequent" pctitlons are are different in nature and are goberned by drfferent statutoryprovisrons. Amended pet~tions governed bq 6 46-21-1 05(l)(a), MC'A, a h ~ c h contemplates that a petztlon nlay be amended d~tring course of an ongoing proceeding that was timely initiated. The provision allows the a district court to set a deadline for filing an amendcdpetition. Ihese petitions are referenced in $ 40-2 I - 105(l)(b): MCA, as "arnended original" petitions '113 1-Iowcver,Root did not file an amended original petition? anci thns, the tin~eliness oi' an amended petrt~on not before the Co~trt 1s herc tl'e tlictefore do not address whether the 1 Root filed a second pctition for postconviction re!iei- which is go\-csl~cil $36-21by 1 5 1 . % I . I'hc provision rn:~nd:itesthat a distrci court "shall dismiss" a scconci or subscqrrei~t petition "ui~lcssthe second or subscquelit petition raises grounds for rclicf thiit could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an at-nended original peiition," Root offers tlic Com~i?ission Comrnents to 3 46-21-105. MCA. in explanation ofthis provision's application: 'The object of this sectiol~ to eli~iiillate iit~neccssar-yburden is the piaceci upon tlic courts by repetitious or specious petitions. it is highly desirable illat a petitioner be rccluired to assert all his claims in one pctition. Gftless good cause is show11why he did not assert all his claims in the original petition: his failure to so assert tlie111constitutes it M-aivcr. 1 he ~ v a y lcft open, however, is for a subseyuent petitioli if the court finds grounds for relief tl~at could not reasonably have been raised in the original pctition. 3 qj15 Root argues that the plain meaning of $5 46-21-!02(1) atld -105(2), kICA, restricts application of the one-year limitation pcriod to initial or original petitions. L-rereasons tint second or subsequent pctltio~ls ltm~ted are only by tile need to demonstrate that the clams therein "could not reasonably ha\;e been raised in rlze original pctition," undcr the standards I Wc disagree. '4 reading o f tile statutes gctverrling posrco~iviction proceedings in their cntircty convinces us that $16-2 02(1), LICA, applies a onc-year pcriod of 1i:nitation o n 1-1 the initiation CISall postcon\-iction proceedings. includir~gtl~osciilitiatcd by second o . r subsccjuent petitions. Section 40-2 1-1 01, MCSI\, sets hrth rhc relief a\-ailable in postcoitviction procecdings, which necessarilg~ inc'ludcs scco~ld suhscyucnt proceedings. or Section 4 - 2 I-!CB2, MVA, states that "'a petirioil h r thc relief rekrred to in 4 - 2 1 -1 01 nlaqbe filed a? any time hithin 1 year" of tlie conviction becoming final. Section 46-21-103, L:l,IC:A, provides that "[t]he proceeding for relief undcr 46-21-101 must be comrncnced by filing a verified petition with the clerk of the appropriate conrt." Section 46-21 -104; MCA, requires that "[tlhe petition for postconviction relief must: . . . (b) identify any previous proceedings that the petitioner may have taken to sceurc relief front the conviction." Thus, a proceeding seeking relief available under 3 40-21-101, MC:.%, nmust meet all the requirements set forth in these pro~iisions,including, for purposes here, the filing. in the appropriate court, of a verified petition which identifies all previous posteon\-iction proceedings, lvithin one year of the conviction becoining final. The statutes do not exempt second or subsequent petitions from any of these requirements. Rather, 3 46-21-105, MCA, imposes an additional requirement: that a second or subsequent petition, in order to avoid ciismissal, must also dclnonstrate good cause why its claims were not asserted in the original petition. 17 Root's proffered interpretat~on% ould lead to absurd results. Iftile one-year l~mitat~on 1 provision did not apply to subsequent petitions, an original petition filed aftcr expiration of be the one-?car limitation period ~vould time baned, but would nonetheless open the door to the filing of a second petition which t v o ~ ~be linliteci only by thc need to demonstrate whj: ld thc claims therein were Itor raised in thc original, time-Darreci petition. This result, though possible under Root's intcrprciatiol~. -!car-ly not coriten~platcd ihr plain \vorcIirrg o f t h e is by sraintes. 9; 18 'l'iie postconviction statutes do provide a narrow exception to the one-year limitatioil period, Section 36-21-102(2), MCA, allows a petition which alleges newly discovered evidencc to be tiled one year after the eviderice was discovered; or "reasonably should have [been] discovered." This indicates that the Legislature contemplated the filing of petitions beyond the one-year period following conviction and provided a narrow exception therefor. tlere, Root has not alleged that the time for filing is extended eitlicr by this statutory "newly discovered evidence" prob~ision, the "miscarriage of justice" exception premised upon nor convietioil of one w11o is actually innocent. See Slirte v. IZe(icr.c~i,~j. 99 MT M5,33,294 1'1 Mont. 252, '! 33,980 P.2d 022.1j 33. Tlius. the statuloryprovisions as interpreted herein arc eontroll~ng. 10 Thc f>lstrtct Court's d~sm~ssal the petlt~onis iiffirined of L e concur: V
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