In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
PAUL LERO & CAROLYN LERO,
)
Respondents, )
v.
)
)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
)
COMPANY,
)
Appellant. )
WD73220
FILED: October 25, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CASS COUNTY
THE HONORABLE R. MICHAEL WAGNER, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION FOUR: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, CHIEF JUDGE, PRESIDING,
MARK D. PFEIFFER, JUDGE AND ANN MESLE, SPECIAL JUDGE
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm") appeals the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Paul Lero and Carolyn Lero ("the
Leros") and denial of State Farm's motion for summary judgment. The court
determined a personal liability umbrella policy purchased by the Leros' deceased
daughter provided uninsured motorist coverage and ordered State Farm to pay the
policy's $1 million limit to the Leros. For reasons explained herein, we reverse the
circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the Leros and enter summary
judgment in favor of State Farm.
Factual and Procedural History
In October 2008, the Leros' daughter, Denise Greene, died from injuries she
sustained in an automobile collision. The other car involved in the collision was
driven by Adam Mace and owned by Robert Lyons. The collision occurred when
Mace, traveling on 291 Highway in Cass County at a high rate of speed and under
the influence of alcohol, crossed into the opposite lane of traffic and struck
Greene's car.
The Leros sued Lyons for the wrongful death of their daughter, alleging he
had negligently entrusted Mace with his car. The circuit court entered a judgment
against Lyons for $2 million. Lyons's insurer, American Family Insurance Group,
denied coverage. On May 14, 2009, the Leros made demand upon Greene's
insurer, State Farm, for uninsured motorist benefits under Greene's automobile
liability policy and her personal liability umbrella policy.1 State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company paid the Leros the automobile liability policy's
uninsured motorist coverage limit of $50,000. On May 29, 2009, State Farm's
counsel sent a letter to the Leros denying any uninsured motorist coverage under
the umbrella policy, stating:
In partial response to your letter of May 14, 2009, State Farm has
advised that under the provisions of the personal liability umbrella
policy issued to Denise N. Greene, Policy #25-BB-N742-4, Ms. Greene
did not have any uninsured motorist coverage. I enclose a copy of the
1
Greene's automobile liability policy was issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, and her personal liability umbrella policy was issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company. The references in this opinion to "State Farm" are to State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, as State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is not a party to this action.
2
Declarations page of her policy which confirms that there was no
uninsured motor vehicle coverage purchased.
On February 10, 2010, the Leros filed a breach of contract claim against
State Farm. In their claim, the Leros asserted State Farm required Greene to carry
uninsured motorist coverage in her underlying automobile liability policy as a
prerequisite to maintaining her umbrella policy. The Leros further allege that
because the umbrella policy was meant to provide excess coverage over Greene's
automobile liability policy, the policy was also required to provide uninsured
motorist coverage. The Leros contended State Farm breached the umbrella policy
by refusing to pay them the policy's $1 million limit to them.
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the umbrella
policy did not provide uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm explained that the
insurance provided by the umbrella policy was based upon Greene's payment of
premiums for the types of coverages she chose. The only type of coverage shown
in the "Coverage(s)" section on the umbrella policy's declarations page was
"Coverage L - Personal Liability." Uninsured motorist coverage was not shown.
State Farm acknowledged the umbrella policy required Greene to maintain
the underlying insurance policies listed on the umbrella policy's declarations page,
and one type of policy Greene was required to maintain was automobile liability.
State Farm denied, however, that the umbrella policy required her to maintain
uninsured motorist coverage on the underlying automobile policy. State Farm
explained the umbrella policy's definition of "automobile liability" policy provided
only that, if uninsured motorist coverage is shown on the umbrella policy's
3
declarations page, then the required underlying automobile liability policy must
include uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm further explained that the
definition did not provide that, if the required underlying automobile liability policy
includes uninsured motorist coverage, then the umbrella policy also includes
uninsured motorist coverage. Because the umbrella policy's declarations page did
not show uninsured motorist coverage, State Farm contended the policy did not
provide such coverage.
The Leros filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting the umbrella
policy provided uninsured motorist coverage. The Leros alleged that uninsured
motorist coverage fit within the umbrella policy's definition of "Coverage L Personal Liability," which said, in pertinent part:
If a claim is made or suit is brought against an insured for damages
because of a loss for which the insured is legally liable and to which
this policy applies, we will pay on behalf of the insured, the damages
that exceed the retained limit.2
The Leros argued their claim for uninsured motor vehicle benefits fit within
Coverage L - Personal Liability because Greene met the policy's definition of an
"insured," which was "you and your relatives whose primary residence is your
household,"3 and Greene suffered a "loss," which the policy defined as "an
accident, including accidental exposure to conditions, which first results in bodily
injury or property damage during the policy period." The Leros contended the
umbrella policy provided coverage over Greene's automobile liability policy and
2
The emphasis was in the original and indicated that the term was defined in the policy.
The Leros did not reside in Greene's household and did not assert they were insureds under the
policy.
3
4
Missouri law required Greene to carry uninsured motorist coverage in her
automobile liability policy. Because the $2 million judgment against Lyons
exceeded the $50,000 limit of uninsured motorist coverage in her automobile
liability policy, the Leros argued Coverage L - Personal Liability included uninsured
motorist coverage absent an express exclusion. The Leros claimed there was no
express exclusion. Additionally, the Leros argued they were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because the umbrella policy was, at best, ambiguous as to
whether it provided uninsured motorist coverage.
In its suggestions in opposition to the Leros' motion for summary judgment,
State Farm responded that, contrary to the Leros' contention, their claim for
uninsured motorist benefits did not fit within the umbrella policy's definition of
Coverage L - Personal Liability because it was not a claim "against an insured" but,
rather, was a claim brought on behalf of an insured. Because the policy's
declarations page listed only Coverage L - Personal Liability and not uninsured
motorist coverage in the "Coverage(s)" section, State Farm contended that the
umbrella policy did not include uninsured motorist coverage.
In response to the Leros' contention that the umbrella policy did not exclude
uninsured motorist coverage, State Farm argued that the Leros were inappropriately
attempting to shift the burden of proof because they failed to meet their initial
burden of showing coverage. State Farm further argued that the policy did, in fact,
expressly exclude uninsured motorist coverage, as Exclusion 13 stated there was
no coverage under the policy for "bodily injury or personal injury to any insured."
5
State Farm acknowledged it had not raised this exclusion earlier and stated it was
raising it solely in response to the Leros' contention, in their summary judgment
motion, that the policy did not exclude uninsured motorist coverage.
The Leros filed a motion to strike State Farm's additional defenses.
Specifically, the Leros asked the court to find that State Farm was estopped from
asserting that:
a.
Uninsured motorist coverage is not included in the
Umbrella Policy's definition of coverage;
b.
The only coverage listed on the declarations page of the
Umbrella Policy is Coverage-L;
c.
[The Leros] inappropriately attempt to shift the burden of
proof by arguing uninsured motorist coverage was not
excluded; and
d.
The Umbrella Policy expressly excluded uninsured
motorist coverage.
The Leros argued these defenses constituted new bases upon which State Farm
was denying coverage and were inconsistent with the defense State Farm asserted
in its denial letter.
Following a hearing on the motions, the circuit court struck State Farm's
defenses. Regarding the parties' summary judgment motions, the court stated both
motions dealt with the same issue: whether Greene's umbrella policy provided
uninsured motorist coverage. The court ruled in favor of the Leros on this issue,
granting their summary judgment motion and denying State Farm's summary
judgment motion. The court ordered State Farm to pay the umbrella policy's $1
million limit to the Leros. State Farm appeals.
6
State Farm raises five points on appeal. In Point I, State Farm claims the
circuit court erred in granting the Leros' summary judgment motion and denying its
summary judgment motion because the umbrella policy does not provide uninsured
motorist coverage. In Points II through V, State Farm alleges error in the circuit
court's striking its defense that the umbrella policy's definition of Coverage L Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage. Because the
availability of this defense is integral to our determination of the ultimate issue of
whether the umbrella policy provides uninsured motorist coverage, we will first
address the propriety of the court's striking the defense.
Striking State Farm's Defense
State Farm raises four allegations of error concerning the court's striking its
defense that the umbrella policy's definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability does
not include uninsured motorist coverage. In Point II, State Farm contends striking
its defense improperly lessened the Leros' burden to demonstrate coverage. In
Point III, State Farm alleges striking its defense was erroneous because estoppel
was not warranted. In Point IV, State Farm argues striking its defense erroneously
created coverage through estoppel. Finally, in Point V, State Farm claims the
court's rulings granting the Leros' motion to strike and the Leros' motion for
summary judgment were inconsistent. Points III and IV, which concern the
invocation of estoppel as the basis for striking State Farm's defense, are dispositive
and, therefore, are the only points we need address.
7
We review the circuit court's ruling on a motion to strike for an abuse of
discretion. Wareham v. Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 922 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Mo. App.
1996). We will reverse the court's ruling only when it "'is clearly against the logic
of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of
justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.'" Id. (citation omitted).
The basis for the Leros' motion to strike was that State Farm was estopped
from asserting its defense that the umbrella policy's definition of Coverage L Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage. To estop State
Farm from asserting a policy defense, the Leros had the burden of showing: (1)
State Farm initially asserted a specific policy defense and later sought to rely
instead upon an inconsistent defense; (2) State Farm's actions induced the Leros to
rely on the original defense to their detriment and subsequent injury; and (3) the
Leros suffered prejudice as a result of such reliance. Versaw v. Versaw, 202
S.W.3d 638, 650 (Mo. App. 2006).
"Estoppel will not be lightly invoked; it should be applied with care and
caution and only when all elements constituting estoppel clearly appear." Whitney
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 16 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Mo. App. 2000). "[A]bsent a
statement which excludes other defenses and upon which the [party asserting
coverage] reasonably relies in preparing to preserve its claim, estoppel is not
applicable." Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Mo.
banc 1989). Indeed, "where the insurer's initial denial is stated in such a way that
it reasonably implies the subsequently, but more specifically stated, consistent
8
reason for denial," the party asserting coverage cannot claim to have changed its
position or relied to its detriment on the insurer's initial denial. Id.
In this case, the Leros failed to establish any inconsistency between State
Farm's initial denial and its defense that the umbrella policy's definition of Coverage
L - Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm's
denial letter advised that "under the provisions of the personal liability umbrella
policy issued to Denise N. Greene, Policy #25-BB-N742-4, Ms. Greene did not have
any uninsured motorist coverage." (Emphasis added.) This statement indicates
State Farm denied coverage because the umbrella policy's provisions, which would
include the definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability, do not provide uninsured
motorist coverage.
State Farm also stated in the denial letter that it was enclosing "a copy of
the Declarations page of [Greene's] policy which confirms that there was no
uninsured motor vehicle coverage purchased." The Leros argue this reference to
the absence of uninsured motorist coverage on the declarations page meant State
Farm denied coverage solely because uninsured motorist benefits are not listed on
the declarations page of the policy. The Leros' argument takes the reference to the
declarations page out of context. State Farm specifically said the declarations page
"confirms that there was no uninsured motor vehicle coverage purchased."
(Emphasis added.) Because the declarations page shows only Coverage L Personal Liability in the "Coverage(s)" section and does not show uninsured
motorist coverage, the declarations page confirms the umbrella policy's coverage is
9
limited to that defined in Coverage L - Personal Liability. The definition of Coverage
L - Personal Liability is a policy provision which, under a reasonable interpretation
of State Farm's previous statement in the denial letter, does not provide uninsured
motorist coverage.
State Farm consistently maintained this position throughout its subsequent
pleadings. In its answer, amended answer, and response to the Leros' request for
admissions, State Farm denied the umbrella policy "included" any uninsured
motorist coverage and referenced its denial letter. In its motion for summary
judgment, State Farm asserted the umbrella policy does not "include" uninsured
motorist coverage because the declarations page does not list uninsured motorist
coverage but lists only Coverage L - Personal Liability in the "Coverage(s)" section.
The Leros place much emphasis on the fact that, in its suggestions in
support of its summary judgment motion, State Farm did not specifically discuss
why Coverage L - Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage
but instead discussed the significance of the absence of uninsured motorist
coverage from the declarations page. The reason for State Farm's focusing on this
issue is clear from the record. In their amended petition, the Leros did not assert
coverage under Coverage L - Personal Liability but instead appeared to assert
coverage solely on the basis that, because Greene carried uninsured motorist
coverage in her automobile liability policy and the umbrella policy required Greene
to maintain underlying automobile liability insurance, the umbrella policy also
included uninsured motorist coverage.
10
To refute the Leros' assertion of coverage based upon the policy's required
underlying insurance provision, State Farm explained in its suggestions in support
of its summary judgment motion that, if the umbrella policy included uninsured
motorist coverage, the declarations page would show such coverage. State Farm
further explained that the mere fact that the required underlying automobile liability
policy includes uninsured motorist coverage does not mean the umbrella policy also
includes such coverage. Hence, State Farm's argument regarding the absence of
uninsured motorist coverage from the declarations page was in response to the
Leros' assertion of coverage based solely upon the required underlying insurance
provision.
After the Leros changed their coverage claim to assert that uninsured
motorist coverage fits within the definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability and is
not expressly excluded by the policy, State Farm stated specifically, in its
suggestions in opposition to the Leros' summary judgment motion, why Coverage L
- Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm said
Coverage L - Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage but
instead covers an insured's tort liability to third persons. State Farm noted the
plain language of the definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability provides coverage
for claims and suits brought "against an insured" and not claims, such as the
Leros', brought on behalf of an insured for the insured's injuries.
This explanation as to why the definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability
does not include uninsured motorist coverage does not constitute a change in State
11
Farm's position but is a subsequent and more specifically stated consistent reason
for its initial denial. See Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 389. Cf. Burns Nat. Lock
Installation Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 61 S.W.3d 262, 267-69 (Mo. App.
2001) (where insurance company's initial denial and pleadings asserted denial
based upon two specific policy exclusions, insurance company was estopped from
later asserting denial based upon coverage provision).
Throughout its denial letter and pleadings, State Farm consistently
maintained that the umbrella policy's provisions do not include uninsured motorist
coverage and that Coverage L - Personal Liability is the only type of coverage
shown on the declarations page. The clear implication of this position is that
uninsured motorist coverage does not fit within the definition of Coverage L Personal Liability -- the umbrella policy's sole provision defining the policy's
coverage. Any belief the Leros held that State Farm denied their claim because
uninsured motorist coverage is not listed on the declarations page, regardless of
the definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability, was not reasonable.
Because State Farm's defense that the umbrella policy's definition of
Coverage L - Personal Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage is not
inconsistent with and may be implied from State Farm's denial letter and pleadings,
the Leros could not have reasonably relied to their detriment on State Farm's initial
denial. The Leros, therefore, were not entitled to invoke estoppel to prevent State
Farm from asserting this defense. See Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 389.
12
Moreover, estopping State Farm from asserting this defense violated the rule
that estoppel "may not be employed to create coverage where it otherwise did not
exist." Shelter Gen. Ins. Co. v. Siegler, 945 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo. App. 1997).
"This rule is grounded in the idea that 'estoppel and waiver do not themselves give
a cause of action, and that the purpose of estoppel is to preserve rights previously
acquired but not to create new ones.'" Id. (citations omitted). The only provision
defining the umbrella policy's coverage is Coverage L - Personal Liability.
Estopping State Farm from asserting that the definition of Coverage L - Personal
Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage creates coverage for the
Leros' claim where it otherwise may not exist. See id.
The circuit court abused its discretion in granting the Leros' motion to strike
State Farm's defense that the umbrella policy's definition of Coverage L - Personal
Liability does not include uninsured motorist coverage. Points III and IV are
granted.
Summary Judgment on Coverage Issue
We now turn to State Farm's claim in Point I that the circuit court erred in
granting the Leros' summary judgment motion and denying its summary judgment
motion because the umbrella policy does not provide uninsured motorist coverage.
Appellate review of summary judgment is essentially de novo. ITT
Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376
(Mo. banc 1993). We will uphold the grant of summary judgment where no
13
genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.
Generally, the court's denial of a summary judgment motion is not a final
judgment that is reviewable on appeal. Lopez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 96
S.W.3d 891, 892 (Mo. App. 2002). "When the merits of that motion, however,
are inextricably intertwined with the issues in an appealable summary judgment in
favor of another party, then that denial may be reviewable." Id. In this case, the
sole issue raised in both parties' motions for summary judgment is whether the
umbrella policy provides uninsured motorist coverage. Because the denial of one
summary judgment motion leads directly to the conclusion that the other should be
granted, we may reach the merits of the denial of State Farm's summary judgment
motion. Lopez, 96 S.W.3d at 892.
The interpretation of an insurance policy is an issue of law that we review de
novo. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. banc 2010). In interpreting an
insurance policy, we read the policy as a whole to determine the parties' intent.
Thiemann v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 338 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Mo. App. 2011).
"An insurance contract includes the declarations, the form policy, and any
endorsements and definitions." Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 654,
658 (Mo. App. 2010). We give the policy language its plain and ordinary meaning.
Thiemann, 338 S.W.3d at 840. "If, giving the language used its plain and ordinary
meaning, the intent of the parties is clear and unambiguous, we cannot resort to
rules of construction to interpret the contract." Id. (citation omitted).
14
"Disagreement over the interpretation of the terms of a contract does not create an
ambiguity." Id.
The insurance policy in this case is a personal liability umbrella policy. While
a primary insurance policy provides "the first layer of insurance coverage," an
umbrella policy is used to provide "specific coverage above an underlying limit of
primary insurance." 3 Leo Martinez, et al., NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE § 29A.02[1] (2012 ed.). The purpose for writing an umbrella policy in
addition to a primary policy is "to protect the insured against liability for
catastrophic losses that would exceed the limits of affordable primary coverage."
Id. at § 29A.02[3].
The plain language of Greene's umbrella policy indicates this was precisely
the purpose for writing the policy -- to protect her against personal liability for
catastrophic losses suffered by third parties that would exceed the limits of her
underlying automobile liability policy. The umbrella policy's declarations page,
which states the policy's essential terms in an abbreviated form, Christensen, 307
S.W.3d at 656 n.1, shows that the only type of coverage provided by the policy is
Coverage L - Personal Liability.4
The policy's definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability says, in pertinent
part:
4
The Leros argue the declarations page is ambiguous because it does not mention uninsured
motorist benefits. The Leros cite no law for the proposition that State Farm was required to
expressly state the types of coverage not included in the policy. Indeed, this court has suggested
otherwise. See Browning v. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 341 S.W.3d 897, 903 n.6 (noting
that Christensen, 307 S.W.3d at 658, which found a declarations page that expressly disclaimed
underinsured motorist coverage to be controlling, "did not hold that every vehicular insurance policy
is required to expressly disclaim every type of potential insurance not included in such a policy").
15
If a claim is made or suit is brought against an insured for damages
because of a loss for which the insured is legally liable and to which
this policy applies, we will pay on behalf of the insured, the damages
that exceed the retained limit.
The term "insured" refers, in relevant part, to:
a.
you . . . ;
....
c.
any other person or organization to the extent they are liable for
the use of an automobile, recreational motor vehicle or
watercraft by a person included in [a.]
The term "you" refers to the named insured on the declarations page.
Greene is the named insured on the umbrella policy's declarations page;
hence, she was an insured. Coverage L - Personal Liability says that it covers
claims made or suits brought "against" an insured. Thus, to be covered under
Coverage L - Personal Liability, the claim must be against Greene. The plain and
ordinary meaning of the word "against" is "in opposition or hostility to" or
"contrary to." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 39 (1993); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 31(4th ed. 2006).
The Leros' claim for uninsured motorist benefits is not a claim made in
opposition to or contrary to Greene. Rather, it is a claim made on behalf of Greene
for her wrongful death. Pursuant to the definition of Coverage L - Personal
Liability, the policy covers only claims made by third parties against an insured and
does not cover claims for uninsured motorist benefits asserted by or on behalf of
an insured. Further, the Leros’s current claim does not involve “a loss for which
16
[Greene] is legally liable.” That the umbrella policy does not cover claims asserted
by or on behalf of an insured is further confirmed by the policy's exclusions, which
expressly exclude claims for bodily injury to an insured, personal injury to an
insured, and damage to property owned by an insured.
To avoid this result, the Leros contend that State Farm is also an insured
under the policy. They argue State Farm qualifies as an insured under subsection
c. of the definition of "insured" because State Farm is an organization whose
liability arose from Greene's use of an automobile. The Leros contend that,
because their claim for uninsured motorist benefits is against State Farm, their
claim is covered under the definition of Coverage L - Personal Liability.
The Leros cite no support for this interpretation of the policy, which would
result in State Farm's being both the insurer and the insured under the same policy.
Moreover, any liability State Farm has in this matter must necessarily arise out of
the umbrella policy. There is no occasion for which State Farm could be legally
liable for damages for Greene's use of an automobile outside of the umbrella policy.
Thus, if State Farm were an insured, then the statement in Coverage L - Personal
Liability that the policy covers damages because of a loss "for which the insured is
legally liable and to which this policy applies" would be redundant. "In interpreting
an insurance contract, we must endeavor to give each provision a reasonable
meaning and to avoid an interpretation that renders some provisions useless or
redundant." Dibben v. Shelter Ins. Co., 261 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Mo. App. 2008).
State Farm was not an insured under Greene's umbrella policy.
17
The Leros also seek to avoid the plain language of the definition of Coverage
L - Personal Liability by asserting the policy is ambiguous. The Leros' ambiguity
argument is premised on the fact that Section 379.203, RSMo 2000, requires
automobile liability policies to provide uninsured motorist coverage. Essentially, the
Leros contend that, because the umbrella policy required Greene to maintain an
underlying automobile liability policy and Missouri law required Greene's automobile
liability policy to include uninsured motorist coverage, the umbrella policy is
ambiguous as to whether it includes uninsured motorist coverage.
We find no ambiguity. The umbrella policy's reference to uninsured motorist
coverage says only that an underlying automobile liability policy must include
uninsured motorist coverage if such coverage "is shown on the declarations page
of this policy." In other words, if the umbrella policy's declarations page shows
that the umbrella policy provides uninsured motorist coverage, then the underlying
automobile liability policy must also include uninsured motorist coverage. There is
nothing in this statement, or in any other provision of the policy, indicating that,
when state law requires the automobile liability policy to provide uninsured motorist
coverage, the umbrella policy automatically includes uninsured motorist coverage.
See West v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Mo. App. 1981)
(stating that umbrella policy, which specified the extent of its coverage and made
no reference to uninsured motorist coverage, covered only insured's tort liability to
third persons).
18
Reading the umbrella policy as a whole, the plain and ordinary meaning of
the language used indicates the policy was intended to protect Greene from
personal liability for catastrophic losses suffered by third parties that would exceed
the limits of her underlying automobile liability policy. The umbrella policy clearly
and unambiguously does not provide uninsured motorist coverage. The circuit
court erred in ruling otherwise. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, we reverse the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Leros and enter summary judgment in favor of
State Farm.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and summary judgment is
hereby entered in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, CHIEF JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
19
