Justia.com Opinion Summary: After an insolvent employer's insurance company also became insolvent, the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Guaranty Association (SIGA) made workers' compensation payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) for reimbursement of those payments, and the trial court ordered reimbursement. The issue came before the Supreme Court who, after consideration, concluded that SIGA's claim against MIGA did not fall within the statutory definition of a "covered claim," and reversed the trial court’s reimbursement decision.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CA-01615-SCT
MISSISSIPPI INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION a/k/a MIGA
v.
MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
INDIVIDUAL SELF-INSURER GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION f/k/a MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’
COMPENSATION SELF-INSURER GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
09/22/2010
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JAN F. GADOW
JAMES D. HOLLAND
A. SPENCER GILBERT, III
CIVIL - INSURANCE
REVERSED AND RENDERED - 04/19/2012
EN BANC.
DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Mississippi Legislature created the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Self-
Insurers Guaranty Association (“SIGA”) to pay workers’ compensation claims on behalf of
insolvent self-insured employers; and it created the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty
Association (“MIGA”) to pay claims on behalf of insolvent insurers. After an insolvent
employer’s insurance company also became insolvent, SIGA made workers’ compensation
payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued MIGA for reimbursement of those payments, and
the trial court ordered reimbursement. But because SIGA’s claim against MIGA does not
fall within the statutory definition of a “covered claim,” we reverse.
BACKGROUND
¶2.
The Legislature abolished most lawsuits by injured employees against their
employers, and provided compensation through the workers’ compensation statutes. Most
employers cover all their workers’ compensation claims filed against them with insurance;
some “self-insure,” that is, they pay the workers’ compensation claims without benefit of any
insurance coverage; and some employers – such as B. C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., the employer
involved in today’s case – self-insure up to a certain limit and then cover claims that exceed
that limit with insurance.
¶3.
The Legislature created MIGA to provide for the payment of benefits due under
insurance policies issued by insurance companies that become insolvent, (with statutory
restrictions);1 and it created SIGA to pay workers’ compensation benefits on behalf of selfinsured employers that become insolvent.2 Today’s case presents the unusual scenario in
which both a partially self-insured employer and its insurance company became insolvent
while a workers’ compensation claim was pending.
¶4.
After Bobby Warren was injured on the job, his self-insured employer, B.C. Rogers
Poultry, Inc., paid $225,000 in workers’ compensation benefits and then turned the claim
over to its excess insurance carrier, Reliance National Indemnity Company.
1
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-103 (Rev. 2011).
2
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-153 (Rev. 2011).
2
¶5.
Reliance paid $129,205.73 in benefits but then became insolvent, requiring Rogers
again to assume responsibility for the claim. Rogers paid an additional $167,419.53, but then
it became insolvent and ceased payments, prompting SIGA to step in and pay Warren’s
claim. After paying benefits exceeding $100,000, SIGA suggested that MIGA consider
stepping into Reliance’s shoes and pay the amount Reliance should have paid, effectively
reimbursing SIGA. MIGA refused, so SIGA filed suit. Meanwhile, Warren sued the other
driver from the accident for personal injuries and collected more than $4 million from
uninsured motorist (“UM”) carriers.
¶6.
SIGA argued to the trial court that MIGA should reimburse it for the money it paid
to Warren, because MIGA had a statutory duty to step into Reliance’s shoes when Reliance
became insolvent. MIGA responded that it was not obligated to pay SIGA, because SIGA
was not a “claimant” or “policyholder” and did not have a “covered claim” under its laws.
MIGA also argued that the Reliance excess policy was not “direct insurance” as to SIGA.
¶7.
Finally, MIGA argued that any reimbursement SIGA might be entitled to must be
reduced, or offset, by the amount Warren received in UM benefits – effectively wiping out
the claim. SIGA responded that, because it stepped into Rogers’s shoes, it should be paid
what Rogers would have been paid had Reliance not become insolvent.
¶8.
SIGA filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, holding that
the Reliance excess insurance policy was “direct insurance” and that SIGA had a “covered
claim.” The trial court also found that SIGA’s claim could not be offset by the amount
recovered by Warren under the UM policies.
3
¶9.
MIGA appealed, asking us to consider whether MIGA is obligated to pay SIGA;
whether MIGA is entitled to a reduction, setoff, or credit for the amount Warren received
from UM policies; and whether SIGA is entitled to an award of interest and costs. Because
we hold that MIGA is not obligated to pay SIGA, we decline to address the other issues.
ANALYSIS
¶10.
We follow our usual standards of review: Summary judgment is appropriate where
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” 3 We review motions for summary judgment de novo, 4 and
although we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,5 statutory
interpretation is a question of law and must be reviewed de novo.6
¶11.
The Legislature created MIGA to “provide a mechanism for the payment of covered
claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid
financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer . . . .” 7
And according to Mississippi Code Section 83-23-107, we interpret MIGA’s laws according
to MIGA’s statutory purpose.8
3
Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
4
Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So. 3d 837, 842 (Miss. 2011).
5
Id.
6
Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Green, 43 So. 3d 1099, 1100 (Miss. 2010).
7
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-103 (Rev. 2011).
8
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-107 (Rev. 2011). The dissent incorrectly attributes the statute’s
phrase “liberally construe” to this majority.
4
MIGA is not obligated to reimburse SIGA for its payments to Warren,
because SIGA does not have a “covered claim.”
¶12.
Under Mississippi Code Section 83-23-115(a), MIGA is “obligated to the extent of
the covered claims existing prior to the determination of insolvency . . . .” 9 The statute
further provides that “[i]n no event shall the association be obligated to a policyholder or
claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy
from which the claim arises.” 10 And Mississippi Code Section 83-23-109(f) defines “covered
claim” as
an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which arises out of and
is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an insurance
policy to which this articles applies issued by an insurer, if such insurer
becomes an insolvent insurer . . . .11
¶13.
Thus, to obligate MIGA to pay SIGA, SIGA must be a claimant or policyholder with
an unpaid claim. SIGA argues that its payments to Warren – in satisfaction of its obligation
to take over Rogers’s workers’ compensation obligations – are unpaid claims. MIGA,
however, argues that SIGA cannot have an “unpaid claim,” because SIGA is not a “claimant”
or “policyholder” under the statute; we agree.
¶14.
MIGA’s laws define “claimant” as “any insured making a first-party claim or any
person instituting a liability claim . . . .” 12 Here, Rogers was the named insured under the
Reliance excess policy – not SIGA. SIGA, however, argues that, under Mississippi Code
9
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1)(a) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added).
10
Id. (emphasis added).
11
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-109(f) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added).
12
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-109(c) (Rev. 2011).
5
Section 71-3-163, it is “deemed the self-insurer to the extent of obligations on its covered
claims and to such extent shall have all rights, duties and obligations of the individual selfinsurer in default or insolvent group self-insurer in default as if such self-insurer were not in
default.” 13 SIGA, therefore, argues that, because it was obligated to step into the shoes of
Rogers, it also has a right to reimbursement under Rogers’s policy with Reliance as a
claimant or policyholder; and since MIGA is obligated to step into Reliance’s shoes, MIGA
should pay SIGA for payments made to Warren. But as this Court has explained, “an
insolvent insurer’s shoes are not always a perfect fit.” 14
¶15.
The MIGA statutes must be interpreted according to the association’s purpose:
[T]o provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under certain
insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid financial
loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer, to
assist in the detection and prevention of insurer insolvencies, and to provide
an association to assess the cost of such protection among insurers.15
¶16.
MIGA’s purpose, though, is not achieved by ordering MIGA to reimburse SIGA,
because doing so would not prevent financial losses to a claimant or policyholder. SIGA is
not seeking money for Rogers (the actual claimant or policyholder); instead, it is seeking
reimbursement for complying with its own statutory duties. While the dissent correctly
observes that SIGA steps into Rogers’s shoes and inherits its rights and obligations, it
overlooks the fact that – with respect to SIGA’s payment to Warren – Rogers has no
outstanding rights or obligations. Rogers – were it not insolvent – would have no right of
13
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1)(b) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added).
14
Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Blackeney, 54 So. 3d 203, 206 (Miss. 2011).
15
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-103 (Rev. 2011).
6
reimbursement for SIGA’s payments to Warren; so SIGA has no right of reimbursement and
no unpaid claim. And no statutory provision allows, or requires, one guaranty association
to pay another. SIGA and the dissent ignore the one avenue of reimbursement authorized by
SIGA’s statute: “An association may recover from the self-insurer in default . . . all amounts
paid by such association on account of covered claims of employees of the member selfinsurer in default . . . .” 16
¶17.
SIGA is not an “insured making a first-party claim,” as the definition of “claimant”
requires; instead, Rogers is the insured. Nor is SIGA “instituting a liability claim”; instead,
it seeks reimbursement only. So MIGA’s statutes neither authorize nor obligate it to pay
SIGA.
¶18.
The dissent says that Rogers’s claim against Reliance remains unpaid. But we find
nothing in the record before us concerning any claim Rogers has, or is asserting, against
Reliance, MIGA, or anyone else. The claim presented today – and the only claim presented
for our consideration – is SIGA’s claim against MIGA: a claim for payments SIGA made in
fulfillment of its statutory duties. Any payment Rogers may have made – after Reliance’s
insolvency – is not relevant to this appeal.
¶19.
SIGA’s claim against MIGA is best characterized as an attempt at novation. Novation
may occur where one debtor is substituted by another in a contract,17 which requires an
express agreement or implied assent.18 Here, no evidence exists – and SIGA does not argue
16
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-169(2) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added).
17
Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. MS Casualty Ins. Co., 947 So. 2d 865, 871 (Miss. 2006).
18
Id.
7
– that Rogers or Reliance expressly or implicitly assented to a novation. Simply because
SIGA’s statute deems it the self-insurer does not mean that SIGA’s name is supplanted into
Rogers’s contract with Reliance.
¶20.
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our decision today does not favor the MIGA
statutes over the SIGA statutes. MIGA’s authority to make payments is limited by the
statutes that created it, and those statutes do not authorize it to reimburse SIGA. Because
SIGA is not a claimant or policyholder with an unpaid claim, it does not have a “covered
claim” under MIGA’s statute.
CONCLUSION
¶21.
MIGA is not obligated to reimburse SIGA for SIGA’s statutorily obligated payments
to Warren. Neither party has presented a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, MIGA is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and
find that the trial court erred in granting SIGA’s motion for summary judgment and in
denying MIGA’s motion for summary judgment. MIGA’s motion for summary judgment
is granted.
¶22.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, CHANDLER AND
KING, JJ., CONCUR. PIERCE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J.
PIERCE, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶23.
This is a case of first impression for this Court. Never before has this Court been
presented a situation in which a self-insured and a direct insurer became insolvent on the
same claim involving the same transaction. The Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association
8
(“MIGA”) and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Individual Self-insurer Guaranty
Association (“SIGA”) are legal entities with similar duties and obligations. In fact, each’s
respective statute mimics the other but for some select wording in each statute.
¶24.
Throughout this case, words “claimant” and “covered claim” were often used. Yet,
each word has a specific meaning as announced by both SIGA’s and MIGA’s respective
statutes. SIGA’s statute does not define “claimant,” 19 but defines “covered claim” as:
“Covered claim” means an unpaid claim upon which compensation or medical
is payable by an individual self-insurer or a group self-insurer under the
Worker’s Compensation Law.20
MIGA’s statute defines “claimant” and “covered claim” as:
“Claimant” means any insured making a first-party claim or any person
instituting a liability claim, provided that no person who is an affiliate of the
insolvent insurer may be a claimant.21
“Covered Claim” means an unpaid claim, including one of unearned
premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and not in excess of
the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this article applies issued
by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer . . . . “Covered
Claim” shall not include any amount awarded as punitive or exemplary
damages; or sought as a return of premium under any retrospective rating plan;
or due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as
subrogation recoveries or otherwise and shall preclude recovery thereof from
the insured of any insolvent carrier to the extent of the policy limits.22
19
Regardless, SIGA’s definition, even if its statute provided one, is irrelevant to this case,
as it is “claimant” under MIGA’s statute that bears directly upon this case.
20
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-157(e) (Rev. 2011).
21
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-109(c) (Rev. 2011).
22
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-109(f) (Rev. 2011).
9
¶25.
Looking at SIGA’s statute specifically, it commands that SIGA must “have all rights,
duties and obligations” of the insolvent self-insurer – B.C. Rogers – “as if such self-insurer
were not in default.” 23 Thus, it seems logical that SIGA should be able to enforce whatever
rights, duties, and obligations B.C. Rogers possessed. MIGA admitted that B.C. Rogers
could bring a claim under the excess policy held with Reliance, but that SIGA could not.
Yet, MIGA provided no authority to support that assertion. Rather, MIGA insists that SIGA
does not meet the requirements listed in MIGA’s statute to be paid.
¶26.
The majority opinion favors MIGA’s statute, yet casts aside SIGA’s statute. Quite
frankly, the majority fails to recognize the importance of SIGA’s statute when aligned with
MIGA’s. As mentioned previously, never before has a self-insured and a direct insurer
become insolvent on the same claim involving the same transaction. Therefore, each
respective statute must be applied accordingly.
¶27.
The majority is correct that, “[t]he Legislature created MIGA to ‘provide a mechanism
for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay
in payment and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders, because of the
insolvency of an insurer. . . .’” 24 This Court must “liberally” construe the MIGA statutes “to
effect the purpose under Section 83-23-103, which shall constitute as an aid and guide to
interpretation.” 25
23
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1)(b) (Rev. 2011).
24
Maj. Op. ¶11; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 83-12-103 (Rev. 2011).
25
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-107 (Rev. 2011).
10
¶28.
The majority reasons that “to obligate MIGA to pay SIGA, SIGA must be a claimant
or policyholder with an unpaid claim.” 26 MIGA’s statute defines “claimant” as “any insured”
or “any person instituting a liability claim.” The majority ignores SIGA’s statute that
commands that it shall:
Be deemed the self-insurer to the extent of obligations on its covered claims
and to such extent shall have the rights, duties and obligations of the
individual self-insurer in default or insolvent group self-insurer in default as
if such self-insurer were not in default.27
SIGA’s statute provides for the same liberal reading and application as MIGA’s,28 and one
statute should not be given any more effect than the other.
¶29.
Reading SIGA’s statute and reconciling it with MIGA’s, SIGA could be considered
both a claimant and a policyholder. First, SIGA’s statute allows it to cloak itself as the selfinsured, entitling it to the same coverage as B.C. Rogers under the Reliance policy. Because
B.C. Rogers would be treated as “any insured making a first-party claim,” SIGA should be
afforded similar treatment. Secondly, SIGA could also be considered a policyholder, because
SIGA’s statute allows it to possess the rights, duties and obligations of the individual selfinsurer in default. Ultimately, SIGA paid out money on B.C. Rogers’s behalf, and it wants
that money to be returned through an insurance policy B.C. Rogers purchased to cover its
liability.
26
Maj. Op. ¶13.
27
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1)(b) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added).
28
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-155 (Rev. 2011).
11
¶30.
We must be mindful of what took place. B.C. Rogers was a self-insured employer up
to $225,000. To cover any liability on workers’ compensation claims in excess of $225,000,
B.C. Rogers purchased a policy with Reliance National Indemnity Company. One of B.C.
Rogers’s employees, Warren, was injured during his employment. As a result, B.C. Rogers
paid $225,000, and then filed a claim with Reliance for the excess amount. Reliance paid
$129,205.73 before becoming insolvent. Because of Reliance’s insolvency, B.C. Rogers
began repaying Warren’s claim, and paid $167,419.53. But then, B.C. Rogers became
insolvent, and SIGA assumed responsibility, paying $111,739.78 to satisfy the rest of
Warren’s claim against B.C. Rogers. Therefore, a total of $279,159.31 was paid by B.C.
Rogers and SIGA, when that amount should have been paid by Reliance under the policy
B.C. Rogers purchased to cover its excess liability.
¶31.
Interestingly, the majority admits that SIGA inherited the rights and obligations of
B.C. Rogers, but found that B.C. Rogers did not possess any outstanding rights or
obligations, even though Reliance only partially had met its contractual duty under the policy
with B.C. Rogers.29 The majority goes further and reasons that if B.C. Rogers were not
insolvent, it would have no right of reimbursement for SIGA’s payment to Warren, and thus,
SIGA cannot be reimbursed either.30 But this is faulty logic, because the majority fails to
recognize that if B.C. Rogers were not insolvent, SIGA would not have had to pay anything
to anyone.
29
Maj. Op. ¶16.
30
Maj. Op. ¶16.
12
¶32.
Of note, MIGA admitted in its brief that B.C. Rogers could bring a claim under the
excess policy held with Reliance, but that SIGA could not do so without providing authority
as to why. The majority fails to recognize MIGA’s admission. And I am unable to reconcile
how B.C. Rogers could bring a claim, yet SIGA cannot, even though all agree that SIGA
inherits the rights, duties, and obligations of the defaulted self-insurer.
¶33.
Additionally, the majority states that SIGA has only one avenue for reimbursement
in that it can recover only from the self-insurer in default.31 However, Mississippi Code
Section 71-3-169(2) is not as absolute as the majority characterizes. Section 71-3-169(2)
clearly uses the word “may.” “May” is not an absolute term, and thus, the statute is not the
only route that SIGA can follow to obtain reimbursement.
¶34.
During oral argument, Presiding Justice Dickinson asked if the excess claim was the
claim that is unpaid. The answer was, emphatically, “yes.” B.C. Rogers’s claim against
Reliance remains unpaid, because $279,159.31 had to be paid once Reliance became
insolvent. Now, both B.C. Rogers and Reliance are insolvent, placing SIGA in the shoes of
B.C. Rogers, and MIGA in the shoes of Reliance. Since Reliance would be obligated to pay
B.C. Rogers, MIGA should be obligated to pay SIGA, irrespective of SIGA’s reasons for
seeking reimbursement. We must remember, SIGA’s statute permits such action.32
¶35.
SIGA’s statute commands that SIGA be treated with the same pleasantries of the self-
insurer as if that self-insurer were not in default. 33 If we read that statute under its plain
31
Maj. Op. ¶16.
32
See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-163(b).
33
Id.
13
meaning, then SIGA’s statute transforms it into B.C. Rogers, allowing SIGA to be
reimbursed by MIGA. And therefore, here, “an insolvent insurer’s shoes are” a perfect fit.34
If this Court subtracts from SIGA’s statute its right to be treated as the self-insurer, what
authority does SIGA have to possess the rights, duties, and obligations of the self-insurer as
its statute commands going forward? But of most importance, the majority admits that SIGA
inherits the rights and obligations of B.C. Rogers.35 Consequently, SIGA is entitled to that
to which B.C. Rogers would be entitled – a claim against MIGA because of Reliance’s
insolvency.
¶36.
The questions to be answered are: 1) what is the claim; and 2) who is the claimant?
The “claim” is that which B.C. Rogers would have received under its policy with Reliance.
MIGA misconstrued who the claimant is, as it reasoned that Warren was the “claimant.”
Although it is true that Warren is a claimant, he is, unmistakably, a workers’ compensation
claimant, not a “claimant” with regard to the policy B.C. Rogers had with Reliance.
MIGA’s statute defines “claimant” as “any insured making a first-party claim or any person
instituting a liability claim. . . .” 36 Therefore, Warren cannot be a “claimant” in the manner
MIGA suggested, because Warren cannot make a claim on B.C. Rogers’s policy with
34
Maj. Op. ¶14; but see Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Blackeney, 54 So. 3d 203, 206 (Miss.
2011) (finding that insolvent insurer’s shoes did not fit because the insolvent insurer's duties and
obligations passed to MIGA under one subsection of the statute but were limited under another
subsection that stated that MIGA may pay covered claims only to the extent of the association's
obligation).
35
Maj. Op. ¶16.
36
Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-109(c) (Rev. 2011).
14
Reliance. Instead, Warren could only be a “claimant” in that he sought payment from an
insolvent B.C. Rogers.
¶37.
And the issue to be decided now is, who is the “claimant” with respect to the Reliance
policy held and purchased by B.C. Rogers? The “claimant,” as defined by MIGA’s own
statute, was and is B.C. Rogers. B.C. Rogers owned the policy. B.C. Rogers was liable to
Warren in excess of $225,000, and thus, B.C. Rogers made a claim on its policy with
Reliance. Due to B.C. Rogers’s insolvency, SIGA is now cloaked with B.C. Rogers’s rights,
duties, and obligations.37 Therefore, SIGA inherits the ability to be the “claimant” under
MIGA’s statutory scheme up to the amount it paid on B.C. Rogers’s behalf, not to exceed
$300,000.38
¶38.
After reviewing caselaw in other jurisdictions, we do not find any case directly on
point with the issues presented here. However, in other states, it seems to be an emerging
trend NOT to expand the language of a guaranty association statute beyond that of the
statute.39 Specifically, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, California, Virginia, and Wyoming all have
held that a guaranty association does not step into the shoes of the self-insured except as to
the extent provided for within the statute affecting that association.40 But Mississippi is
37
See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-163(b) (Rev. 2011).
38
See Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-115(a)(iii) (Rev. 2011).
39
See Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 225 P. 3d 1061, 1067-68 (Wyo. 2010).
40
See T&N PLC v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 800 F. Supp. 1259, 1263 (E.D. Pa.
1992); Nebraska Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Dobias, 247 Neb. 900, 531 N.W.2d 217, 220
(1995); Saylin v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 179 Cal. App. 3d 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. 493, 497 (1986);
Virginia Property & Casualty Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. International Ins. Co., 238 Va. 702, 385 S.E.
2d 614, 616 (1989); Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 225 P. 3d 1061, 1067-68 (Wyo.
2010).
15
different from those states, and here, we are not expanding SIGA’s statute beyond its
respective language, because SIGA’s statute specifically allows it to assume the rights,
duties, and obligations of a self-insurer as though no default had occurred.41
¶39.
However, in one interesting case from Pennsylvania from 2009 – General
Reinsurance Corporation v. American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida,42 the
Pennsylvania court decided an issue regarding our own MIGA.43 There, MIGA brought an
interpleader action, seeking a determination as to whether a statutory liquidator of a workers’
compensation insurer or MIGA was owed $2,488,336.19 pursuant to a reinsurance agreement
between the reinsurer and the liquidated workers’ compensation insurer.44 The court found
that MIGA could not stand in the shoes of another with regard to the reinsurance proceeds
subject to the interpleader complaint.45 Here, it seems that MIGA attempts to employ that
same argument, but to an entirely different set of circumstances. At this juncture, we have
a self-insurer who would lay claim to proceeds from an insurance policy but for insolvency,
and a statute which specifically allows a guaranty association to step into the shoes of the
insolvent self-insurer as if it were not in default. Ultimately, the question turns on how
broadly this Court will construe SIGA’s statute in regard to “rights, duties and obligations.”
41
See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-163(b) (Rev. 2011).
42
Gen. Reinsurance Corp. v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 996 A. 2d 26 (2009).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 28.
45
Id. at 36.
16
¶40.
B.C. Rogers’s claim on its policy with Reliance remains unsatisfied. Otherwise,
SIGA would have no right to enforce the claim on B.C. Rogers’s behalf. We must remember
that B.C. Rogers purchased a policy with Reliance to cover all its liability on workers’
compensation claims in excess of $225,000. B.C. Rogers’s claim has been only partially
paid by Reliance, as Reliance paid $129,205.73 before becoming insolvent, leaving
$279,159.31 to be paid in order to satisfy Warren’s workers’ compensation claim. SIGA
stated at oral argument that neither it nor B.C. Rogers had received anything on the Reliance
policy, but as shown above, B.C. Rogers did receive a partial amount from Reliance.
Nevertheless, SIGA seeks to recoup what it was obligated to pay on B.C. Rogers’s behalf
because of Reliance’s insolvency. Statutorily, MIGA is to step into the shoes of Reliance and
pay the liabilities of Reliance.46 Yet here, MIGA does not desire to wear those shoes, even
though they are a perfect fit.
¶41.
The majority concludes by characterizing SIGA’s attempt at reimbursement as a
novation.47 Although the majority properly defines novation, it still fails to recognize what
SIGA’s statute allows. SIGA’s statute specifically directs it to stand in the shoes of the selfinsurer as if that self-insurer had never defaulted. MIGA conceded that B.C. Rogers may
have an unpaid claim, but claimed that, since SIGA is making a claim for itself, MIGA is not
obligated to pay. This logic is faulty and allows MIGA to escape the liability it would have
had to pay B.C. Rogers. If B.C. Rogers had not become insolvent and SIGA was out of the
46
See Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1)(a) (Rev. 2011).
47
Maj. Op. ¶19.
17
picture, MIGA would have had to pay B.C. Rogers on the Reliance claim.48 Accordingly,
MIGA should have to pay SIGA, and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
KITCHENS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
48
See Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1)(a) (Rev. 2011).
18
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