Samuel Williams and Carolyn Williams v. Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2011-CA-00371-COA
SAMUEL WILLIAMS AND CAROLYN
WILLIAMS
APPELLANTS
v.
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
APPELLEE
02/09/2011
HON. JANACE H. GOREE
MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
DAMON RAMON STEVENSON
J. DOUGLAS MINOR JR.
ERIN DIANE SALTAFORMAGGIO
CIVIL - CONTRACT
GRANTED APPELLEE’S MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AFFIRMED: 06/05/2012
07/20/2012: DENIED; AFFIRMED:
07/23/2013
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
MODIFIED OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶1.
The motion for rehearing is denied. We withdraw our original opinion and substitute
this modified opinion.
¶2.
Samuel and Carolyn Williams (the Williamses) appeal from the Madison County
Chancery Court’s judgment granting a motion to enforce the settlement agreement that
resolved the Williamses’ claims against Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.
(Homecomings). On appeal, the Williamses argue that the chancellor erred by admitting into
evidence a deposition, which they allege included hearsay statements, in determining the
enforceability of the Williamses’ settlement with Homecomings. We find substantial
evidence in the record to support the chancellor’s order enforcing the settlement; accordingly,
we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
The Williamses brought suit against Homecomings,1 alleging Homecomings conspired
to defraud the Williamses by procuring fraudulent appraisals and entering into loan
agreements with them that included repayment terms exceeding what they could afford.
Approximately fifteen other plaintiffs, all represented by the same counsel as the Williamses,
filed substantially similar lawsuits against Homecomings and other defendants. The record
reflects that Attorney Precious Martin signed the complaint against Homecomings on behalf
of the Williamses.
¶4.
On October 3, 2008, the Williamses, as well as the other plaintiffs with similar claims,
reached a global settlement agreement with Homecomings. The settlement terms called for
a modification of each plaintiff’s note. As to the Williamses, the modification reduced the
amount owed to $460,000, changed their monthly interest and principal payments to
$3,283.57, and set their initial interest rate at 7.250%. Homecomings agreed to and waived
the past due and currently owed principal and interest, late fees, escrows, and other fees.
Homecomings also agreed to pay $16,000 in attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs in each action.
1
The record reflects that the Williamses initially brought this suit against five
different parties, but the parties either settled or were dismissed.
2
The terms of the settlement also provided that all plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claims
against Homecomings. Martin, as counsel of record for the Williamses, agreed on their
behalf to the terms of the settlement offered by Homecomings.
¶5.
On October 14, 2008, the parties to the settlement agreement, including the
Williamses, filed an agreed order of dismissal without prejudice. On November 11, 2008,
Homecomings sent the Williamses’ counsel, Martin, the settlement agreement, along with
an agreed final judgment of dismissal with prejudice and the settlement proceeds.
Homecomings was later advised that the documents were executed by all of the plaintiffs in
the settlement except for the Williamses, who refused to sign the documents.
¶6.
Homecomings filed a motion to enforce the settlement in the Madison County
Chancery Court, and the court set a date for an evidentiary hearing. The court wanted
testimony from Martin presented at the scheduled evidentiary hearing, but due to a trial
conflict, Martin could not attend the hearing on the motion. The parties agreed that Martin
would testify by deposition.2 The deposition took place on March 17, 2010. During the
deposition, Martin confirmed he was counsel of record for the Williamses and had accepted
the settlement offered on behalf of the Williamses. He also stated that due to the number of
parties he represented in the settlement discussion, he and his co-counsel, Omar Nelson, had
agreed to split up and discuss the terms of the proposed settlement with different parties.
Martin explained that he did not personally meet with the Williamses to discuss the terms of
the settlement, but he stated that Nelson met with them. Martin testified that Nelson
2
The deposition was a defense deposition requested by Homecomings. See M.R.C.P.
30.
3
informed him that Nelson had spoken to the Williamses about the settlement terms, and the
Williamses had agreed to accept the proposed settlement. Martin confirmed that he had then
informed counsel for Homecomings that the Williamses had accepted the settlement
agreement. Martin further testified that he had signed the complaint against Homecomings
as counsel for the Williamses.3
¶7.
On April 7, 2010, the chancellor entered an order permitting Martin to withdraw as
counsel for the Williamses. On August 19, 2010, the chancellor heard arguments on
Homecomings’ motion to enforce the settlement. At the hearing, the new counsel for the
Williamses objected to Martin’s deposition being admitted into evidence. Homecomings
argued that the alleged hearsay statements by Martin, referring to his communications with
Nelson, were irrelevant because under agency and principal law, a lawyer possesses apparent
and actual authority to bind his client to a settlement offer. The chancellor overruled the
objection and allowed the deposition to be admitted.
¶8.
Following the hearing, the chancellor entered an order granting Homecomings’
motion to enforce the settlement. The Williamses filed an interlocutory appeal, which the
Mississippi Supreme Court denied. Following the denial of the interlocutory appeal, the
chancellor entered a final judgment, declaring that a settlement had been reached between
the parties. The Williamses now appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9.
This Court will not disturb the chancellor's findings when they are supported by
3
Counsel for Homecomings offered to contact the judge during Homecomings’
deposition of Martin, but the Williamses declined.
4
substantial, credible evidence, unless the chancellor's findings are an abuse of discretion,
manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or the result of an erroneously applied legal standard.
Williams v. King, 860 So. 2d 847, 849 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶10.
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a) allows any party to take a deposition of any
person, including a party. The admission of deposition testimony is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Robinson v. Lee, 821 So. 2d 129, 133 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App.
2000). “While the admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge[,] that
discretion is not unfettered.” Id. at 134 (¶19). It is especially not unfettered where a party
seeks to introduce the deposition of an absent witness under Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 32(a)(3). Robinson, 821 So. 2d at 134 (¶19). The party offering the deposition
must show that it fits into one of the stated exceptions. Id. “Where the exercise of the court's
discretion is not supported by the evidence, this Court is obligated to find an abuse of
discretion.” Id.
DISCUSSION
¶11.
The Williamses argue that the chancellor erred by admitting the deposition of their
counsel into evidence, claiming that the deposition included a hearsay statement.
Specifically, the Williamses claim that Martin’s statements expressing that Nelson informed
him that the Williamses accepted the settlement agreement constitute hearsay, and thus the
statements should have been excluded. Homecomings argues that any communications
between Nelson and Martin were irrelevant, since the evidence established Martin constituted
counsel of record possessing the authority to bind his clients to the settlement.
¶12.
In her order granting Homecomings’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the
5
chancellor determined:
1.
. . . [The Williamses] retained the law firm of Martin & Associates,
PLLC, with [Martin], as lead attorney, to file suit on their behalf against
[Homecomings]. The suit was filed, and in the process of time,
October 3, 2008, a settlement was reached between the attorney for [the
Williamses] and the attorney for [Homecomings]. The attorney,
[Martin], acknowledged . . . that as attorney for [the Williamses], he
negotiated and accepted the settlement in question, on behalf of [the
Williamses]. [The Williamses] opposed the settlement and would not
participate therein.
2.
[Homecomings] filed a motion to enforce said settlement.
3.
There is a long-standing principle in [the] law that settlements are
contracts which are enforceable according to their terms. An attorney
is presumed to have the authority to speak for and bind his client.
Parmley v. 84 Lumber [Co.], 911 So. 2d 569 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Whether or not an attorney has agreed to a settlement on behalf of his
client is a question of fact. Id.
4.
In the case at bar, the attorney for [the Williamses], [Martin], at the
time of the settlement, admits he accepted the settlement in question on
behalf of the [Williamses]. The said attorney withdrew from the case
on April 7, 2010.
5.
The court[,] having considered said motion, finds that it is well-taken
and hereby grants the relief requested.
(Emphasis added).
¶13.
In reviewing the record, we note that Martin’s deposition reveals he testified that he
possessed authority from the Williamses to act as their counsel with respect to their claims
against Homecomings and as to all settlement matters. Of particular significance to our
decision is the complaint against Homecomings, which Martin signed on behalf of the
Williamses. The chancellor’s order reflects that she relied on Martin’s authority as counsel
of record to enforce the settlement.
6
¶14.
Martin stated that he and Nelson represented sixteen clients during the settlement
agreement. Martin explained that due to the large number of clients, he and Nelson agreed
to split up and each talk to a certain number of clients. Martin and Nelson agreed to explain
the settlement terms to the clients and then inquire whether the clients wanted to accept or
reject the proposed agreement. Martin stated that Nelson met with the Williamses to discuss
the settlement terms; Martin himself did not personally meet with the Williamses. Martin
testified that after Nelson met with the Williamses, Nelson informed Martin that the
Williamses had agreed to the settlement. Martin expressed that he did not know what was
said during their meeting; he only knew what Nelson told him regarding the result of the
meeting. We note that the record reflects the Williamses were present during the deposition,
and both Samuel and Carolyn Williams 4 possessed the opportunity to question Martin while
he was under oath. The transcript reflects that the Williamses each presented their questions
to Martin. Afterwards, the Williamses confirmed on the record that they had in fact
possessed the opportunity to question Martin.
¶15.
During the hearing on the motion to enforce settlement, counsel for Homecomings
explained that he intended to offer Martin’s deposition testimony into evidence “because Mr.
Martin says what he told my client” regarding the settlement. Counsel for Homecomings
further clarified to the chancellor: “[T]o the extent the court wants to ignore any testimony
. . . about what the Williamses may have told Mr. Martin, that’s fine. I’m not offering it for
4
The record reflects that the Williamses’ daughter, Angelia, was also present during
the deposition. However, counsel for Homecomings prohibited Angelia from questioning
Martin since she failed to constitute a party to the present action.
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that purpose.”
¶16.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) provides that a statement is not hearsay
if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by a person authorized by
him to make a statement concerning the subject[.]” Our supreme court has held that “[a]n
attorney is presumed to have the authority to speak for and bind his client.” Parmley, 911 So.
2d at 573 (¶19); see also Pace v. Fin. Sec. Life of Miss., 608 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Miss. 1992);
Fairchild v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 254 Miss. 261, 265, 179 So. 2d 185, 187 (1965).
Additionally, we recognize the determination of “[w]hether or not the attorney has agreed
to a settlement on behalf of the client is a question of fact.” Parmley, 911 So. 2d at 573
(¶19).
¶17.
In this case, as previously noted, Martin expressed on the record through deposition
testimony that he had the authority to bind the Williamses to the terms of the settlement upon
learning from Nelson of the Williamses’ alleged acceptance of the proposed settlement. As
also previously noted, the record reflects that Martin signed the complaint against
Homecomings on behalf of the Williamses. We thus find that the record provides substantial
evidence supporting Martin’s authority as counsel of record to bind the Williamses to the
agreement. We also find substantial evidence exists to support the chancellor’s order
enforcing the settlement agreement. See Parmley, 911 So. 2d at 573 (¶19). Furthermore,
Martin’s testimony that he possessed authority as the Williamses’ attorney to accept the
settlement terms, coupled with Martin signing the complaint on behalf of the Williamses,
demonstrates that Martin indeed possessed the authority to enter into a settlement and bind
the Williamses to the terms of any such agreement with Homecomings. Fairchild, 254 Miss.
8
at 265, 179 So. at 187.
¶18.
Moreover, we review the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. Robinson,
821 So. 2d at 133 (¶16). If any error occurred in the admission of such statements, the error
was harmless. In this case, the chancellor’s order enforcing the settlement does not reflect
that she considered any statements conveyed by Nelson to Martin. Instead, the order reflects
that the chancellor relied on Martin’s authority as the Williamses’ counsel of record to speak
for and bind his clients in settlement negotiations. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion
in the chancellor’s admission of Martin’s deposition into evidence. See id.
¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANTS.
LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND
FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT.
JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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