Mark V. Frank, Relator, vs. Entegris, Inc., Respondent, Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.

Mark V. Frank, Relator, vs. Entegris, Inc., Respondent, Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent. A04-1560, Court of Appeals Unpublished, July 5, 2005.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A04-1560

 

 

Mark V. Frank,

Relator,

 

vs.

 

 

Entegris, Inc.,

Respondent,

 

Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development,

Respondent.

 

 

Filed July 5, 2005 Affirmed Toussaint, Chief Judge

 

Agency File No. 5178 04

 

Mark V. Frank, 214 Norton Street, Mankato, MN 56001 (pro se relator)

 

 Entegris, Inc., 3500 Lyman Blvd., Chaska, MN 55318 (respondent)

 

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, E200 First National Bank Building, 332 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent DEED)

 

            Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Toussaint, Chief Judge; and Kalitowski, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge

 

Relator challenges the decision of the commissioner's representative that he was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because he had quit without good reason attributable to his employer.  Because the evidence reasonably tends to sustain the findings, we affirm.

D E C I S I O N

 

An applicant who quits employment is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (Supp. 2003).[1]  "Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact."  Midland Elec., Inc. v. Johnson, 372 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. App. 1985).  "A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at the time the employment ended, the employee's."  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (Supp. 2003).  An appellate court reviews factual findings made by the commissioner's representative in the light most favorable to the decision and does not disturb them if there is evidence that reasonably tends to sustain
them.  Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).

            Relator Mark Frank worked as an extruder-setup operator at respondent Entegris, Inc.'s Gaylord, Minnesota, facility from March 24, 2003, until January 13, 2004.  On December 8, 2003, he expressed interest in a quality-inspection job at the Chaska, Minnesota, Entegris facility.  The human resources manager arranged an interview for him.  Relator applied for the position and was accepted, and, on December 12, 2003, his transfer was approved without a set date.  As of January 13, 2004, his transfer to Chaska had not been completed, and he announced that he was quitting that day.

               The uncontroverted testimony established that the Gaylord position remained relator's on January 13.  His transfer to Chaska was approved; however, a replacement worker for his Gaylord position was required.  A replacement worker requiring training was hired on January 12.  Entegris management thought relator's transfer to Chaska was likely within a month after the date relator quit.  In short, the evidence reasonably supports the finding that it was relator's decision to quit.

               Relator argues that the "internal job application form," showing that he had "gone through the application process properly with the help of [the human resources manager] and the approval of my supervisor," should have been admitted into evidence.  He states that the form "confirms what I have presented from the start of this process that I was indeed beyond the application stage of my request for a transfer to [Quality Assurance] Department in Chaska."  As the commissioner's representative determined, there was no dispute that relator applied for and was approved for the Chaska position.  Therefore, the commissioner's representative did not err in determining that the form itself was of no consequence to the litigation.

Under Minnesota law, an employee who quits is not disqualified if he or she had a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.  A good reason is a reason

(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; and

(2) that is significant and would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.

 

Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (Supp. 2003).  Whether an employee has good cause to quit attributable to the employer is a question of law, which we review de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).

The commissioner's representative found that Entegris did not treat relator "wrongly or unreasonably" and did not try to block or frustrate his transfer.  The record supports these findings; it reflects Entegris's efforts to accommodate relator.  Moreover, there is no showing that relator communicated to management that those efforts were insufficient.  Had relator not quit, the whole process of replacing and then transferring him would have taken two months or less, including the holiday season.  The termination date was chosen by relator, not Entegris, whose testimony indicates that it valued relator's work and intended for him to retain his position until the steps for his requested transfer had occurred.  These are not circumstances that would justify a reasonable person quitting employment.

  The evidence supports the commissioner's representative's finding that relator left his employment while employment was still available to him, which is a quit rather than a discharge under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(b) (Supp. 2003), and relator did not have good reason to quit.       

Affirmed.

[1] The revisor's office inadvertently substituted the term "ineligible for" for the term "disqualified from" in Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subds. 1, 4, 7, 8(a) (Supp. 2003).  See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subds. 1, 4, 7, 8(a) (2002) (using term "disqualified from"); 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2, § 11 (making other changes to Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1, but retaining term "disqualified from"); 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2, § 20(j), (k) (directing revisor to change the term "disqualified from" to "ineligible for" only in Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 12, and then to renumber to Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13b).