Micheal B. Prickett, et al., Appellants, vs. David E. Peterson, et al., Respondents, Streeter & Associates, Inc., Defendants.

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1996).

 STATE OF MINNESOTA

 IN COURT OF APPEALS

 C3-97-2057

In the Matter of: Phillip Eugene Perkins.

 Filed March 31, 1998

 Affirmed

 Davies, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 9760117

William L.H. Lubov, Lubov & Associates, 2445 Park Ave., Minneapolis, MN 55404 (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Karen Ann Roesler, Assistant County Attorney, A-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Foley, Judge.*

*Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 DAVIES, Judge

Appellant Phillip Eugene Perkins challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his commitment as mentally ill and dangerous. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant and two other guards provided 24-hour security for a condemned building (appellant was assigned to the midnight shift, guard Robert Wee to the 8:00 a.m. shift, and guard Kenneth Peterson to the 4:00 p.m. shift). On August 30, 1996, Peterson arrived at the building at 3:50 p.m. and honked his horn as a signal to Wee. Wee did not respond. When Peterson gained entry to the building, he found Wee dead. Following an investigation, the police arrested appellant and charged him with second-degree murder.

Appellant made two confessions. Appellant told Dr. Carl Malmquist, who was evaluating appellant to determine his competency to stand trial, that delusional beliefs led him to kill Wee. When a Hennepin County Medical Center nurse asked appellant why he was in the hospital, he responded, "All I know is I kilt a man and I got to pay the price."

The first court-appointed examiner, Dr. Roger Sweet, diagnosed appellant as mentally ill with psychosis not otherwise specified. Dr. Sweet testified that appellant posed a clear danger to the safety of others. Dr. Sweet cited the murder (assuming it had been committed), appellant's verbally threatening behavior at the security hospital, and an allegation that appellant later tried to strangle his roommate at the hospital.

The second court-appointed examiner, Dr. Owen Nelson, also concluded that appellant was mentally ill with a paranoid delusional disorder, persecutory type. Dr. Nelson declined to express an opinion as to appellant's dangerousness.

The trial court found that appellant was mentally ill when he killed Wee, that appellant continues to be mentally ill, that he has never received treatment for his illness, and that there is a substantial likelihood he would engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another. The trial court committed appellant to the Minnesota Security Hospital as mentally ill and dangerous.

D E C I S I O N

On appeal, the findings of a trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed under a de novo standard. Id.

If the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person is "mentally ill and dangerous to the public, it shall commit the person." Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (1996). A mentally ill and dangerous person is one

(a) who is mentally ill; and (b) who as a result of that mental illness presents a clear danger to the safety of others as demonstrated by the facts that (i) the person has engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another and (ii) there is a substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (1996) (emphasis added). Appellant contends that respondent failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he committed the overt act of killing Wee.

The trial court made specific findings to support its determination that appellant killed Wee. First, the court found appellant had the opportunity to kill Wee. Appellant disputes this, arguing that others had an opportunity to kill Wee. He contends there were repeated breaches in security at the building and that the breaches allowed others, including transients, to frequent the building. The evidence, however, showed only that several construction workers had entered the building.

The trial court also cited appellant's confessions to Dr. Malmquist and the HCMC nurse. Appellant challenges the trial court's decision to give weight to these confessions rather than to his denials. Dr. Malmquist, however, testified that appellant could relate factual material and provide a coherent history. Dr. Malmquist explained that an accused is not likely to falsely incriminate himself unless he is trying to feign a psychosis, which is rarely done. The trial court had clear and convincing evidence from which to conclude that appellant killed Wee. The trial court's factual findings and credibility assessments are not clearly erroneous.[3]

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 DAVIES, Judge

Appellant Phillip Eugene Perkins challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his commitment as mentally ill and dangerous. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant and two other guards provided 24-hour security for a condemned building (appellant was assigned to the midnight shift, guard Robert Wee to the 8:00 a.m. shift, and guard Kenneth Peterson to the 4:00 p.m. shift). On August 30, 1996, Peterson arrived at the building at 3:50 p.m. and honked his horn as a signal to Wee. Wee did not respond. When Peterson gained entry to the building, he found Wee dead. Following an investigation, the police arrested appellant and charged him with second-degree murder.

Appellant made two confessions. Appellant told Dr. Carl Malmquist, who was evaluating appellant to determine his competency to stand trial, that delusional beliefs led him to kill Wee. When a Hennepin County Medical Center nurse asked appellant why he was in the hospital, he responded, "All I know is I kilt a man and I got to pay the price."

The first court-appointed examiner, Dr. Roger Sweet, diagnosed appellant as mentally ill with psychosis not otherwise specified. Dr. Sweet testified that appellant posed a clear danger to the safety of others. Dr. Sweet cited the murder (assuming it had been committed), appellant's verbally threatening behavior at the security hospital, and an allegation that appellant later tried to strangle his roommate at the hospital.

The second court-appointed examiner, Dr. Owen Nelson, also concluded that appellant was mentally ill with a paranoid delusional disorder, persecutory type. Dr. Nelson declined to express an opinion as to appellant's dangerousness.

The trial court found that appellant was mentally ill when he killed Wee, that appellant continues to be mentally ill, that he has never received treatment for his illness, and that there is a substantial likelihood he would engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another. The trial court committed appellant to the Minnesota Security Hospital as mentally ill and dangerous.

,D E C I S I O N

On appeal, the findings of a trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed under a de novo standard. Id.

If the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person is "mentally ill and dangerous to the public, it shall commit the person." Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (1996). A mentally ill and dangerous person is one

(a) who is mentally ill; and (b) who as a result of that mental illness presents a clear danger to the safety of others as demonstrated by the facts that (i) the person has engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another and (ii) there is a substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (1996) (emphasis added). Appellant contends that respondent failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he committed the overt act of killing Wee.

The trial court made specific findings to support its determination that appellant killed Wee. First, the court found appellant had the opportunity to kill Wee. Appellant disputes this, arguing that others had an opportunity to kill Wee. He contends there were repeated breaches in security at the building and that the breaches allowed others, including transients, to frequent the building. The evidence, however, showed only that several construction workers had entered the building.

The trial court also cited appellant's confessions to Dr. Malmquist and the HCMC nurse. Appellant challenges the trial court's decision to give weight to these confessions rather than to his denials. Dr. Malmquist, however, testified that appellant could relate factual material and provide a coherent history. Dr. Malmquist explained that an accused is not likely to falsely incriminate himself unless he is trying to feign a psychosis, which is rarely done. The trial court had clear and convincing evidence from which to conclude that appellant killed Wee. The trial court's factual findings and credibility assessments are not clearly erroneous.[1]

The trial court also found a substantial likelihood that appellant would, in the future, engage in acts that would inflict serious physical harm to another. Appellant contends that, absent consideration of the contested killing, he does not pose a threat of future harm. Because we accept the trial court's determination that appellant killed Wee, appellant's argument as to risk of future harm has no merit. The evidence supports the trial court's decision. See In re Clemons, 494 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. App. 1993) (fact that person "does not have a long history of violence does not preclude a finding of future dangerousness").

  Affirmed.

[3*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

[ 1] Respondent's motion to strike certain reports attached to a stipulation because they were not part of the trial court record is granted. Minn. R. Civ. App. 110.01.