State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mark Edward Wadena, Appellant.

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This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1996).

 STATE OF MINNESOTA

 IN COURT OF APPEALS

 C8-98-55

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Mark Edward Wadena,

Appellant.

 Filed September 22, 1998

 Affirmed

 Thoreen, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court

File No. K3972443

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2131; and

Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Darrell C. Hill, Assistant County Attorney, Ramsey County Government Center West, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Ann McCaughan, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Lansing, Judge, and Thoreen, Judge.

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 THOREEN, Judge

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Because the evidence supports the jury's finding of guilt, we affirm.

 D E C I S I O N

An appeal claiming insufficient evidence requires appellate review of the record in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). Circumstantial evidence supports a conviction if it is "consistent only with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt." State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 534 (Minn. 1995).

Appellant argues that the state failed to prove the necessary intent. Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (1996),[1] defines unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as:

Whoever * * *

(17) intentionally * * * drives a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or an authorized agent of the owner.

The intent required to support a conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle

[i]s the intent to use a vehicle knowing that one does not have permission from the true owner to do so.

In re Welfare of C.D.L., 306 N.W.2d 819, 820 (Minn. 1981). Knowing requires only a belief "that the specified fact exists." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(2) (1996). The district court's intent instruction was consistent with the law.

The intent required for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle can be established by showing use and lack of permission to use. C.D.L., 306 N.W.2d at 820. The state established that appellant was driving the stolen vehicle and the owner had not given him permission to drive it. Appellant argues that the fact that he had the keys to the vehicle and the testimony of Joanne Hamilton create a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant knew he did not have permission. Hamilton, who was a passenger in the stolen car when appellant was arrested, testified that a third party told appellant it was her car and gave appellant the keys to the car in exchange for crack cocaine.

However, the state disproved permission by the owner's testimony that she had not given anyone the keys to her car, but she had hidden a set in the armrest. The jury could infer that appellant did not have permission in spite of his possession of the keys. Obviously, the jury did not believe Hamilton's testimony. When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Id.; State v. Darrow, 287 Minn. 230, 235, 177 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1970) (evidence that defendant drove stolen vehicle was sufficient to support jury inference of intent to drive without permission); cf. State v. Dahms, 310 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Minn. 1981) (knowledge that goods are stolen can be inferred from possession of stolen property); State v. Duea, 414 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn. App. 1987) (unexplained possession of stolen property within reasonable time after theft sufficient to sustain conviction).

 Affirmed.

*Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

[1] We note the statute was amended during the 1997 legislative session and now includes "knowing or having reason to know that the owner or an authorized agent of the owner did not give consent." Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (Supp. 1997). The amended statute applies to crimes committed on or after August 1, 1997. 1997 Minn. Laws ch. 239, art. 3, § 26 (sections 1 to 20 (the amended statute was section 17) are effective August 1, 1997, and apply to crimes committed on or after that date). Appellant committed his crime on July 26, 1997, and accordingly, the 1996 version of the statute applies to this appeal.

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