Barbara Burns, Appellant, vs. Michael Mayer, et al., Respondents.

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1996).

 STATE OF MINNESOTA

 IN COURT OF APPEALS

 C2-97-302

Barbara Burns,

Appellant,

vs.

Michael Mayer, et al.,

Respondents.

 Filed January 27, 1998

 Affirmed and Motions Denied

 Davies, Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. T49457367

Barbara R. Burns, 13684 Harmony Way, Apple Valley, MN 55124 (appellant pro se)

Michael J. Mayer, Grannis & Hauge, P.A., 1260 Yankee Doodle Road, Suite 200, Eagan, MN 55121-2201 (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Huspeni, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.*

*

Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 DAVIES, Judge

Appellant challenges an order granting respondent access to a sealed court file, contests the judge's refusal to honor a notice of removal, and seeks various other relief. We affirm and deny appellant's motions.

 FACTS

Respondent Michael Mayer was involved as a lawyer in legal proceedings associated with appellant Barbara Burns' traffic-related offenses. Burns later filed an ethics complaint against Mayer. Mayer sought access to the sealed file to defend against the complaint and Burns opposed his motion. In February 1997, the district court granted Mayer's request. Burns appeals. Only Burns has filed a brief, and this court directed the appeal to proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

 D E C I S I O N

1. Burns first claims the February 1997 order is "without authority" because the judge failed to honor a notice of removal. Because Burns previously removed two other judges, for her to remove a third judge requires a showing of actual prejudice. Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03. The cases Burns cites to the contrary are distinguishable. Burns makes only conclusory allegations of prejudice against the judge in question. Therefore, to reverse, we would have to presume the judge erred in not removing himself. But error is never presumed on appeal. Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949).

Burns also claims that sealing the file is analogous to an injunction and granting Mayer access to the file is a denial of her request for an injunction. Even assuming that Burns' analogy is valid, the posture here does not allow a traditional analysis of the Dahlberg factors. See Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (1965) (listing factors to be considered when addressing propriety of injunction). The record shows: (1) the Burns-Mayer relationship is acrimonious; (2) the damage to Burns of allowing Mayer access to the sealed file is unclear, but Mayer's defense against Burns' ethics complaint could be seriously hindered if he is denied access to that file; and (3) there is no underlying dispute on which one of the parties could prevail on the merits.

The district court adopted a limited exception to the seal and required Mayer to obtain court permission before divulging the contents of the file to others. Because it is not clear how the exception to the seal could be any narrower, and because the balance of the harms favors Mayer, the exception to the court seal is well within the district court's discretion. See Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979) (district court has broad discretion in injunction matters).[3]

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 DAVIES, Judge

Appellant challenges an order granting respondent access to a sealed court file, contests the judge's refusal to honor a notice of removal, and seeks various other relief. We affirm and deny appellant's motions.

 FACTS

Respondent Michael Mayer was involved as a lawyer in legal proceedings associated with appellant Barbara Burns' traffic-related offenses. Burns later filed an ethics complaint against Mayer. Mayer sought access to the sealed file to defend against the complaint and Burns opposed his motion. In February 1997, the district court granted Mayer's request. Burns appeals. Only Burns has filed a brief, and this court directed the appeal to proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

 D E C I S I O N

1. Burns first claims the February 1997 order is "without authority" because the judge failed to honor a notice of removal. Because Burns previously removed two other judges, for her to remove a third judge requires a showing of actual prejudice. Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03. The cases Burns cites to the contrary are distinguishable. Burns makes only conclusory allegations of prejudice against the judge in question. Therefore, to reverse, we would have to presume the judge erred in not removing himself. But error is never presumed on appeal. Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949).

Burns also claims that sealing the file is analogous to an injunction and granting Mayer access to the file is a denial of her request for an injunction. Even assuming that Burns' analogy is valid, the posture here does not allow a traditional analysis of the Dahlberg factors. See Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (1965) (listing factors to be considered when addressing propriety of injunction). The record shows: (1) the Burns-Mayer relationship is acrimonious; (2) the damage to Burns of allowing Mayer access to the sealed file is unclear, but Mayer's defense against Burns' ethics complaint could be seriously hindered if he is denied access to that file; and (3) there is no underlying dispute on which one of the parties could prevail on the merits.

The district court adopted a limited exception to the seal and required Mayer to obtain court permission before divulging the contents of the file to others. Because it is not clear how the exception to the seal could be any narrower, and because the balance of the harms favors Mayer, the exception to the court seal is well within the district court's discretion. See Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979) (district court has broad discretion in injunction matters).[1]

2. Burns seeks relief under the Government Data Practices Act and Minn. Stat. § 299C.11 (1996). She also asks this court to rule that Mayer committed abuses of process and malicious prosecution. Because these claims were not addressed in the February 1997 order, we do not address them here. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (appellate courts generally address only issues presented to and decided by district court); Frank v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 1983) (appellate court will not address issue if trial court did not address it and that omission was not brought to trial court's attention).

3. Burns also challenges a refusal to accept a filing in January 1997. The alleged January 1997 order is unreviewable because we lack the order. See Truesdale v. Friedman, 267 Minn. 402, 404, 127 N.W.2d 277, 279 (1964) (party seeking review must provide appellate court with record allowing review of alleged errors); see also Noltimier v. Noltimier, 280 Minn. 28, 29, 157 N.W.2d 530, 531 (1968) (party's pro se status does not lift obligation to provide adequate record).

4. Since this appeal was filed, Burns has made various requests for relief. All such currently pending requests connected with this case are denied.

  Affirmed and motions denied.

[3]* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

[ ]1 If we were to apply the test set out in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 202-03 (Minn. 1986), we would reach the same result.