DEBRA LEA MILLER V JOHN THOMAS MILLER
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED DECEMBER 28, 2005
DEBRA LEA MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 127767
JOHN THOMAS MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
This case presents the question whether the domestic
relations arbitration act (DRAA)1 requires a formal hearing
during
arbitration
comparable
traditional trial proceedings.
to
that
which
occurs
in
We conclude that it does
not.
Also at issue is whether a court order to which the
parties have stipulated in writing can satisfy the act’s
requirement
of
a
written
conclude that it can.
agreement
to
arbitrate.
We
Therefore, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, which ruled to the contrary on
1
MCL 600.5070 t seq.
e
both issues, and we reinstate the arbitration award and the
judgment of divorce.
THE FACTUAL
AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed for divorce in January 2001.
failed
settlement
conferences
in
the
circuit
After
court,
on
December 4, 2001, both parties stipulated in writing to
entry of an order sending all issues in the case to binding
arbitration.
The
arbitrator
put
the
parties
during the arbitration proceedings.
in
separate
rooms
He shuttled between
them, gathering the necessary information and hearing the
respective
arguments.
Both
parties
agreed
to
this
procedure.
At the end of the day, plaintiff asked the arbitrator
for additional sessions.
He denied the request, expressly
noting in his written award that plaintiff had failed to
raise anything new to justify further proceedings.
When
plaintiff made a second request, the arbitrator gave her
three days to provide an outline of what she would present
at
the
additional
voluminous material.
proceedings.
She
supplied,
instead,
Rather than schedule more hearings,
the arbitrator reviewed plaintiff’s material, modified the
award, and issued the final binding arbitration award.
2
Plaintiff filed a motion in court to set aside the
arbitration
award
on
the
basis
that
the
arbitrator
had
failed to conduct a “hearing” as required by the DRAA.
She
also claimed that no arbitration agreement existed.
The
court rejected plaintiff’s claims and entered a judgment of
divorce.
In
a
Appeals
reversed
vacated
the
split
the
published
judgment
arbitration
decision,
of
award.
the
It
the
circuit
held
Court
of
court
and
the
DRAA
that
required a formal hearing and that none occurred during the
arbitration.
Miller v Miller, 264 Mich App 497; 691 NW2d
788 (2004).
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
The
two
issues
on
appeal
are
OF
REVIEW
matters
interpretation that we review de novo.
470
Mich
305,
308-309;
684
NW2d
of
statutory
People v Kimble,
669
(2004).
When
interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the
Legislature’s intent as determined from a review of the
language of the statute.
People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515,
518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002).
Defendant
asks
us
to
review
the
Court
decision not to enforce the arbitration award.
of
Appeals
We review
such decisions de novo to determine whether the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.
Bros,
Inc,
438
Mich
See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence
488,
496-497;
3
475
NW2d
704
(1991).
Arbitrators exceed their powers whenever they act beyond
the material terms of the contract from which they draw
their
authority
or
in
contravention
of
controlling
law.
DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 433-434; 331 NW2d 418 (1982).
WHAT CONSTITUTES
A
HEARING
UNDER THE
DRAA
MCL 600.5081 is the statutory provision that governs
vacation and modification of arbitration awards under the
DRAA.
MCL 600.5081(2) provides:
If a party applies under this section, the
court shall vacate an award under any of the
following circumstances:
(a) The award was procured
fraud, or other undue means.
by
corruption,
(b) There was evident partiality by an
arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of
an
arbitrator,
or
misconduct
prejudicing
a
party’s rights.
(c)
powers.
The
arbitrator
exceeded
his
or
her
(d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the
hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy, or
otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice
substantially a party’s rights.
The
violated
Court
MCL
of
Appeals
concluded
600.5081(2)(d).
It
that
the
reasoned
arbitrator
that
the
informality of the hearing prejudiced plaintiff’s rights.
The question is whether, in proceedings under the DRAA, the
statute precludes hearings being conducted as the hearing
was conducted in this case.
4
In
majority
reaching
relied
its
decision,
primarily
on
the
MCL
Court
of
Appeals
600.5074(1),
which
provides:
An arbitrator appointed under this chapter
shall hear and make an award on each issue
submitted for arbitration under the arbitration
agreement subject to the provisions of the
agreement. [Emphasis added.]
The DRAA does not define the term “hear” or “hearing.”
Moreover,
it
arbitration.
example,
MCL
sets
requirements
for
Rather, it specifically eschews them.
For
600.5077
no
procedural
requires,
with
certain
exceptions,
that the arbitrator not make an official record of most
arbitration proceedings.2
This purposeful requirement of
little or no record shows that the Legislature intended not
to require specific procedures in arbitration proceedings.
2
MCL 600.5077 provides:
(1) Except as provided by this section,
court rule, or the arbitration agreement, a
record shall not be made of an arbitration
hearing under this chapter.
If a record is not
required, an arbitrator may make a record to be
used only by the arbitrator to aid in reaching
the decision.
The parties may provide in the
arbitration agreement that a record be made of
those portions of a hearing related to 1 or more
issues subject to arbitration.
(2) A record shall be made of that portion
of
a
hearing
that
concerns
child
support,
custody, or parenting time in the same manner
required by the Michigan court rules for the
record of a witness’s testimony in a deposition.
5
Without
a
record,
reviewing
courts
cannot
assess
what
procedures have been followed.
The
Legislature’s
failure
to
provide
specific
arbitration procedures is consistent also with tradition.
Historically,
judicial
highly limited.
characterized
review
of
arbitration
Gavin, 416 Mich 433-434.
arbitration
procedures
sometimes unorthodox . . . .”
as
Id. at 429.
awards
is
This Court has
“informal
and
Consequently,
courts should not speculate why an arbitrator ruled in one
particular manner.
Id.
Rather than employ the formality required in courts,
parties in arbitration are able to shape the parameters and
procedures of the proceeding.
The DRAA requires that they
first sign an agreement for binding arbitration delineating
the
powers
and
duties
of
the
arbitrator.
MCL
600.5072(1)(e).
The
act
also
contemplates
that
the
parties
will
discuss with the arbitrator the scope of the issues and how
information
produced.
necessary
for
MCL 600.5076.
their
resolution
the
DRAA
are
be
The act contemplates that the
parties will decide what is best for their case.
in
will
procedural
restrict this freedom.
6
formalities
Nowhere
imposed
that
This Court has consistently held that arbitration is a
matter of contract.
“It is the agreement that dictates the
authority of the arbitrators[.]”
Rowry v Univ of Michigan,
441 Mich 1, 10; 490 NW2d 305 (1992).
Court
of
Appeals
decision
infringes
In this case, the
on
the
parties’
recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration.
It restricts the parties’ freedom to decide how the
arbitration
presents
hearing
no
should
convincing
be
argument
conducted.3
that
the
Plaintiff
Legislature
intended all DRAA hearings to approximate traditional court
hearings.
court
to
We know of none.4
read
into
a
statute
It is inappropriate for a
something
that
was
not
3
The language in US Const, art I, § 3, cl 6, stating
that the Senate shall “try all Impeachments,” does not
constitute an “implied limitation on the method by which
the Senate might proceed in trying impeachments,” Nixon v
United States, 506 US 224, 230; 113 S Ct 732; 122 L Ed 2d 1
(1993).
Similarly, the language in MCL 600.5074(1),
stating that the arbitrator “shall hear and make an award
on each issue submitted for arbitration,” does not
constitute an implied limitation on the method by which the
arbitrator might proceed in hearing the issues.
(Emphasis
added.)
4
Court of Appeals Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly correctly
noted in her dissent:
“[A]lthough the majority refers to
the process [used in this arbitration] as mediation, the
process was still binding; binding mediation is equivalent
to arbitration and subject to the same judicial limitations
on review.
Frain v Frain, 213 Mich App 509, 511-513; 540
NW2d 741 (1995).” Miller, 264 Mich App 517-518.
7
intended.
AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d
695 (2003).
Significantly, in this case, the parties specifically
agreed to allow the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in
two
separate
rooms.
If
the
parties
and
the
arbitrator
thought that this was the best way to hold their hearing,
they were at liberty to make that agreement.
Because it is
the agreement of the parties that dictates arbitration, the
Court of Appeals should not have altered the agreement.
Rowry, 441 Mich 10.
THE SUFFICIENCY
Plaintiff
agreement
OF THE
argued
existed
PARTIES’ WRITTEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
below
this
in
that
no
case.
written
arbitration
Defendant
disagreed.
Although the Court of Appeals majority did not reach this
issue
directly,
possible
relief
it
listed
that
as
the
alternative
stipulated
grounds
order
constitute a written arbitration agreement.
Mich App 507 n 12.
As
we
arbitration
noted
not
Miller, 264
We disagree.
earlier,
agreement
the
setting
DRAA
out
requires
the
arbitration and the arbitrator’s powers.
MCL
did
for
600.5072(1)(e).
Here,
the
parties
a
subject
written
of
the
MCL 600.5071 and
entered
into
a
written agreement satisfying these requirements when they
8
stipulated to entry of the particularized order for binding
arbitration that the court in due course entered.
The
clearly
order
lists
delineates
the
the
issues
for
arbitrator’s
arbitration.
powers
and
It
duties.
Accordingly, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e).5
Nothing
agreement
consistent
in
the
separate
with
DRAA
from
the
nature of arbitration.
mandates
the
that
stipulated
informal
and
there
sometimes
Gavin, 416 Mich 429.
an
This
order.
be
is
unorthodox
As long as
the parties agree to some document that meets the minimal
requirements of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), the
agreement
is
sufficient.
Therefore,
we
reverse
5
the
In addition, but not relevant here, the parties must
satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d), which provide:
The court shall not order a party to
participate in arbitration unless each party to
the domestic relations matter acknowledges, in
writing or on the record, that he or she has been
informed in plain language of all of the
following:
(a) Arbitration is voluntary.
(b) Arbitration is binding and the right of
appeal is limited.
(c) Arbitration is not recommended for cases
involving domestic violence.
(d) Arbitration
all cases.
may
9
not
be
appropriate
in
decision of the Court of Appeals that reached the contrary
conclusion.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the domestic relations arbitration act
does
not
require
that
the
formality
of
a
hearing
in
arbitration proceedings approximate that of a hearing in
court.
Arbitration
is
by
its
nature
informal.
The
appropriate structure for an arbitration hearing is best
decided by the parties and the arbitrator.
which
the
arbitrator
shuttles
between
A procedure by
the
parties
in
separate rooms questioning and listening to them satisfies
the act’s requirement of a hearing.
We
order
also
for
hold
binding
that
no
written
arbitration
is
agreement
required
beyond
(1)
if
the
the
parties stipulate to entry of the order and the order meets
the criteria of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), and
(2) if the parties satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d) on the
record.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals
and
reinstate
the
arbitration
award
and
judgment of divorce.
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
10
the
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
DEBRA LEA MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 127767
JOHN THOMAS MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the majority for the
reasons set forth in Renny v Port Huron Hosp, 427 Mich 415,
437; 398 NW2d 327 (1986).
Michael F. Cavanagh
1
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