IN RE J M DIBERT MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2010
In the Matter of J. M. DIBERT, Minor.
No. 298409
Osceola Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-004612-NA
Before: MARKEY, P.J., AND WILDER AND STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent G. Dibert (“respondent-mother”) appeals as of right from the trial court’s
order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), (j), and
(m). We affirm.
Although respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that §§ 19b(3)(i)
and (j) were both established by clear and convincing evidence, she concedes that the trial court
“had sufficient basis to terminate [her] parental rights pursuant to [§ 19b(3)(m)] due to her
voluntary release of her rights to her older daughters.” 1 Because only one statutory ground for
termination is required, it is unnecessary to address respondent-mother’s arguments concerning
§§ 19b(3)(i) and (j). In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). We may
affirm the trial court’s determination of the existence of a statutory ground for termination solely
on the basis of § 19b(3)(m). Id.
We note that respondent-mother also attempts to challenge the trial court’s termination of
the parental rights of the child’s legal father’s, respondent S. Dibert (“respondent-father”).
However, the claim of appeal was filed on behalf of respondent-mother only. Respondent-father
is not a party to this appeal. The termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights is not
1
MCL 712A.19b(3)(m) was amended by 2010 PA 7, effective September 24, 2010. As
respondent-mother observes, however, the amendment does not apply to this case, which arose
and was decided before the effective date of the amendment. As in effect at the time this case
was decided, § 19b(3)(m) authorized termination of parental rights where “[t]he parent’s rights to
another child were voluntarily terminated following the initiation of proceedings under section
2(b) of this chapter or a similar law of another state.”
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dependent upon the establishment of grounds to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights, In
re Marin, 198 Mich App 560, 566-568; 499 NW2d 400 (1993), and respondent-mother lacks
standing to challenge the trial court’s termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. See In
re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 21; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). Accordingly, we decline to consider
respondent-mother’s arguments relating to respondent-father’s parental rights.
Respondent-mother lastly argues that, even if a statutory ground for termination was
established, the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights because termination was not in
the child’s best interests. We disagree. We review the trial court’s best interests decision for
clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Jones,
286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).
There was considerable evidence that respondent-mother engaged in services designed to
improve her parenting skills after she released her parental rights to her first four children, and
after her parental rights to a fifth child were terminated. She intensified her services during her
pregnancy with the child who is the subject of this petition. Service providers offered positive
testimony regarding her progress during her pregnancy on such issues as managing crises and
supervision of children. However the trial court appropriately evaluated this evidence in light of
respondent-mother’s past history and other circumstances, including her continued belief that she
was a good mother to her older children, despite the evidence that she failed to properly
supervise them. The petitioner repeatedly failed to accept objective facts such as her husband’s
criminal record and the biological parentage of Gracie. Further, respondent-mother was adamant
that she planned to raise the child with respondent-father and was steadfast in her belief that he
was incapable of abusing a child, despite the evidence of his assaultive criminal history, which
included a conviction of child abuse for abusing his older son. Giving deference to the trial
court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, In re Miller,
433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989), we find no clear error in the trial court’s
determination that respondent-mother failed to understand the gravity of her past actions and that
she lacked the ability to apply what she had learned on a long-term basis. The trial court did not
clearly err when it concluded that respondent-mother was unlikely to be able to properly raise the
child in the foreseeable future, and it did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondentmother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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