PEOPLE OF MI V JOHNNY BERNARD CALVIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294761
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-006673-01
JOHNNY BERNARD CALVIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and FITZGERALD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(“CSC”), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) and (b), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). He was originally sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 23
years and 9 months to 50 years for each first-degree CSC conviction, and 10 to 15 years for each
second-degree CSC conviction. In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions,
but remanded for resentencing because the trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines
range, but “gave no reasons at all” for the departure. People v Calvin, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 11, 2007 (Docket No. 274240). On remand,
defendant was resentenced by a different judge to concurrent prison terms of 30 to 60 years for
each first-degree CSC conviction and 10 to 15 years for each second-degree CSC conviction. A
third judge subsequently granted defendant’s motion for resentencing, because, “It was not clear
to this Court when it came back to me whether …or to what extent Judge Brown actually took
this new law (the legislative change in minimum sentencing) into effect. . . . The Court was not
…applying the law retroactively.” The third judge then resentenced defendant to identical prison
terms of 30 to 60 years for the first-degree CSC convictions and 10 to 15 years for the seconddegree CSC convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. Because the sentencing court did not
justify the extent of the departure from guidelines and the proportionality of the sentence
imposed as required by People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 300; 754 NW2d 284 (2008), we vacate
defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues that resentencing is required because the trial court improperly
departed from the sentencing guidelines range for reasons that were already used to determine
the appropriate guidelines range. He further argues that the trial court failed to justify the extent
of its departure from the guidelines. We agree in part.
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A court must impose a minimum sentence within the sentencing guidelines range unless a
departure from the guidelines is permitted. MCL 769.34(2). The court may depart from the
guidelines if it “has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the
record the reasons for departure.” MCL 769.34(3). Only factors that are objective and verifiable
may be used to assess whether there are substantial and compelling reasons to deviate from the
minimum sentence range under the guidelines. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 257; 666
NW2d 231 (2003).
In reviewing a trial court’s departure from the guidelines range, the existence of a
particular factor supporting a departure is reviewed for clear error, the determination whether the
factor is objective and verifiable is reviewed de novo, and the determination whether a reason is
substantial and compelling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 264-265. The extent of
a trial court’s departure from the guidelines range and the proportionality of a sentence is also
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 300; 754 NW2d 284 (2008).
In this case, the trial court referred to the ages of the victims, defendant’s predatory
behavior, and the years of abuse as objective and verifiable factors supporting a departure from
the guidelines. Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s consideration of the years of abuse
as an objective and verifiable factor to support a departure from the guidelines. However, he
contends that the trial court improperly considered his predatory conduct and the ages of the
victims as reasons for departure because those factors are already reflected in the scoring of the
guidelines. MCL 769.34(3)(b) provides that a court “shall not base a departure on an offense
characteristic or offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate
sentence range unless the court finds . . . that the characteristic has been given inadequate or
disproportionate weight.” See also People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 474; 650 NW2d 700
(2002). To determine whether a factor was given inadequate or disproportionate weight in the
guidelines calculations, a court “must determine how that characteristic affected the defendant’s
minimum sentence range.” People v Young, 276 Mich App 446, 451; 740 NW2d 347 (2007).
Predatory behavior and the ages of the victims, which relate to “vulnerability,” are at
least partially accounted for in offense variable 10, MCL 777.40. See People v Cannon, 481
Mich 152, 156-162; 749 NW2d 257 (2008). Indeed, the trial court scored 15 points for OV 10
because predatory conduct was involved. The trial court did, however, find that these
characteristics were given inadequate or disproportionate weight. In addition, the sentencing
court was aware of the sentencing record created by her predecessor judges when she noted, “I
think that the judges who have had this case before me have made it clear that these
circumstances and these facts are horrific here…” The record establishes that the predatory
behavior of the defendant was profound. By way of example, in scoring OV 13, the guidelines
score 3 or more crimes against a person within a five year period. Here, the period of criminal
sexual conduct exceeded 5 years. Additionally, the number of offenses to show a pattern of
criminal behavior of crimes against a person (here 3 or more penetrations and touching), may
have been in the hundreds. Also, as Judge Brown noted, the defendant was engaged in grooming
behaviors toward these children that not only “cultivated them for your sexual pleasure and
increase the sexual exposure to intercourse, but you began to pay them for intercourse…. I can’t
think of anything more horrific than to cultivate little girls for you own sexual perversion and
then to require them to perform acts of prostitutions so that they could have money . . .” Clearly,
it is the profound abuse and the long duration of abuse that constituted the driving force in
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establishing the minimum sentence. The factors recited constitute objective and verifiable
behaviors that extend beyond the factors considered in the sentencing guidelines. We do not find
that the sentencing court’s determination that substantial and compelling reasons existed for
departure was an abuse of discretion.
Defendant also argues, and the prosecutor agrees, that resentencing is required because
the trial court failed to justify the extent of its departure as required by Smith, 482 Mich 292. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that a trial court must “explain why” the substantial and
compelling reasons that exist in a case justify the particular departure imposed. Id. at 310-311,
318. In the present case, as in Smith, the trial court stated that a departure from the guidelines
was appropriate for substantial and compelling reasons, but failed to “justify why it chose the
particular degree of departure” and explain “why the substantial and compelling reason or
reasons articulated justify the minimum sentence imposed.” This lapse in the sentencing record
requires resentencing. Id. at 319.
For these reasons, we vacate defendant’s sentences and remand this case for resentencing
consistent with this opinion.
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly refused to consider his positive
prison adjustment at resentencing, erroneously believing that it was not relevant. From the
context of the trial court’s statement it appears that the trial court determined that the defendant’s
adjustment to prison and his behavioral progress was not significant to the court’s sentencing
decision. Because we are remanding this case for resentencing, we merely remind the sentencing
court that a defendant’s conduct while in prison is an appropriate consideration at a resentencing
proceeding. See People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 516; 287 NW2d 165 (1980).
We vacate defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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