YVONNE WILLIAMS V SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
YVONNE WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 9, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293061
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-001387-NI
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JOHN DOE,
Defendant.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) appeals
as of right from a circuit court order denying its motion for summary disposition based on
plaintiff Yvonne Williams’ alleged failure to provide timely notice of her claim. Because the
trial court correctly determined that Williams timely gave the required notice and, for that
reason, properly denied SMART’s motion, we affirm. We have decided this appeal without oral
argument under MCR 7.214(E).
MCL 124.419 allows for “ordinary claims against a common carrier” on the condition
that “written notice of any claim based upon injury to persons or property shall be served upon
the authority no later than 60 days from the occurrence” giving rise to the injury. An unknown
bus driver allegedly injured Williams on November 12, 2008. Williams sent a letter to the agent
designated by SMART regarding the circumstances of the incident on November 29, 2008, and
her attorney sent another letter directly to SMART on January 12, 2009. The trial court
determined that Williams’ letter of November 29 met the notice requirements of the statute.
On appeal, SMART argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the notice
requirements had been met. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for
summary disposition. Gillie v Genesee Co Treasurer, 277 Mich App 333, 344; 745 NW2d 137
(2007).
-1-
In order to comply with the notice requirements under MCL 124.419, Williams had to
give the authority written notice of her claim within 60 days of the accident. Nothing within the
terms of the statute precludes a potential plaintiff from providing notice by giving notice to an
agent designated by SMART. Because there was evidence that Williams sent her letter of
November 29 to the agent that SMART had instructed her to deal with, the trial court did not err
when it declined to grant SMART’s motion on the basis that the notice was not sent directly to
SMART. In addition, the trial court did not err when it determined that Williams’ letter of
November 29 gave SMART notice of Williams’ claim.
The term “claim” is generally understood to mean “the aggregate of operative facts
giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.” Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 63; 783
NW2d 124 (2010). For purposes of MCL 124.419, the claim must be premised on an injury to a
person or property. Id. In her letter of November 29, Williams gave notice that the driver of the
bus she was exiting closed the doors on her, trapping her in the doors, and injuring her hand. A
governmental agency is liable for bodily injury “resulting from the negligent operation by any
officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the
governmental agency is the owner . . . .” MCL 691.1405. The phrase “‘operation of a motor
vehicle’” requires that “the motor vehicle is being operated as a motor vehicle” and refers to
“activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” Chandler v
Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 320-321; 652 NW2d 224 (2002) (emphasis in original). The
loading and unloading of passengers is an action within the operation of a bus. Martin v Rapid
Inter-Urban Partnership, 480 Mich 936; 740 NW2d 657 (2007). Thus, Williams’ letter clearly
alleged that she had a common carrier-passenger relationship with SMART, see Dawe v Dr
Reuven Bar-Levav & Assoc, PC, 485 Mich 20, 25-26 n 3; 780 NW2d 272 (2010) (noting that the
common carrier-passenger relationship is one that creates a duty to exercise due care), and that
the bus’ driver negligently caused personal injury to her as she was exiting the bus. See Case v
Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6-7; 615 NW2d 17 (2000) (stating that negligence is the
failure to exercise reasonable care). Further, Williams’ letter provided SMART with the date
and time of the injury, the location of the bus at the time of the injury, the route number of the
bus, and the first name of the bus driver. Williams was not required to specifically state that the
bus driver breached the duty of ordinary care owed to her as a passenger, which breach resulted
in personal injury for which SMART could be liable under MCL 691.1405, in order to notify
SMART of her claim. Williams’ letter of November 29 was sufficient to apprise SMART of her
belief that she had a personal injury claim against SMART.
The trial court did not err in denying SMART’s motion for summary disposition.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
1
In light of our decision, it is unnecessary to address whether Collins’s January 12 letter also
satisfied the statutory notice requirement.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
