PEOPLE OF MI V NELSON SUMPTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 23, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289835
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 08-002791-FH;
08-002794-FH;
08-004315-FH
NELSON SUMPTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 292814
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-002789-FH
NELSON SUMPTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and METER and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of a total of 41 counts in four separate
cases that were consolidated for trial. In LC No. 08-002789-FH (Docket No. 292814), he was
convicted of two counts of uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249, two counts of forgery, MCL
750.248, and one count each of false pretenses over $20,000, MCL 750.218(5)(a), second-degree
money laundering, MCL 750.411n, and identity theft, MCL 445.65. In LC No. 08-002791-FH
(Docket No. 289835), he was convicted of ten counts of uttering and publishing, eight counts of
forgery, four counts of false pretenses over $20,000, and one count each of second-degree money
laundering and identity theft. In LC No. 08-002794-FH (Docket No. 289835), he was convicted
of two counts of uttering and publishing, two counts of forgery, and one count each of false
pretenses over $20,000, second-degree money laundering, and identity theft. In LC No. 08004315-FH (Docket No. 289835), he was convicted of two counts of false pretenses over
$20,000 and one count of second-degree money laundering. Defendant was sentenced as a
fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 9-1/2 to 25 years for each
conviction. He appeals as of right in each of his four cases. We affirm in each case.
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I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s convictions arise from a series of fraudulent real estate transactions
involving property located in Detroit. Three of the consolidated cases involve schemes whereby
defendant acquired personal information and an electronic signature from property owners and
then used that information to prepare fraudulent powers of attorney that were used to sell the
owners’ properties without their knowledge or consent. In each instance, the purchaser obtained
a mortgage loan and the proceeds were disbursed to companies owned or controlled by
defendant. In two instances, the title company made a disbursement by issuing a check that was
payable to the property owner, but defendant cashed the check at a check-cashing business by
endorsing it after the forged endorsement of the property owner. In the fourth case, evidence
was presented that defendant was involved in selling the same real property to two different
purchasers within one week. Again, mortgage loan proceeds were diverted to a company owned
by defendant.
II. SEARCH WARRANTS
A. PROBABLE CAUSE
Defendant first argues that a September 20, 2007, search warrant for his home, vehicle,
and computer was invalid because it was not supported by probable cause. Although defendant
contends that he preserved this issue by challenging the validity of the warrant in a pretrial
motion to suppress that was denied on August 28, 2008, the record discloses that the September
20, 2007, warrant was not a subject of the motion to suppress and that the trial court’s August 28,
2008, opinion did not address whether there was probable cause to support any search warrant.
Although the trial court recognized that defendant had raised a challenge to a warrant on the
ground that “it stated no probable cause for his arrest nor did it have an affidavit attached,” the
court declined to further consider that issue because defendant failed to specify which warrant he
was contesting. Thus, the record does not support defendant’s claim that this issue was
preserved below. In addition, it is impermissible for a party to enlarge the record on appeal,
People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 524 n 1; 616 NW2d 710 (2000); see also People v Seals,
285 Mich App 1, 21; 776 NW2d 314 (2009), and People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 38; 755
NW2d 212 (2008), and this Court previously denied defendant’s motion to expand the record on
appeal to include the search warrants and affidavits that are the bases for his argument on appeal.
See People v Sumpter, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 17, 2010
(Docket Nos. 289835 and 292814). Thus, the September 20, 2007, warrant and affidavit are not
properly before this Court for review.
Even if this issue was properly before us, we would reject defendant’s request for relief.
Because the record does not indicate that defendant timely challenged the September 20, 2007,
search warrant in the trial court, this unpreserved issue is subject to review for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999); see also People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003). Although it appears
that defendant raised this issue in a posttrial motion for a new trial, raising the issue at that late
stage was insufficient to preserve a claim that evidence should have been suppressed before trial.
To the extent defendant also challenges the trial court’s decision denying his motion for a new
trial, such a decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451,
460; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). But issues of law, such as statutory questions and the application of
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a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, are reviewed de novo. People v Mullen, 282 Mich
App 14, 21; 762 NW2d 170 (2008). We review any factual findings made by the trial court for
clear error. Id.
There is no merit to defendant’s argument that the September 20, 2007, search warrant
and affidavit failed to pass constitutional muster. Defendant’s reliance on Paramount Pictures
Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708; 344 NW2d 788 (1984), is misplaced because defendant was not
compelled to produce evidence of any kind, let alone evidence of personal records. The
execution of the search warrant did not violate defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination or Const 1963, art 1, § 17, even if the seized records were personally
incriminating to defendant. Id. at 725-731.
Defendant has also failed to show that the warrant was invalid because it was issued
without probable cause. The Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause considers
whether there is probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 475; 739 NW2d 505 (2007). “Probable cause
exists when the facts and circumstances would allow a reasonable person to believe that the
evidence of a crime or contraband sought is in the stated place.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich
App 634, 698; 780 NW2d 321 (2009); see also People v Darwich, 226 Mich App 635, 639-640;
575 NW2d 44 (1997). An affidavit must be read in a commonsense and realistic manner.
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 244; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). The issuing magistrate’s task
is to make a practical and commonsense determination whether, considering all of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit presented, including the veracity and bases of knowledge
of persons supplying hearsay to the affiant, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place. Keller 479 Mich at 475. A reviewing court need
only ask if a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis
for finding probable cause to issue a warrant. Mullen, 282 Mich App at 21.
In this case, although the affiant, Wayne County Sheriff’s Deputy Allen Cox, provided
little information concerning his law enforcement experience in the fraud unit, his affidavit
indicated that he was conducting a fraud investigation that involved contact by himself or other
members of the fraud unit with multiple homeowners and banking institutions, various
documents that were used to trace real estate transactions from homeowners to a title company,
and, ultimately, deposits to various bank accounts. The affidavit included detailed information
describing how defendant had obtained personal information and signatures from homeowners,
none of whom knowingly executed a power of attorney authorizing defendant to act on their
behalf. Deputy Cox also described how proceeds from transactions handled by the title
company, Original Title Agency, Inc., were traced to business and personal bank accounts, and
he also provided specific information regarding defendant’s arrest on September 19, 2007, while
driving a vehicle that contained checkbooks for businesses that were associated with him.
Because the cell phone that defendant possessed contained an Ann Arbor address and
information indicated that defendant’s dependent resided at that address, and because proceeds
from real estate transactions were linked to personal accounts, there was a substantial basis for
finding probable cause to believe that additional evidence of the fraudulent real estate scheme
would be found at that address. Thus, defendant has not established any constitutional error
based on the probable cause requirement.
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Defendant has also failed to show a violation of MCL 780.653. Under that statute, the
facts set forth in an affidavit for a search warrant need only show that an unnamed person spoke
with personal knowledge of the information and that the person is either credible or that the
information is reliable. People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 501; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). It could
be inferred from the information in the affidavit that Deputy Cox acquired personal knowledge
of the documents used in the real estate transactions and the information known by unnamed
homeowners who were crime victims. Crime victims are presumably reliable. People v Dowdy,
211 Mich App 562, 567; 536 NW2d 794 (1995). Thus, there is no basis for finding that the
requirements of the statute were not satisfied.1
Further, we are not persuaded that the September 20, 2007, search warrant is overly
broad, vague, or amounts to a “general warrant.” The warrant authorized a search for various
items, stored on a computer or otherwise, related to the sale and purchase of real estate, as well
as the proceeds or substituted proceeds from the sales. The affidavit was sufficiently specific to
pass constitutional muster. Unger, 278 Mich App at 245; see also People v Hellstrom, 264 Mich
App 187, 192-193; 690 NW2d 293 (2004) (purpose of the particularity requirement is to provide
reasonable guidance to the executing officers regarding the items to be seized).
In sum, defendant has not established any error, plain or otherwise, associated with the
September 20, 2007, search warrant and affidavit, and thus has not shown that any trial evidence
should have been excluded as the fruit of the search of the Ann Arbor residence or the computer
obtained from that residence. Further, absent any constitutional or statutory infirmity,
defendant’s attempt to restate this claim as a general due process claim is unavailing. Cf. People
v Blackmon, 280 Mich App 253, 261; 761 NW2d 172 (2008).
Defendant generally asserts that other affidavits and search warrants were “similarly
defective,” but he does not discuss the substance of any other warrants or supporting affidavits,
the evidence seized, or even the identities of the places searched. “An appellant may not merely
announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.”
People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Thus, defendant has
abandoned any challenge to other affidavits and warrants.2
1
Although we do not find that MCL 780.653 was violated, we note that any violation of the
statute would not require suppression of the seized evidence as the officer acted reasonably and
in good faith. Hawkins, 468 Mich at 512-513.
2
Further, to the extent defendant argues in his pro se Standard 4 brief that there was no probable
cause to issue search warrants that were executed at various banks and at Original Title,
defendant has not established that he has standing to challenge these searches. The state and
federal constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizures are personal rights.
People v Gadomski, 274 Mich App 174, 178; 731 NW2d 466 (2007). A defendant has no
standing to challenge a search of businesses, such as banks, because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information that he and others expose to third parties. Id. at 178-179.
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B. SUPPRESSION OF SEARCH WARRANTS
We next consider defendant’s claims involving the delay in providing him with copies of
the search warrants and affidavits, which were initially suppressed by the issuing magistrate. It
is undisputed that defendant eventually received copies of the affidavits and warrants in January
2008, more than nine months before trial. In August 2008, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence based on the alleged delay in providing him with the affidavits and
warrants, finding that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. On appeal, defendant argues
that the delay in providing the search warrants and affidavits affected his constitutional rights to
confrontation, a speedy trial, and due process.3 We disagree.
First, the record does not disclose that defendant timely challenged the suppression of the
search warrants on the ground that it affected his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. “An
objection based on one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack based on a
different ground.” People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d 478 (1996). At most,
defendant untimely raised the Confrontation Clause issue in his motion for a new trial.
Therefore, we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right “to be
confronted with the witnesses against him” US Const, Am VI. Therefore, testimonial
statements of witnesses who are unavailable for trial are generally inadmissible unless a
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. People v Bryant, 483 Mich 132, 138;
768 NW2d 65 (2009). A primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the defendant’s
right to cross-examine witnesses, but that right is not unlimited. People v Adamski, 198 Mich
App 133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). A defendant does not have a right to cross-examine a
witness on irrelevant issues, but he should be permitted a reasonable opportunity to test the
truthfulness of testimony. Id.
Here, there is no claim that the search warrants themselves were admitted at trial, and
defendant does not dispute that he received the search warrants in January 2008, more than nine
months before his trial. Under the circumstances, defendant has not established any violation of
his confrontation rights. There is no basis for concluding that defendant was deprived of an
opportunity to cross-examine any witness. To the extent defendant also suggests that this issue
implicates the prosecutor’s due process obligation to disclose material exculpatory or
impeachment evidence, People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281; 591 NW2d 267 (1998), his
argument is equally unavailing. Defendant’s mere assertion that he was not privy to the
prosecutor’s evidence is insufficient to establish error. Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641.
3
Defendant argues in his pro se Standard 4 brief that the delay in providing him with the
affidavits and search warrants violated MCL 780.654 and, therefore, any evidence seized
pursuant to the warrants should have been suppressed at trial. However, even assuming that
there was a statutory violation, defendant has failed to establish any basis for applying the
exclusionary rule to this statutory violation. People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 710; 625
NW2d 764 (2001).
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Although defendant also presented a speedy trial claim in connection with this issue, both
at trial and in his motion for a new trial, the record does not support his claim that the
suppression of the search warrants and affidavits until January 2008 violated his right to a speedy
trial because the delay affected the memories of witnesses. The time for evaluating a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial claim begins with the date of the defendant’s arrest. People v Williams,
475 Mich 245, 261-262; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). If the delay is less than 18 months, the
defendant must prove prejudice. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
Here, the delay between defendant’s arrest in each of the four cases and defendant’s trial was
approximately 13 months. Therefore, defendant had the burden of establishing prejudice. The
only prejudice alleged by defendant was that the delay could affect the memories of witnesses.
However, defendant has not identified any factual basis for finding that the memories of any
witnesses were affected. On the contrary, in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial
court specifically found that none of the witnesses had claimed any memory problems.
Accordingly, defendant failed to establish any violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Finally, defendant’s due process claim is based on the alleged violations of his rights to
confrontation and a speedy trial. Because there is no merit to those claims, defendant’s due
process claim cannot succeed.
III. INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS
Defendant next argues that he was deprived of due process because of the prosecutor’s
wrongful use of investigative subpoenas. We disagree. The prosecutor’s use of investigative
subpoenas is governed by MCL 767A.1 et seq. “MCL 767.4(1)(a) and (f) make clear that only
the person at whom the subpoena was directed can challenge the subpoena under MCL 767A.1 et
seq.” Gadomski, 274 Mich App at 181; see also People v Earls, 477 Mich 1119; 730 NW2d 241
(2007). Therefore, as the trial court properly determined, defendant lacks standing to challenge
the prosecutor’s issuance of investigative subpoenas to third parties.
Defendant’s reliance on People v Pruitt, 229 Mich App 82; 580 NW2d 462 (1998), to
advance a contrary argument is misplaced. The narrow question in Pruitt was whether the
defendant had a right to compel discovery of witnesses’ statements given pursuant to
investigative subpoenas before the preliminary examination, id. at 83-84, not whether any
investigative subpoena should have been issued in the first instance. Here, defendant does not
raise any discovery issues related to witness statements and it is clear from the record that
defendant was provided with copies of witness statements, because he relied on investigative
subpoena transcripts as support for his pretrial motion to suppress the testimony of the
subpoenaed witnesses.
Given defendant’s lack of standing to pursue his claim of statutory error with respect to
the other witnesses, defendant’s unpreserved general due process claim also fails. Further, any
violation of MCL 767A.1 et seq. would not require suppression under the exclusionary rule.
Earl, 477 Mich at 1119. Thus, defendant has not established any error that so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make his resulting convictions a denial of due process. Blackmon, 280
Mich App at 262.
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IV. OTHER EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. LAPTOP COMPUTER
Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to permit him to turn on his laptop computer
at trial. The record indicates that defendant sought to turn on his computer at trial primarily to
demonstrate its functionality; therefore, this argument presents an evidentiary issue. We review
preserved evidentiary issues for an abuse of discretion. Unger, 278 Mich App at 216. “A trial
court may be said to have abused its discretion only when its decision falls outside the principled
range of outcomes.” Blackston, 481 Mich at 460.
Demonstrative evidence is admissible where it aids a fact-finder in reaching a conclusion
on a matter material in the case. Unger, 278 Mich App at 247. It must also satisfy traditional
grounds for relevancy and probative value in light of policy considerations for the administration
of justice. Id.
In this case, the trial judge also served as the trier of fact and found no need for a
demonstration of how the computer functions when it was turned on. Thus, defendant failed to
establish that a demonstrative purpose was necessary. Further, defendant did not present any
basis for questioning the accuracy of either the disk copy of documents produced from an image
on the hard drive, or any paper documents printed from the disk copy, which were admitted at
trial. Under MRE 1003, “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a
genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” The trial court was also advised
that there was a risk that data could be lost if the computer was turned on. Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to turn
on the computer at trial.
Defendant also argues that his inability to turn on the computer deprived him of his due
process right to present a defense, but the right to present a defense is not absolute, as a
defendant must still comply with established rules of procedure to assure fairness and reliability
in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 279-280; 364 NW2d
635 (1984). The application of a rule of evidence contravenes due process “if it infringes on a
defendant’s substantial interest or significantly undermines a fundamental element of his or her
defense.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 637; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Although
defendant accurately asserts that the prosecutor did not offer into evidence everything on the
computer, the trial court made sure that defendant was provided with an entire copy of the
imaged hard drive. Further, the record indicates that defendant was given an opportunity to
acquire additional data from the hard drive before trial, but did not choose to do so or request
assistance in acquiring such data. The only missing data suggested by defendant at trial were
alleged purchase agreements pertaining to some of the cases, but it is clear from the trial court’s
decision that the presence or absence of a purchase agreement was not material to the court’s
determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence. Moreover, the prosecutor stipulated to the fact
central to defendant’s defense, namely, that Rochell Copeland, Billy Baker, and Shirley Snyder
provided the signatures on defendant’s computer for the power of attorney documents. Under
these circumstances, defendant has not established that his inability to turn on the computer
violated his right to due process.
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B. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF
In his Standard 4 brief, defendant argues that the admission of the laptop computer and
the disk copy of information obtained from the hard drive violated MCL 600.4703a, MRE
803(6), and his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.
Because defendant did not raise the statutory claim below, our review of that issue is
limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. MCL
600.4703a is part of the forfeiture provisions in Chapter 47 of the Revised Judicature Act. The
statute imposes certain duties on a seizing agency when a computer is seized for a violation of
MCL 752.791 et seq. In this case, there is no indication that defendant’s computer was seized
for violating MCL 752.791 et seq. Thus, defendant has not shown that MCL 600.4703a is
applicable and, accordingly, has not demonstrated a plain error.
Defendant has also failed to establish that admission of the computer contravened MRE
803(6), or his constitutional rights of confrontation or to due process. Further, because the
record indicates that defendant considered the computer to be material to his defense,
defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by its admission. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. The
disk copy of the documents produced from the image of the computer’s hard drive was admitted
only after defendant and his advisory counsel had an opportunity to review it and informed the
trial court that they were “okay” and “fine” with it. By affirmatively representing to the trial
court that he had no issue with the admission of the disk copy, defendant waived any claim that it
should have been excluded. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). A
waiver, as distinguished from a forfeiture that arises from a failure to object, extinguishes any
error. Id. at 215.
In his Standard 4 brief, defendant also challenges the admissibility of various paper
documents that were admitted at trial on the ground that the trial court did not require the
prosecutor to comply with MRE 803(5) and (6). Defendant argues that this evidentiary error
violated his constitutional rights of confrontation and to due process. We conclude that
defendant waived any claim concerning the authenticity of documents within the group of
exhibits that were admitted as exhibits 1 to 162 by affirmatively representing to the trial court
during Betsy Hogan’s testimony that there was no need for the prosecutor to establish a
foundation for the documents. Carter, 462 Mich at 215-216. But because authenticated exhibits
must still satisfy other evidentiary standards, such as relevancy and hearsay rules, People v
Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 260; 537 NW2d 828 (1995), we shall consider whether defendant has
established any improper use of the evidence. Because defendant did not raise his evidentiary
challenges below, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
MRE 103(d); Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
We disagree with defendant’s argument that the prosecutor was required to establish the
applicability of a hearsay exception for the payoff invoice that was admitted as part of the
closing documents for the sale of Copeland’s property. Hearsay is “a statement, other than the
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). The payoff invoice indicated that $61,805 was owed
to a company owned by defendant. However, it was the prosecutor’s theory at trial that the
invoice was a false statement. Because the evidence was not offered for its truth, it was not
hearsay and, accordingly, there was no need to establish a hearsay exception.
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Defendant’s argument regarding the power of attorney documents is similarly unavailing.
Those documents, on their face, indicate that they were signed by Copeland, Baker, and Snyder,
who appointed defendant to act as their attorney in fact for the purpose of selling specific
property. Although the documents establish the statements made, the prosecutor offered other
evidence to establish the falsity of the statements. Because the prosecutor clearly did not offer
the documents to prove the truth of the matters asserted, they were not hearsay.
We also reject defendant’s hearsay challenges to the two checks in the amounts of
$79,210 and $77,089, respectively. The documents contained the endorsement signatures of
both defendant and Baker. But the prosecutor’s theory at trial was that Baker did not sign the
checks. Where a check is introduced to show utterance of a forged instrument, the hearsay rule
is not implicated. People v Parm, 15 Mich App 303, 305; 166 NW2d 536 (1968). Further, the
portion of the check made out by defendant is not hearsay because it is defendant’s own
statement. MRE 801(d)(2)(A); see also United States v Johnson, 28 F3d 1487, 1498-1499 (CA
8, 1994). Sam Munaco confirmed at trial that defendant signed the checks in his presence.
Therefore, defendant has not established that the checks presented any hearsay concerns.
Although the Internal Revenue Service forms completed by Munaco for the currency
transactions would be hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, it is not clear
that a hearsay exception could not have been established if a proper objection was made at trial.
The exception for business records in MRE 803(6) is based on the inherent trustworthiness of
business records. People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 414; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). In any event,
because Munaco also testified regarding the currency transactions, defendant has not shown that
any error affected his substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
We decline to consider defendant’s challenges to the Snyder purchase agreements for the
sale of the Glynn Court property to Omar Sumpter in May 2006, and to defendant on July 1,
2006. We note that a contract has “legal reality independent of the truth of any statements
contained in it.” Kepner-Tregoe, Inc v Leadership Software, Inc, 12 F3d 527, 540 (CA 5, 1994).
Defendant’s cursory claim of plain error relative to the purchase agreements is insufficient to
invoke our review. Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641. Further, defendant has not shown any
basis for concluding that admission of any of the documents implicated his right of
confrontation. Bryant, 483 Mich at 138. Finally, defendant’s due process claim fails because the
alleged evidentiary errors are not constitutional in nature. Blackmon, 280 Mich App at 259.
We also decline to address defendant’s challenge in his Standard 4 brief to the
admissibility of the closing package for the July 1, 2008, sale of the Hessel property, which was
admitted as exhibit 168, for failure to adequately identify the particular information in the
closing package that defendant claims is hearsay or should be treated as raising constitutional
concerns. Kelly, 231 Mich App 640-641.
Lastly, we find no merit to defendant’s argument in his Standard 4 brief that the trial
court impermissibly considered “special knowledge” regarding handwritten signatures. The
court’s observation that some variation in handwritten signatures would naturally be expected
was based on common sense. Although a fact-finder may not rely on special knowledge, it is
appropriate to consider common sense and everyday experience when evaluating evidence.
People v Simon, 189 Mich App 565, 569; 473 NW2d 785 (1991). In addition, there is nothing to
indicate that this extrinsic information affected the trial court’s conclusion that defendant forged
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each of the four power of attorney documents for Baker’s properties by applying a signature that
Baker had provided on defendant’s computer. Even defendant agreed in his testimony that “if
you understand the technology then you would know that it’s not necessary for him to sign four
separate times. I mean that would be redundancy.”
V. VENUE
Defendant also argues that he was deprived of due process because he was required to
stand trial in Wayne County. We review de novo a trial court’s determination that venue was
proper. People v Houthoofd, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___, issued July 31, 2010 (Docket Nos.
138959 and 138969), slip op at 9.
The general venue rule is that a defendant should be tried in the county where an offense
is committed. Id, slip op at 9. “[E]xcept as the [L]egislature for the furtherance of justice has
otherwise provided reasonably and within the requirements of due process, the trial should be by
a jury of the county or city where the offense was committed.” People v Lee, 334 Mich 217,
226; 54 NW2d 305 (1952).4
MCL 762.8 provides that “[w]henever a felony consists or is the culmination of 2 or more
acts done in the perpetration thereof, said felony may be prosecuted in any county in which any 1
of said acts was committed.” Under this statute, “it is the act that constitutes the felony–rather
than its effects–that gives rise to venue.” Houthoofd, ___ Mich ___, slip op at 15 (emphasis in
original); see also People v Webbs, 263 Mich App 531, 534; 689 NW2d 163 (2004) (the act must
be done in perpetration of the crime).5
In this case, defendant relies only on the fact that the closings for the various real estate
transactions occurred in Oakland County to argue that venue was improper in Wayne County.
As explained, above, however, venue is proper in a given county if any act in the perpetration of
a charged crime was committed in that county. Here, the charged offenses were based on several
acts that extended beyond the closings for the property transactions. Defendant makes no effort
to discuss the various acts that formed the bases for his 41 convictions. His cursory treatment of
this issue is insufficient to properly invoke this Court’s review. Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641;
see also People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 413; 760 NW2d 882 (2008) (defendant may not
leave it to this Court to search the record for a factual basis to sustain or reject his position).
In any event, the Court in Houthoofd, ___ Mich ___, slip op at 21-22, determined that
criminal venue is inherently procedural in nature and, therefore, is subject to MCL 600.1645,
which provides that “[n]o order, judgment, or decree shall be void or voidable solely on the
4
Although defendant relies in part on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in support of his
venue argument, our Supreme Court in Lee, 334 Mich at 224, noted that provisions of the federal
constitution, which require criminal trials to take place in the state and district where the crime
was committed, only apply to federal prosecutions.
5
In Houthoofd, ___ Mich ___, slip op at 13, our Supreme Court agreed with this Court’s
analysis of MCL 762.8 in Webbs.
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ground that there was improper venue.” Under MCL 600.1645, a criminal defendant’s
conviction “cannot be vacated solely on grounds of improper venue.” Houthoofd, __ Mich __,
slip op at 22. The Court also determined that a preserved venue claim is subject to review under
MCL 769.26, which provides that a defendant who advances a claim of nonconstitutional error
has the burden of establishing “a miscarriage of justice under a ‘more probable than not’
standard in order to warrant reversal.” Houthoofd, __ Mich __, slip op at 20-21. This generally
requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court
proceedings. Id. at 20. Earlier case law, which required that a conviction be reversed if venue
was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was abrogated by statute. Id. at 23. Here, assuming
without deciding that venue in Wayne County was improper for some offenses, the associated
verdicts were not void or voidable solely on the grounds of improper venue, nor did the verdicts
represent a miscarriage of justice, as there was no prejudice to defendant. Defendant has not
shown “that it is more probable than not that the outcome of the trial [on these offenses] would
have been different had he been prosecuted in another county[.]” Id. at 21. Therefore, reversal
is not warranted.
VI. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him
of the charged offenses. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence at a bench trial.
People v Lanzo Constr Co, 272 Mich App 470, 473-474; 726 NW2d 746 (2006). Due process
commands a directed verdict of acquittal where trial evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 633-634; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). An appellate
court “reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any
trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 5; 715 NW2d 44 (2006). Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising therefrom may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a
crime. Unger, 278 Mich App at 223. “[B]ecause it can be difficult to prove a defendant's state
of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to
establish the defendant's state of mind, which can be inferred from all the evidence presented.”
People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 622; 751 NW2d 57 (2008).
Here, defendant’s argument is primarily directed at his convictions for false pretenses
over $20,000. MCL 750.218(1) provides, in pertinent part:
A person who, with the intent to defraud or cheat makes or uses a false
pretense to do 1 or more of the following is guilty of a crime punishable as
provided in this section:
(a) Cause a person to grant, convey, assign, demise, lease, or mortgage
land or an interest in land.
(b) Obtain a person’s signature on a forged written instrument.
(c) Obtain from a person any money or personal property or the use of any
instrument, facility, article, or other valuable thing or service.
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If the “[l]and, interest in land, money, personal property, use of the instrument, facility, article, or
valuable thing, service, larger amount obtained, or smaller amount sold or disposed of has a
value of $20,000.00 or more,” the person is guilty of a felony. MCL 750.218(5)(a).
In general, the elements of the offense are “(1) a false representation concerning an
existing fact, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation, (3) use of the
representation with intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental reliance on the false representation by
the victim.” People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34, 37-38; 566 NW2d 21 (1997). A false statement
of promise or intention may not form the basis of the conviction. Id. at 38. Further, the offense
cannot be based on a misrepresentation of a future event. People v Dewald, 267 Mich App 365,
371 n 1; 705 NW2d 167 (2005). But where several false representations are made, the fact that
one or more of them may refer to future events does not preclude a conviction so long as the
conviction rests on misrepresentations of past or existing facts. See People v Cage, 410 Mich
401, 405; 301 NW2d 819 (1981), and People Segal, 180 Mich 316, 319; 146 NW 644 (1914).
Here, defendant was convicted of eight counts of false pretenses over $20,000. With
respect to Copeland’s property (LC No. 08-002789-FH), defendant’s characterization of
Copeland as the victim is consistent with the trial court’s decision. The trial court found the false
pretense to be defendant’s representation that he met with Copeland to purchase her property and
that she was injured by the loss of ownership of the property and the sales proceeds. As a matter
of law, however, a forged deed is insufficient to convey title, even where a purchaser claims to
be a bona fide holder of title. See Special Prop VI LLC v Woodruff, 273 Mich App 586, 591;
730 NW2d 753 (2007). Further, the record reflects that the prosecutor’s theory at trial was that
defendant committed the false pretenses offense by obtaining two checks for his companies, in
the amount of $61,508.82 each, by falsely creating liabilities. The prosecutor argued that
defendant used Kathleen Marinelli to obtain a mortgage loan to purchase the property, and then
succeeded in having Original Title disburse the loan proceeds to his companies based on the
false liabilities and by falsely claiming that he had authority to act on behalf of Copeland. The
trial court’s findings of fact indicate that it found each of the relevant facts necessary to establish
the prosecutor’s theory beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence of the “phony
invoices.”
Examined in the proper context, we disagree with defendant’s claim that the offenses
were based on misrepresentations of a future event. The material misrepresentations related to
present facts, i.e., the existence of liabilities to defendant’s companies, which were satisfied by
disbursements from the mortgage loan proceeds. Defendant has failed to show that the evidence
was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense.6
We also reject defendant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the two
forgery convictions under MCL 750.248, which were based on defendant’s forgery of the power
6
To the extent that the trial court misinterpreted the relevant false representations as occurring
at the beginning of the transaction, when defendant met with Copeland, rather than at the closing,
when false invoices were used to obtain the mortgage loan proceeds, the error was harmless
because defendant was not prejudiced. Lanzo Constr Co, 272 Mich App at 476.
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of attorney and deed documents, or the related uttering and publishing convictions under MCL
750.249. Forgery includes any act that makes an instrument appear to be what it is not. People v
Susalla, 392 Mich 387, 392; 220 NW2d 405 (1974). The essence of forgery is the falsification
of the instrument. People v Hogan, 225 Mich App 431, 435; 571 NW2d 737 (1997). In this
case, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant falsified each document with the intent to injure or defraud another person.
Only minimal circumstantial evidence is required to establish defendant’s state of mind.
Dewald, 267 Mich App at 372.
The injury or fraud arose from the uttering and publishing of the power of attorney and
warranty deed. “One commits the crime by uttering or publishing a false, forged, altered, or
counterfeit record, deed, or instrument, whether it is an original or a copy.” People v Cassadime,
258 Mich App 395, 399; 671 NW2d 559 (2003). “To utter and publish means to offer something
as if it is real, whether or not anyone accepts it as real.” People v Harrison, 283 Mich App 374,
381; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence
established that defendant presented the forged power of attorney and deed, as real, to Original
Title to complete the sale of the property to Marinelli and acquire the mortgage loan proceeds. A
rational trier of fact could infer from the evidence that defendant uttered and published the
instruments with an intent to injure or defraud.
The evidence was also sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for identity theft.
MCL 445.65(1) provides, in pertinent part:
A person shall not do any of the following:
(a) With intent to defraud or violate the law, use or attempt to use the
personal identifying information7 of another person to do either of the following:
(i) Obtain credit, goods, services, money, property, . . . .
(ii) Commit another unlawful act.
7
“Personal identifying information” means:
[A] name, number, or other information that is used for the purpose of
identifying a specific person or providing access to a person's financial accounts,
including, but not limited to, a person’s name, address, telephone number, driver
license or state personal identification card number, social security number, place
of employment, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer
identification number, government passport number, health insurance
identification number, mother's maiden name, demand deposit account number,
savings account number, financial transaction device account number or the
person's account password, stock or other security certificate or account number,
credit card number, vital record, or medical records or information. [MCL
445.63(o).]
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Consent is an affirmative defense to a charge of identity theft, but a defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he “acted with the consent of the person whose personal
identifying information was used, unless the person giving consent knows that the information
will be used to commit an unlawful act.” MCL 445.65(2)(d). Here, although Copeland testified
that she permitted defendant to copy her driver’s license and social security card, her testimony
established that she did not consent to her personal identifying information being used to create
and present fraudulent documents to obtain proceeds from the unauthorized sale of her property.
Copeland testified that defendant told her that he would purchase her house if she gave him
permission to have it appraised, which she did, but that she did not hear from defendant again.
This evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was not acting with Copeland’s consent
when he sold her property. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
identity theft.
We also reject defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to establish seconddegree money laundering with respect to the transaction involving the sale of Copeland’s
property. The evidence that defendant obtained mortgage loan proceeds by false pretenses is
sufficient to establish that defendant knowingly received proceeds or substitute proceeds of a
specified criminal offense. See MCL 750.411k(1)(a), and MCL 750.411j(g)(xix). Further, the
evidence that defendant created false invoices or liabilities to have the mortgage loan proceeds
directed to his companies was sufficient to establish that the receipt or acquisition of the
proceeds was done with an intent to conceal that the source of the proceeds was linked to the
fraudulent power of attorney and the false pretenses offense. MCL 750.411n(1)(b)(ii). Viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant committed second-degree money laundering.
In LC No. 08-002791-FH, involving the sale of Baker’s four properties, defendant was
convicted of ten counts of uttering and publishing, eight counts of forgery, four counts of false
pretenses over $20,000, and one count each of second-degree money laundering and identity
theft. The offenses were similar to those involving Copeland’s property and similar evidence
was presented to establish the offenses, except that two uttering and publishing convictions were
based on evidence that defendant received checks payable to Baker as disbursements at the
closings for two of the fraudulently sold properties, and cashed those checks at a check-cashing
business. According to Munaco, defendant was accompanied by a man whom he identified as
Baker when he appeared to cash the checks. In addition, unlike Copeland, Baker testified that he
signed “on the computer.” Baker testified that defendant told him that he wanted to make sure
that he was not an imposter. Like Copeland, Baker denied signing the power of attorney
documents or authorizing anyone to produce them. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions.
We reach this same conclusion with respect to the convictions arising from the sale of
Snyder’s property in LC No. 08-002794-FH. Defendant was convicted of the same seven
offenses that he was convicted of in the case involving Copeland’s property, and similar
evidence was presented in both cases, except that Snyder had a real estate agent and testified that
she signed a purchase agreement to sell the property to defendant. However, Snyder denied
authorizing defendant to sell her property to a third party, or receiving any of the proceeds from
defendant’s sale of the property to Paul Rhoads using a fraudulent power of attorney.
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Finally, in LC No. 08-004315-FH, defendant was convicted of two counts of false
pretenses over $20,000 and one count of second-degree money laundering. Although the two
real estate transactions in that case did not involve a fraudulent power of attorney, the evidence
showed that defendant arranged for two different investors to purchase the same property in July
2005. The first sale was made to Marzen Baldonado on July 1, 2005, and the second sale was
made to David Ferrand on July 8, 2005. In both instances, the plan was for defendant to collect
land contract payments for the property so that the investor could pay the mortgage loan. Similar
to the other three cases, the prosecutor’s false pretenses theory was that each transaction was
intended to obtain mortgage loan proceeds by having the title company disburse the proceeds to
a company owned by defendant based on falsified liability claims. The money laundering charge
was based on defendant’s use of a company to conceal the source of the proceeds. Examined in
this context, we reject defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his
three convictions.
VII. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant also challenges his convictions on the ground that they are against the great
weight of the evidence. We disagree. A court has discretion to grant a new trial if a verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence. Lemmon, 456 Mich at 634-635. We review a trial
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 648 n 27. The trial
court “may grant a new trial only if the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that
it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Id. at 627. “Conflicting
testimony and questions of witness credibility are generally insufficient for granting a new trial.”
Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. The evidence in these cases did not preponderate so heavily
against the trial court’s verdicts that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow defendant’s
convictions to stand. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion.
VII. OTHER ISSUES
Defendant raises two other issues in his pro se Standard 4 brief, neither of which have
merit.
First, defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence and to dismiss at the preliminary examination the cases involving the fraudulent power
of attorney documents. The preliminary examination is not a constitutionally based procedure
and, therefore, any improperly admitted evidence is subject to the harmless error standard in
MCL 769.26. People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 603-604, 613; 460 NW2d 520 (1990). The proper
focus is on whether an alleged error affected the trial. People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 685;
672 NW2d 191 (2003); see also People v Moorer, 246 Mich App 680, 682; 635 NW2d 47
(2001). Considering that defendant had the opportunity to raise issues concerning whether
evidence should be suppressed after his bindover to circuit court, we find no basis for relief.
Indeed, to properly preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, it should be presented to and
addressed in the circuit court after the bindover decision. See People v Coy, 243 Mich App 283,
286-287; 620 NW2d 888 (2000).
Second, defendant questions the propriety of Deputy Cox being named as the
complaining witness for the complaint in LC No. 08-004315-FH. Because defendant did not
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preserve this issue below, he has the burden of showing a plain error affecting his substantial
rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
“‘The primary function of a complaint is to move the magistrate to determine whether a
warrant shall issue,’” People v Higuera, 244 Mich App 429, 443; 625 NW2d 444 (2001)
(citation omitted), but it is not necessary that the complaint contain factual allegations
establishing probable cause for an arrest. MCL 764.1d (“A complaint shall recite the substance
of the accusation against the accused[,] [and it] . . . may contain factual allegations establishing
reasonable cause”). (Emphasis added.) The magistrate may also consider the complainant’s
sworn testimony or affidavit, which may be based on personal knowledge, information and
belief, or both. MCL 764.1a. Regardless, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination
before an information is filed at which the magistrate determines whether there is probable cause
for charging the defendant with the crime. See People v Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 130-131; 214
NW2d 823 (1974). The sole remedy for an illegal arrest is the suppression of evidence obtained
as a result of that arrest. People v Rice, 192 Mich App 240, 244; 481 NW2d 10 (1991).
Because there is no statutory prohibition against a law enforcement officer serving as a
complaining witness, defendant has not shown any defect in the complaint. Further, defendant
has not shown that his arrest was illegal. Moreover, even if there was a basis for finding that
defendant’s arrest was illegal, defendant’s failure to identify any evidence that was obtained as a
product of his arrest is fatal to his claim that application of the exclusionary rule is required. In
sum, defendant has not established a plain error affecting his substantial rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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