GARY KOGELSHATZ V WHITE CHAPEL MEMORIAL CEMETERY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY KOGELSHATZ, WILLIAM
KOGELSHATZ, and LINDA HAUER,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V
No. 293977
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-002689-NO
GENDERNALIK FUNERAL HOME, INC.,
Defendant,
and
WHITE CHAPEL MEMORIAL CEMETERY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and ZAHRA and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10).1 Because plaintiffs have not
established that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to their causes of action
including negligence/gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, conversion,
violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.903, and breach of
contract, we affirm.
I
1
While the trial court states in the conclusion of its opinion and order that it granted defendant’s
motion for summary disposition “under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(1),” it appears that the
“(C)(1)” is a typographical error. Defendant brought its motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8)
and/or (C)(10), the trial court set out the standards of review for both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
(C)(10), and there is no mention of MCR 2.116 (C)(1) which concerns jurisdiction, by the parties
or the trial court.
-1-
Plaintiffs are siblings. Their mother, Virginia Kogelshatz, passed away on April 23, 2007
of natural causes. That same day, plaintiffs contracted with Gendernalik Funeral Home2 to
perform funeral services and to arrange for the cremation and burial of Mrs. Kogelshatz at
defendant cemetery. The contract also sets out crematory charges for defendant cemetery in the
amount of $200 and cemetery charges of $530 for defendant cemetery. The contract sets out a
date of funeral service as April 26, 2007. Plaintiff William Kogelshatz also signed an
“Authorization for Cremation” form dated April 23, 2007, that was prepared by the funeral home
and signed by Patricia Gendernalik, the funeral director. The form stated that “the disposition of
cremated remains shall be carried out in thirty days after cremation. The cremated remains are to
be: X interred at White Chapel Memorial Cemetery . . . .”
Carol Daniels, an employee at defendant cemetery, testified via deposition that she spoke
with Patricia Gendernalik at the funeral home to arrange the cremation services as well as the
interment of the cremated remains at defendant cemetery. She testified that she filled out a
Cremation Order and an Interment Order with information provided to her by Patricia
Gendernalik from the funeral home. Daniels stated that the Interment Order directs that the
cremated remains be buried in defendant cemetery’s Garden of Victorious Faith, Section E-222.
Daniels stated that she left the exact space in which the cremated remains were to be buried
blank because Patricia Gendernalik did not provide the specific location. The Cremation Order
lists the location to be buried as “E-222, ____, Vic Faith.” Plaintiffs had no contact with
defendant cemetery during the arrangements.
Gendernalik Funeral Home provided a check in the amount of $730 to defendant
cemetery on April 26, 2007 for cremation services and opening and closing for the interment of
the cremated remains. Defendant cemetery received the body of Mrs. Kogelshatz on April 26,
2007 and cremation occurred at defendant cemetery also on April 26, 2007. Phillip
Moschenrose, an employee of defendant cemetery, testified in his deposition that because the
Interment Order was incomplete based on the information Daniels received from Gendernalik
Funeral Home, the Interment Order was placed into a pending file awaiting a Consent to Inter
Order form. According to Moschenrose, the cremated remains were stored at the mausoleum
awaiting further instruction.
Plaintiffs’ family has owned two spaces in the Guardian of Victorious Faith section of
defendant cemetery since 1993. Mrs. Kogelshatz’s husband predeceased her in 1993 and Mrs.
Kogelshatz purchased the two spaces at that time. Mr. Kogelshatz was not cremated and was
buried in one of the spaces in a casket. Steven Prykucki, an employee at defendant cemetery,
testified that based on the configuration of the two plots, the cremated remains of Mrs.
Kogelshatz could have been placed into the same space as Mr. Kogelshatz or could have been
placed in the second plot. Prykucki also testified that the burial of the ashes at defendant
2
Gendernalik Funeral Home, Inc. was a defendant in the trial court proceedings, however, the
trial court dismissed Gendernalik by stipulation, and thus, the funeral home is not a party to this
appeal.
-2-
cemetery was dependent on direction from the family on their choice of placement and that was
the reason why defendant’s burial of the cremation remains was delayed.
Moschenrose testified that as a result of a customary cemetery procedure to check the
status of cremated remains shelved in the mausoleum every three to six months, a mausoleum
employee called him to notify him that the cremated remains of Mrs. Kogelshatz were still in the
mausoleum awaiting burial. Moschenrose then reviewed the file and discovered the missing
Consent to Inter form. Shortly thereafter, in February 2008, Moschenrose called plaintiff
William Kogelshatz and informed him of the missing form and that the cremated remains of Mrs.
Kogelshatz were still awaiting burial. Moschenrose also faxed a Consent to Inter form to
plaintiff William Kogelshatz. Moschenrose also testified that the length of time cremation
remains were shelved in the mausoleum varied greatly depending on the circumstances and
remains could be shelved in the vault for several months. After receiving the signed Consent to
Inter form, defendant cemetery interred the cremated remains on February 22, 2008, in the same
grave as her late husband, leaving the second space empty.
Plaintiffs then filed suit against defendant cemetery on September 16, 2008 alleging gross
negligence, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, conversion,
and violation of the Michigan Consumer Law Act. Defendant filed a motion for summary
disposition which the trial court entertained on June 6, 2009. The trial court granted defendant’s
motion for summary disposition as to all counts in an opinion and order on July 16, 2009.
Plaintiffs now appeal as of right.
II
Defendant cemetery moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
(C)(10). Both parties, in their briefs, relied on evidence outside of the pleadings, such as
documents and depositions. As a result, this Court reviews the record as if the motion for
summary disposition was brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Silberstein v Pro-Golf of America,
Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 457; 750 NW2d 615 (2008). We review a motion for summary
disposition de novo. Robertson v Blue Water Oil Co, 268 Mich App 588, 592; 708 NW2d 749
(2005).
A trial court should grant a motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Miller v Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 246; 631 NW2d 760 (2001). The nonmoving party may not
rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must, by documentary evidence, set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich
358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds could differ. West v GMC, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
When deciding a motion for summary disposition under this rule, a court must consider the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence then filed in the
action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR
2.116(G)(5); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).
III
-3-
A. Negligence/Gross Negligence
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant cemetery’s motion for
summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant cemetery’s actions were
negligent or grossly negligent. In order to state a negligence claim on which relief may be
granted, plaintiffs must prove: “(1) that defendant owed (plaintiffs) a duty of care, (2) that
defendant breached that duty, (3) that plaintiffs were injured, and (4) that defendant’s breach
caused plaintiffs’ injuries.” Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71-72; 701 NW2d 684 (2005).
Plaintiffs have not presented an analysis of the elements of negligence or any legal support
buttressing their argument. “It is not sufficient for a party ‘simply to announce a position or
assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to
sustain or reject his position.’” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998),
quoting Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
In any event, there is no support in the record for plaintiffs assertion that defendant
cemetery was “obliged to promptly inform [plaintiffs] if performing the contract for burial and
funeral services would be impossible, impracticable, or delayed prior to accepted money
consideration for the services and burial arrangements.” But plaintiffs have presented no law or
facts establishing that defendant cemetery owed any legal duty to plaintiffs to promptly bury the
cremation remains. The facts show that plaintiffs had no contact with defendant cemetery during
the funeral, cremation, and burial arrangements. Plaintiffs met with staff at Gendernalik Funeral
Home and signed all the documents there. Gendernalik forwarded several signed forms as well
as payment for services to defendant cemetery. However, Gendernalik Funeral Home did not
forward a Consent for Interment form signed by plaintiffs or provide specific information with
regard to the exact location where the remains were to be buried. Because of the missing
information, defendant cemetery filed the paperwork in a pending file and safely stored the
cremation remains in their mausoleum awaiting further instruction. Through its customary
review, when defendant cemetery discovered that the cremation remains were shelved for many
months, defendant cemetery promptly contacted plaintiffs seeking further instruction. There was
uncontroverted deposition testimony in the record that it was not uncommon for cremation
remains to be stored at defendant cemetery for long periods of time while families determine
what they want to do with cremation remains. Plaintiffs have not stated a negligence claim on
which relief may be granted. Henry, 473 Mich at 71-72.
With regard to gross negligence, “gross negligence” has been defined in many contexts
as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury
results.” Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263, 269; 668 NW2d 166 (2003); see MCL 691.1407(7)(a)
(Governmental Immunity) and MCL 324.81131(11) (Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act.) Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to establish that defendant cemetery’s
conduct was so reckless that it showed a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury
resulted. To the contrary, the evidence shows that defendant cemetery was waiting to bury the
cremation remains of Mrs. Kogelshatz until it received the proper documentation. Defendant
cremated Mrs. Kogelshatz’s body on the day it received the body and then stored the cremation
remains in an urn in the mausoleum awaiting further burial instructions. After plaintiffs signed
and submitted the Consent to Inter form faxed to them by Moschenrose, defendant cemetery
immediately interred the cremation remains at the designated location in the family plot.
-4-
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that defendant cemetery was grossly negligent in its
handling of the cremation remains. Xu, 257 Mich App at 269.
The trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition to defendant cemetery on
plaintiffs’ counts of negligence and gross negligence.
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs next argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant cemetery’s actions
resulted in negligent infliction of emotional distress. The elements of this claim are: (1) a serious
injury is threatened or inflicted on a third person, (2) the nature of the injury is such as to cause
severe mental disturbance to the plaintiff, (3) the shock results in actual physical harm, (4) the
plaintiff is a member of the third person’s immediate family, and (5) the plaintiff is present at the
time the third person is injured or suffers shock fairly contemporaneously with that injury.
Taylor v Kurapati, 236 Mich App 315, 360; 600 NW2d 670 (1999).
The operable facts of this case do not fit into the framework of a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs state that they had visited the cemetery many times
and believed that their mother’s remains had been interred in the family plot with their father.
When they found out that the remains were instead awaiting burial in the mausoleum they
suffered an extreme shock. Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are not
predicated simply upon some negligent action that causes a plaintiff to suffer severe emotional
distress. Rather, the claim is predicated on a plaintiff’s witnessing of a negligent injury to an
immediately family member and suffering severe mental distress resulting in actual physical
harm. Duran v Detroit News, Inc, 200 Mich App 622, 629; 504 NW2d 715 (1993); Wargelin v
Sisters of Mercy Health Corp, 149 Mich App 75, 81; 385 NW2d 732 (1986). Unfortunately, in
the case, plaintiffs’ mother had already passed away and had been cremated by the time of the
alleged shocking event. Thus, plaintiffs could not have witnessed a negligent injury being
threatened or inflicted on their mother who had already passed away and been cremated. Further
there is no record support for the proposition that any of the three plaintiffs suffered actual
physical harm as a result of learning that their mother’s remains had not yet been buried. In fact,
all three testified at their depositions that the shock of learning that their mother’s cremation
remains had not been interred caused them “stress” or “sleeplessness.” None of them treated
with a physician or could document a physical injury directly resulting from a shocking event
related to the delayed burial of their mother.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly found that plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of proof to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because none of the three plaintiffs actually witnessed a negligent injury being
threatened or inflicted on their mother who had already passed away and been cremated or
suffered actual physical harm as a result of the delayed burial of their mother’s cremation
remains. Taylor, 236 Mich App at 360.
C. Conversion
-5-
Next, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting defendant cemetery’s motion
for summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to establish a claim of conversion. In
particular, plaintiffs assert that while they had no personal property interest in the body of their
deceased mother, defendant cemetery failed to return the fees paid for cremation and interment
services. In order to maintain an action for conversion, the plaintiff must have an enforceable
interest in the property at issue. See Thomas v Watt, 104 Mich 201, 207; 62 NW 345 (1895) (the
plaintiff must prove “[p]roperty in herself, and a right of possession at the time of the
conversion”); Hance v Tittabawassee Boom Co, 70 Mich 227, 231; 38 NW 228 (1888) (“the
plaintiff must prove his ownership, absolute or qualified, of the property”). If the defendant’s
right to possession is greater than that of the plaintiff, a claim for conversion will not lie because
a person cannot convert his own property. Foremost Ins Co v Allstate Ins Co, 439 Mich 378,
391; 486 NW2d 600 (1992); Rohe Scientific Corp v Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 133 Mich App 462,
468; 350 NW2d 280 (1984), modified in part on other grounds 135 Mich App 777 (1984).
There is a common-law tort of conversion and a statutory tort of conversion. Lawsuit
Fin, LLC v Curry, 261 Mich App 579, 591-593; 683 NW2d 233 (2004). The common-law tort
“is defined as any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in
denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” Foremost Ins Co, 439 Mich at 391. Statutory
conversion consists of (1) another person steals or embezzles property or converts property to his
own use or (2) another person buys, receives, possesses, conceals or aids in the concealment of
stolen, embezzled, or converted property knowing that the property had been stolen, embezzled,
or converted. MCL 600.2919a.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly found that plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of proof to create a justiciable question of fact on their claim for
conversion. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that defendant cemetery wrongfully converted
the cremation fee or interment fee. Plaintiffs have testified that the services provided by
defendant cemetery were untimely, but none testified or provided evidence that the services were
not performed. Further, plaintiffs present no legal authority supporting the proposition that the
fees should be refunded to plaintiffs. As such, plaintiffs have not presented sufficient proof to
establish with common law or statutory conversion.
D. Michigan Consumer Protection Act
Plaintiffs next maintain that the trial court erred in granting defendant cemetery’s motion
for summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to establish a violation of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.903. In plaintiffs’ brief on appeal, they set out the
following sections of MCL 445.903:
(1) Unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct
of trade or commerce are unlawful and are defined as follows:
***
(b) Using deceptive representations or deceptive designations of geographic
origin in connection with goods or services.
***
-6-
(q) Representing or implying that the subject of a consumer transaction will be
provided promptly, or at a specified time, or within a reasonable time, if the
merchant knows or has reason to know it will not be so provided.
***
(s) Failing to reveal a material fact, the omission of which tends to mislead or
deceive the consumer, and which fact could not reasonably be known by the
consumer.
***
(u) Failing, in a consumer transaction that is rescinded, canceled, or otherwise
terminated in accordance with the terms of an agreement, advertisement,
representation, or provision of law, to promptly restore to the person or persons
entitled to it a deposit, down payment, or other payment, or in the case of property
traded in but not available, the greater of the agreed value or the fair market value
of the property, or to cancel within a specified time or an otherwise reasonable
time an acquired security interest.
***
(bb) Making a representation of fact or statement of fact material to the
transaction such that a person reasonably believes the represented or suggested
state of affairs to be other than it actually is . . . .
Again, aside from merely listing sections of the MCPA, plaintiffs do not explain or
provide authority in support of their argument that defendant cemetery made misrepresentations
to plaintiffs, misled plaintiffs, and deceived plaintiffs. “It is not sufficient for a party ‘simply to
announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.’” Wilson, 457 Mich at 243, quoting
Mitcham, 355 Mich at 203.
After reviewing the record, we have not located any evidence that defendant cemetery
engaged in deceptive practices with regard to plaintiffs. The tardiness of the interment of the
cremation remains was not due to any wrongdoing or misrepresentation on the part of defendant
cemetery but instead was as a result of defendant cemetery not receiving a signed Consent to
Inter form. When defendant’s staff discovered that the remains had been shelved for several
months, defendant contacted plaintiffs, notified them of the situation and asked for direction.
Furthermore, plaintiffs admitted that none of them had any contact with defendant cemetery until
defendant cemetery contacted them about the status of the remains. Plaintiffs could have
contacted defendant cemetery at any time to find out what date the interment would take place or
to confirm that it had taken place. Again there is testimony in the record that it was not
uncommon for families to store cremation remains at defendant cemetery’s mausoleum until they
-7-
decide where, how, and when to permanently place a loved one’s cremation remains. On this
record, plaintiffs have not established a valid cause of action under the MCPA.
E. Breach of Contract
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it found that defendant was not
liable for breach of contract because no contract existed between the parties. In particular,
plaintiffs assert on appeal that they contracted with defendant cemetery for a funeral service,
cremation services, and burial of their mother’s cremation remains through Gendernalik Funeral
Home, who acted as the “conduit” for the transaction. The essential elements of a valid contract
are “‘(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4)
mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.’” Hess v Cannon Twp, 265 Mich App
582, 592; 696 NW2d 742 (2005), quoting Thomas v Leja, 187 Mich App 418, 422; 468 NW2d
58 (1991). In order for a contract to be completed, there must be an offer and acceptance.
Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). Without an
unambiguous acceptance in strict conformance with the offer, no contract is formed. Id. A
contract requires mutual assent or a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms. Id. at 453.
Plainly, no contract existed between the parties. Plaintiffs admittedly contracted with
Gendernalik Funeral Home for their mother’s funeral, cremation, and interment. Gendernalik
made all the arrangements. None of the three plaintiffs ever spoke to anyone at defendant
cemetery. Our review of the record reveals that plaintiffs have presented no documentary
evidence or testimonial evidence that a contract existed between plaintiffs and defendant
cemetery. Because no contract existed, there can be no breach, and thus, the trial court properly
granted summary disposition on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.
IV
Because plaintiffs have not established, through the presentation of evidence, that a
genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to any of plaintiffs’ causes of action, the trial
court properly granted summary disposition on all of plaintiffs’ counts including:
negligence/gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, conversion, violation of
the MCPA, and breach of contract.
Affirmed. Defendant may tax costs, having prevailed in full. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.