DONALD T MCCUE V O-N MINERALS (MICHIGAN) CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONALD T. MCCUE, individually and as the
conservator of the ESTATE OF DEBRA K.
MCCUE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 4, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294661
Mackinac Circuit Court
LC No. 08-006594-NO
O-N MINERALS (MICHIGAN) CO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and BECKERING and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this suit to recover damages sustained in a bicycle accident, plaintiff Donald T.
McCue, individually and as the conservator of the Estate of Debra K. McCue, appeals as of right
the trial court’s order granting defendant O-N Minerals (Michigan) Co.’s motion for summary
disposition and denying his motion for partial summary disposition. Because we conclude that
the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of O-N Minerals, but did not
err when it denied McCue’s motion for partial summary disposition, we reverse in part, affirm in
part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2007, Donald and Debra McCue participated in an annual bicycle tour that
started in Lansing and proceeded to the Upper Peninsula. On September 2, 2007, Debra was
riding east on State Highway M-134 when she rode onto a section of the highway where a
private gravel road connected to the highway. O-N Minerals owned the land on both sides of the
highway including the private gravel road. It used the private road to move heavy mining
equipment and limestone to and from its properties on both sides of the highway. The highway
was paved with concrete and reinforced with six railroad rails at the point where the gravel road
connected to the highway. However, the concrete around the rails had deteriorated and left ruts
in the road. While travelling along the highway at this point, Debra McCue struck a defect in the
highway and was thrown to the ground. She suffered numerous injuries including a fractured
skull and head trauma that left her with permanent brain damage.
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Donald McCue sued O-N Minerals in April 2008 on his own behalf and as the
conservator of his wife’s estate. In his complaint, he alleged that O-N Minerals had a duty to
maintain the highway at the point where his wife fell and breached that duty by permitting the
intersection to fall into disrepair. He further alleged that O-N Mineral’s failure to maintain the
highway at that point caused his wife to be thrown from her bike and sustain severe injuries. He
claimed that, as a result of the injuries sustained by his wife through O-N Mineral’s failure, he
too suffered damages through loss of consortium.
McCue also sued the State of Michigan and the Michigan Department of Transportation
(the Department) for failing to maintain the highway. However, on December 22, 2008, the trial
court, sitting as the Court of Claims, dismissed his claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because
Debra McCue executed a waiver of liability in favor of the State and its agencies in exchange for
permission to participate in the tour.1
In February 2009, McCue filed an amended complaint. In the complaint, McCue alleged
that O-N Minerals had a duty to maintain the highway in reasonable repair at the point where its
private road connected to the highway, which it failed to do. He also alleged that O-N Mineral’s
use of the highway at that point to move heavy equipment caused the highway to deteriorate and
the resulting hazardous condition amounted to a nuisance. Finally, McCue alleged that the
failure to properly maintain the highway proximately caused his and his wife’s injuries.
In July 2009, O-N Minerals moved for summary disposition of McCue’s claims under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). In support of its motion, O-N Minerals presented evidence that the highway
was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department and, therefore, the Department had the
sole duty to maintain the highway. O-N Minerals also argued that, for the same reason, if the
highway’s condition at that point amounts to a nuisance, it is the Department’s nuisance because
it alone has a duty to inspect and repair the highway.
In response to O-N Mineral’s motion for summary disposition, McCue argued that a duty
to maintain or repair a public right-of-way may arise where the adjacent landowner creates a new
hazard on the right-of-way, increases an existing hazard on the right-of-way, or has a servitude
through physical intrusion or otherwise onto the right-of-way that affects the safety of the rightof-way. He stated that, because the evidence showed that O-N Minerals crossed the highway at
the point where the private road connected to the highway with very heavy vehicles and the
highway had only deteriorated at that point, there was evidence that O-N Minerals caused or
increased the deteriorated condition and the deteriorated condition was a public nuisance. For
these reasons, he asked the trial court to deny O-N Mineral’s motion for summary disposition.
He also argued that the undisputed evidence showed that, as a matter of law, O-N Minerals had a
duty to maintain the highway at the point where the private road connected to the highway,
1
McCue eventually applied for delayed leave to appeal the order granting summary disposition
in favor of the State and the Department, which this Court denied for “lack of merit in the
grounds presented.” See McCue v Department of Transportation, unpublished order of the Court
of Appeals, entered April 2, 2010 (Docket No. 295235).
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breached that duty, and proximately caused Debra McCue’s injuries. For that reason, he asked
the trial court to grant summary disposition in his favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
At the hearing on the parties’ motions for summary disposition, the trial court indicated
that there was nothing in the factual submissions that would give rise to an inference that O-N
Minerals had a duty to maintain the section of the highway where its private road connected with
the highway. For that reason, any deterioration in the highway at that point—even if it were a
nuisance—was the responsibility of the Department. On August 31, 2009, the trial court signed
an order granting O-N Minerals’ motion for summary disposition and denying McCue’s motion
for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
McCue now appeals.
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We shall first address McCue’s claim that the trial court erred when it determined that, as
a matter of law, O-N Minerals had no duty to repair or maintain the highway at the point where
O-N Minerals’ gravel road connected to the highway. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s
decision on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance
Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). This Court also reviews de
novo, as a question of law, whether O-N Minerals’ use of the section of the highway at issue
gave rise to a duty. Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 463; 683 NW2d 587 (2004).
B. ANALYSIS
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A party is entitled to summary disposition
under this rule if, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact . . . .” MCR 2.116(C)(10). In evaluating the motion, the court must consider the
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, in the
light most favorable to the part opposing the motion, and determine whether there is a genuine
issue as to any material fact. Maiden, 461 Mich at 120, citing MCR 2.116(G)(5). If the party
opposing a properly supported motion for summary disposition fails to present documentary
evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the trial court should grant the
moving party’s motion. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 363; 547 NW2d 314
(1996).
In order to prevail on his negligence claim, McCue had to establish that O-N Minerals
had a duty to Debra McCue. Fultz, 470 Mich at 463 (listing the elements of a negligence cause
of action and stating that whether there was a duty is a threshold question to the imposition of
liability). The duty element of a negligence claim encompasses whether the defendant was under
any obligation to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 437;
254 NW2d 759 (1977). Thus, if O-N Minerals’ use of the highway at the point where its private
road connected to the highway did not give rise to a duty to avoid negligent conduct, then
McCue’s claim for negligence fails as a matter of law.
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It is generally for the courts to decide whether a duty exists. Id. at 438. However, under
some circumstances, whether a defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff will depend on the
resolution of factual disputes. In such cases, it is for the jury to resolve the factual dispute. See
MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 339; 628 NW2d 33 (2001); Bonin v Gralewicz, 378 Mich
521, 526-528; 146 NW2d 647 (1966) (noting that, where the duty depends on the resolution of
fact questions, the issue should be submitted to the jury with an appropriate conditional
instruction regarding the duty). In this case, it is undisputed that Debra McCue fell and suffered
injuries while riding within the right-of-way of a state highway. And, normally, a landowner has
no duty to repair or maintain an adjacent public right-of-way. See Kubczak v Chemical Bank &
Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 660; 575 NW2d 745 (1998) (stating that premises liability is
conditioned upon the presence of both possession and control over the land); see also Stevens v
Drekich, 178 Mich App 273, 277; 443 NW2d 401 (1989) (holding that, whatever rights to a
public right-of-way that are retained by the adjacent landowner, they are not possessory in nature
and so cannot give rise to premises liability). Instead, the duty to maintain the highway in
reasonable repair rests exclusively with the State. See MCL 691.1402. Nevertheless, there are
circumstances where an adjacent landowner’s conduct can give rise to a duty with regard to an
adjacent right-of-way.
In order to be liable for a condition in a public right-of-way, the adjacent landowner must
have “physically intruded upon the area in some manner” or must have “done some act which
either increased [an] existing hazard or created a new hazard.” Berman v LaRose, 16 Mich App
55, 57; 167 NW2d 471 (1969). “Where the occupant of one parcel of land has been held
responsible for the condition of an adjoining parcel to which another has title or possession, such
responsibility is predicated on the fact that he exercised control over the land beyond his
boundaries.” Rodriguez v Sportsmen’s Congress, 159 Mich App 265, 271; 406 NW2d 207
(1987); see also Ward v Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, 186 Mich App 120, 133; 463 NW2d 442
(1990) (relying on Berman to conclude that the defendant in that case could be liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries under the facts of that case because there was evidence that the defendant may
have cast debris into the right-of-way or through its actions increased or caused the hazardous
condition in the right-of-way). In this case, it is undisputed that the hazard at issue was a defect
in the surface of the highway and did not involve a private servitude in favor of O-N Minerals.2
Likewise, it is undisputed that the hazard does not involve an improvement on O-N Minerals’
land that somehow affects the safety of travel on the highway. See Langen v Rushton, 138 Mich
App 672; 360 NW2d 270 (1984). Thus, in order to demonstrate that O-N Minerals had a duty
2
In the original deed granting the right-of-way at issue, O-N Minerals’ predecessor in interest
retained the right to cross the right-of-way. This, however, did not give O-N Minerals’
predecessor a private servitude over the surface of the highway. Rather, O-N Minerals’
predecessor reserved the right to connect its private roads to the right-of-way and to have the
State take steps to ensure that its maintenance of the right-of-way did not interfere with this right
to cross. But, with respect to the actual surface of the highway, O-N Minerals had only the same
right of travel that every other member of the public had.
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with regard to the defective condition of the highway, McCue had to present evidence that O-N
Minerals caused the defect at issue or, at the very least, increased the hazard posed by the defect.
In its motion for summary disposition, O-N Minerals presented evidence that the
Department had exclusive jurisdiction over the right-of-way and argued that it, therefore, could
not be liable for the condition of the highway at the point where its private gravel road connected
to the highway. Once O-N Minerals presented evidence that it did not have a duty to maintain
the highway at the point where Debra McCue fell, McCue had to respond by presenting evidence
that established a factual question as to whether O-N Minerals had a duty with regard to the
hazard at issue. Barnard Mfg, 285 Mich App at 374.
In response, McCue presented the affidavit from a retired employee of O-N Minerals.
The employee averred that she had frequently crossed the highway at the point at issue with
vehicles that O-N Minerals admitted weighed between 46,000 pounds and 213,000 pounds.
McCue also presented evidence that the surface of the highway was reinforced at the point where
O-N Minerals’ private road connected to the highway, had deteriorated into a state of general
disrepair, and that the surface of the highway immediately adjacent to that point was in
reasonable repair. This evidence included photographs of the highway and intersection at issue.
These evidentiary submissions were sufficient to establish a question of fact as to whether O-N
Minerals had created or increased the hazard at issue.
The evidence submitted by McCue in support of his position at summary disposition
established that O-N Minerals used the surface of the highway to cross from one section of its
property to another section of its property.3 And there is evidence that the vehicles that crossed
the highway at that point were particularly heavy—so heavy that a finder-of-fact could
reasonably conclude that the vehicles would directly damage the highway at the crossing point or
cause it to deteriorate at an accelerated pace. Indeed, there was evidence that the intersection
was reinforced with railroad rails for this very reason. Further, the evidence that the highway
was generally in good repair except at the point where O-N Minerals’ vehicles crossed the road
permits—but does not require—an inference that the regular traffic along the highway did not
cause the deterioration at issue. For this reason, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that,
more likely than not, O-N Minerals’ negligent use of the highway at that point caused or at least
increased the hazard of the condition that caused Debra McCue’s fall. See, e.g., Skinner v
Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164-165; 516 NW2d 475 (1994) (stating that, in the causation
context, the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant’s acts more likely than not caused
the injury). Because McCue presented evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could
conclude that O-N Minerals used the highway in a way that created a hazard or increased an
existing hazard on the highway, and thereby breached a duty owed, the trial court could not
properly dismiss McCue’s claim for negligence on the ground that O-N Minerals did not owe a
3
There was no evidence that O-N Minerals actually maintained, constructed or otherwise
physically altered the highway at the point at issue in any way other than through its use of the
surface as a crossing point.
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duty to Debra McCue. See Bonin, 378 Mich at 526-528 (noting that, where the duty depends on
the resolution of fact questions, the issue should be submitted to the jury with an appropriate
conditional instruction). Moreover, for the same reason, the trial court erred in dismissing
McCue’s public nuisance claim. See Capitol Properties Group, LLC v 1247 Center St, LLC, 283
Mich App 422, 427-428; 770 NW2d 105 (2009) (stating that, in order to prove a public nuisance
the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in a way so as to unreasonably interfere with a
common right enjoyed by the public). We do not, however, agree with McCue’s contention that
the trial court should have granted partial summary disposition in his favor because the
undisputed evidence showed that O-N Minerals had a duty to repair the highway, failed to repair
it, and that that failure caused Debra McCue’s fall. Although a reasonable fact-finder could find
that O-N Minerals negligently caused the highway to deteriorate at the point where its vehicles
crossed the highway, it could also conclude that the specific defect at issue was not caused by ON Minerals’ use of the highway or that O-N Minerals’ use was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it declined to grant summary
disposition in favor of McCue.
The trial court erred when it granted O-N Minerals’ motion for summary disposition, but
did not err when it denied McCue’s motion for partial summary disposition. Because of our
resolution of this issue, we need not consider McCue’s remaining argument on appeal.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. As the prevailing party, McCue may tax costs.
MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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