IN RE GENTILE TRUST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re SAMUEL GENTILE TRUST.
JOHN CARLESIMO, Successor Trustee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 21, 2010
Appellant,
v
No. 288690
Livingston Probate Court
LC No. 2008-009868-TT
JOHN GRAYBILL,
Appellee.
In re Estate of SAMUEL GENTILE.
JOHN GRAYBILL, Second Successor Personal
Representative,
Appellee,
v
No. 289809
Livingston Probate Court
LC No. 2008-009856-DE
JOHN CARLESIMO,
Appellant,
and
PETER B. VAN WINKLE,
Appellee.
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In re SAMUEL GENTILE TRUST.
JOHN CARLESIMO,
Appellee,
v
No. 291938
Livingston Probate Court
LC No. 2008-009868-TT
JOHN GRAYBILL,
Appellant.
In re Estate of SAMUEL GENTILE.
JOHN CARLESIMO,
Appellant,
v
JOHN GRAYBILL, Second Successor Personal
Representative, PETER B. VAN WINKLE, and
JOYCE GENTILE,
No. 292188
Livingston Probate Court
LC No. 2008-009856-DE
Appellees.
In re SAMUEL GENTILE TRUST.
JOHN CARLESIMO,
Appellant,
v
No. 292189
Livingston Probate Court
LC No. 2008-009868-TT
JOHN GRAYBILL and JOYCE GENTILE,
Appellees.
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In re SAMUEL GENTILE TRUST.
JOHN CARLESIMO,
Appellant,
v
No. 294015
Livingston Probate Court
LC No. 2008-009868-TT
JOHN GRAYBILL,
Appellee.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals arise from two related probate court cases, one involving the
administration of the Samuel Gentile Trust (LC No. 2008-009868-TT), and the other involving
the administration of Samuel Gentile’s probate court estate (LC No. 2008-009856-DE).
Samuel Gentile (hereinafter “the decedent”) established a revocable trust agreement in
1994. In January 2007, he executed a first amendment to the trust to name John Carlesimo as the
beneficiary of the trust and a successor trustee upon the decedent’s death. On January 1, 2008,
the decedent executed a second amendment to the trust that removed Carlesimo as beneficiary
and successor trustee, and named John Graybill as the sole beneficiary of the trust. The decedent
died three days later on January 4, 2008. Although the decedent also had a will that named
Carlesimo as the beneficiary of his estate, the will was never amended or revoked before the
decedent’s death.
After the decedent’s death, Carlesimo challenged the validity of the second amendment
to the trust in LC No. 2008-009868-TT, arguing that it was the product of undue influence or
fraud, and that the decedent was not competent to execute the amendment. Following a trial, a
jury determined that the amendment was valid. The probate court subsequently entered an order
on June 27, 2008, upholding the validity of the amendment.1 On January 23, 2009, the probate
court issued an order allowing Graybill to recover his costs as the prevailing party, but directing
that the costs be recovered from the trust, rather than from Carlesimo personally. Carlesimo
subsequently filed a motion to recover his attorney fees and costs from the trust. The probate
court denied the motion in an order dated August 10, 2009. In Docket No. 288690, Carlesimo
appeals as of right from the June 27, 2008, order upholding the validity of the second amendment
to the trust. In Docket No. 291938, Graybill appeals as of right from the probate court’s January
1
The probate court later entered a similar judgment dated July 2, 2008.
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23, 2009, order directing that Graybill’s costs be recovered from the trust. In Docket No.
294015, Carlesimo appeals as of right from the probate court’s August 10, 2009, order denying
his request to recover his attorney fees and costs from the trust.
After the trial in the trust case, Graybill filed a petition in LC No. 2008-009856-DE to
partially revoke the decedent’s will to the extent that it named Carlesimo as the beneficiary of the
decedent’s remaining estate. Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate court determined that
there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended to leave his entire estate to
Graybill and that the second amendment of his trust was intended to effectuate that intent and to
revoke “any bequests, gifts and appointments in favor of John Carlesimo.” In Docket No.
289809, Carlesimo appeals as of right from the probate court’s December 17, 2008, order
declaring that the second amendment to the trust partially revoked the decedent’s will.
In Docket Nos. 292188 and 292189, Carlesimo appeals as of right from the probate
court’s May 4, 2009, order entered in both the trust and estate cases that denied his request for a
stay in the estate case, denied his request for supervision of the trust, denied his request to set
aside an order appointing Graybill as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, and
awarded Graybill attorney fees of $1,000 to be paid by Carlesimo as a sanction for filing
frivolous petitions.
We partially reverse the probate court’s January 23, 2009, order in LC No. 2008-009868TT to the extent that it requires John Graybill to recover his prevailing party costs from the trust
rather than from John Carlesimo personally and affirm in all other respects.
I. DOCKET NO. 288690
Carlesimo argues that misconduct by both Graybill’s attorney and a witness at the jury
trial in the trust case requires reversal of the decision upholding the validity of the second
amendment to the decedent’s trust. We disagree.
This Court’s role in reviewing claims of attorney misconduct is summarized in Reetz v
Kinsman Marine Transit Co, 416 Mich 97, 102-103; 330 NW2d 638 (1982):
When reviewing an appeal asserting improper conduct of an attorney, the
appellate court should first determine whether or not the claimed error was in fact
error and, if so, whether it was harmless. If the claimed error was not harmless,
the court must then ask if the error was properly preserved by objection and
request for instruction or motion for mistrial. If the error is so preserved, then
there is a right to appellate review; if not, the court must still make one further
inquiry. It must decide whether a new trial should nevertheless be ordered
because what occurred may have caused the result or played too large a part and
may have denied a party a fair trial. If the court cannot say that the result was not
affected, then a new trial may be granted. Tainted verdicts need not be allowed to
stand simply because a lawyer or judge or both failed to protect the interests of
the prejudiced party by timely action. [Footnotes omitted.]
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As explained in Hunt v Freeman, 217 Mich App 92, 95; 550 NW2d 817 (1996):
An attorney’s comments usually will not be cause for reversal unless they
indicate a deliberate course of conduct aimed at preventing a fair and impartial
trial. Reversal is required only where the prejudicial statements of an attorney
reflect a studied purpose to inflame or prejudice a jury or deflect the jury’s
attention from the issues involved. [Citations omitted.]
In this case, Carlesimo argues that Graybill’s attorney engaged in misconduct by
improperly eliciting and relying on inadmissible hearsay that an unnamed doctor had advised the
decedent’s attorney, Neal Nielsen, that Carlesimo’s girlfriend, Mary Ellen Parks, had asked the
doctor to write a letter stating that the decedent was not competent. Carlesimo further argues
that Nielsen himself engaged in misconduct by repeatedly violating the probate court’s order
prohibiting Nielsen from testifying to what he was told by the doctor. We disagree.
The record discloses that it was Carlesimo’s attorney who first asked Nielsen on direct
examination if he had told the decedent that Parks was trying to have the decedent “committed.”
Nielsen admitted having such a discussion with the decedent. On cross-examination, Nielsen
was again asked about this conversation and explained that he told the decedent that he had
received a telephone call from an unnamed doctor who asked Nielsen if he should write a letter
stating that the decedent was incompetent. The probate court sustained Carlesimo’s hearsay
objection to what Nielsen was told by the unnamed doctor. When questioning resumed, Nielsen
was asked why he told the decedent that Parks was attempting to obtain a determination of the
decedent’s competency. Nielsen informed the court that he was hesitant about responding in
light of the court’s prior ruling. After the jury was excused, Nielsen explained that the reason for
his conversation with the decedent about Parks was that a doctor had told him that Parks had
asked for a letter declaring the decedent incompetent, but that the doctor did not believe the
decedent was incompetent. The probate court again ruled that Nielsen could not testify about
what he was told by the unnamed doctor. When the jury was recalled, Nielsen was questioned
about other matters.
Contrary to what Carlesimo argues, Nielsen’s brief reference to the doctor did not involve
a deliberate attempt to interject prejudicial information into the trial. The reference occurred in
the context of attempting to explain the reason for Nielsen’s conversation with the decedent
about Parks, an issue that Carlesimo first raised on direct examination. We also disagree with
Carlesimo’s argument that Nielsen’s testimony violated the probate court’s ruling. After the
probate court initially sustained Carlesimo’s hearsay objection to what Nielsen was told by the
unnamed doctor, Nielsen appropriately asked for guidance from the probate court before offering
testimony that he believed might contravene the probate court’s previous ruling. The court
excused the jury, considered the proposed testimony, and stood by its previous ruling. When the
jury returned, Nielsen was questioned about another subject. Thus, there was no violation of the
probate court’s evidentiary ruling.
Carlesimo also argues that Graybill’s attorney improperly referred to the excluded
hearsay testimony in the following comment during closing argument:
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It’s undisputed that Neal Nielsen called Sam around December 20th or
21st and relayed the information that he understood that Ms. Parks was trying to
have a declaration of incapacity obtained from a physician regarding Sam.
There was no objection to this comment at trial. The comment did not refer to the content of any
conversation between Nielsen and the unnamed doctor and, therefore, did not involve a reference
to inadmissible evidence. As previously indicated, it was Carlesimo who first elicited from
Nielsen that he told the decedent that Parks was trying to get the decedent “committed.” Further,
Parks had previously testified that she had tried to get a letter from a doctor while the decedent
was in the hospital to excuse him from appearing at his divorce trial. Given this testimony, the
comment does not amount to any clear type of intentional misconduct.
Accordingly, Carlesimo is not entitled to a new trial because of the alleged misconduct
by Graybill’s attorney or witness Nielsen.
Carlesimo next argues that the probate court erred in denying his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence. When reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, a court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and determine whether the facts presented preclude judgment for the
nonmoving party as a matter of law. If reasonable minds could differ regarding the evidence, the
issue is for the jury and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper. McPeak v McPeak
(On Remand), 233 Mich App 483, 490; 593 NW2d 180 (1999). A trial court’s decision denying
a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. As explained in Allard v
State Farm Ins Co, 271 Mich App 394, 406-407; 722 NW2d 268 (2006):
When a party challenges a jury’s verdict as against the great weight of the
evidence, this Court must give substantial deference to the judgment of the trier of
fact. If there is any competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we must
defer our judgment regarding the credibility of the witnesses. The Michigan
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the jury’s verdict must be upheld, “even if
it is arguably inconsistent, ‘[i]f there is an interpretation of the evidence that
provides a logical explanation for the findings of the jury.’” [Footnotes omitted.]
Carlesimo first challenges the jury’s determination that the decedent was competent to
execute the second amendment to his trust. In In re Sprenger’s Estate, 337 Mich 514, 521; 60
NW2d 436 (1953), the Court explained:
To have testamentary capacity, an individual must be able to comprehend
the nature and extent of his property, to recall the natural objects of his bounty,
and to determine and understand the disposition of property which he desires to
make. The burden is upon the person questioning the competency of the deceased
to establish that incompetency existed at the time the will was drawn.
Illiteracy or lack of education has little, if any, bearing upon mental
capacity to make a will and the appointment of a guardian to protect the property
of a person does not constitute probative evidence of mental incompetency. Nor
should the lack of wisdom in the disposition of the property nor the fairness of the
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provisions of the will influence the court in a determination of mental
competency. Weakness of mind and forgetfulness are likewise insufficient of
themselves to invalidate a will. [Citations omitted.]
Although there was testimony that the decedent was sometimes confused or disoriented
near the end of his life, several witnesses testified that he was alert and oriented when he signed
the trust amendment. In addition, the nurse who was caring for the decedent when he executed
the documents testified that she had been trained to look for signs of competency in her patients,
that she had evaluated the decedent’s mental faculties throughout the evening based on her
training, that his mental condition had improved that day, and that she had no doubt that he was
competent and aware of his surroundings from a medical standpoint. The testimony also
indicated that the decedent had arranged for the changes to be made to his trust before he was
hospitalized, and that he was anticipating signing the documents, thereby indicating that he was
able to understand what he was doing. The fact that the decedent initially asked if the documents
were related to his divorce does not indicate that he lacked competency, especially considering
that he was also awaiting a divorce judgment so that his former wife would not receive his estate.
Carlesimo gives weight to testimony that the decedent’s doctor had directed that he be
notified before the decedent signed any documents, so that he could evaluate the decedent’s
competency, but was never notified. However, the doctor also conceded that the decedent’s
mental state was such that he could have been competent when he signed the documents.
Further, the doctor testified that the decedent later confirmed to him that he had changed his
medical power of attorney and explained that he had wanted to make that change for some time,
but had not gotten around to do it. This testimony indicates that the decedent was able to
comprehend and understand what he was doing.
Because there is competent evidence to support the jury’s determination that the decedent
was competent when he executed the second amendment to his trust, the probate court did not err
in denying Carlesimo’s motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict with
respect to this issue.
Carlesimo also argues that he was entitled to a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict with respect to the issue of undue influence. We again disagree.
Undue influence is established by showing “that the grantor was subjected to threats,
misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud, or physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower
volition, destroy free agency, and impel the grantor to act against the grantor’s inclination and
free will.” In re Erickson Estate, 202 Mich App 329, 331; 508 NW2d 181 (1993). However,
“[m]otive, opportunity, or even ability to control, in the absence of affirmative evidence that it
was exercised, is not sufficient.” Id. See also In re Karmey Estate, 468 Mich 68, 75; 658 NW2d
796 (2003). A presumption of undue influence can arise
upon the introduction of evidence that would establish (1) the existence of a
confidential or fiduciary relationship between the grantor and a fiduciary, (2) the
fiduciary, or an interest represented by the fiduciary, benefits from a transaction,
and (3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision in that
transaction. [In re Erickson, 202 Mich App at 331.]
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The benefit received by the fiduciary must arise from the specific transaction claimed to have
been the subject of undue influence. Id. at 332. Where the presumption is established, it
creates a “mandatory inference” of undue influence, shifting the burden of going
forward with contrary evidence onto the person contesting the claim of undue
influence. However, the burden of persuasion remains with the party asserting
such. If the defending party fails to present evidence to rebut the presumption, the
proponent has satisfied the burden of persuasion. [In re Peterson Estate, 193
Mich App 257, 260; 483 NW2d 624 (1991), quoting In re Mikeska Estate, 140
Mich App 116, 120-121; 362 NW2d 906 (1985).]
The fact that a testator was advised, persuaded, or solicited does not prove undue
influence so long as he was capable of acting on his own motives and so long as he remained
free to make his own decision. In re Hannan’s Estate, 315 Mich 102, 123; 23 NW2d 222
(1946). Undue influence will only vitiate a will where the testator’s free agency is overcome so
that the will represents not the testator’s desires, but those of someone else. Id.
Carlesimo argues that the evidence showed that Nielsen exerted undue influence upon the
decedent and convinced him to amend both his trust and power of attorney. Although Nielsen
did not benefit directly by the amendment, Carlesimo contends that Nielsen had a motive to have
the decedent change his trust and power of attorney to prevent Carlesimo from intervening in the
decedent’s affairs, such as by hiring another attorney to intervene in the decedent’s divorce case
that Nielsen was handling. However, the testimony showed that Nielsen’s involvement in
helping the decedent change his estate plan did not occur until late December 2007, shortly
before the decedent died. Further, there was testimony that during the preceding year, the
decedent made statements to several different individuals expressing his intention to leave his
estate to Graybill. The evidence showed that Nielsen became involved only because the
decedent asked him to review his estate plan documents, at which time Nielsen informed the
decedent that the documents did not dispose of the decedent’s estate in the manner the decedent
had expressed. Nielsen thereafter prepared new documents at the decedent’s request that
disposed of the decedent’s estate in a manner consistent with the decedent’s previously
expressed intentions. Thus, the evidence supports the jury’s determination that the decedent’s
decision to amend his trust was the product of his own free will, not any undue influence by
Nielsen. Therefore, the probate court did not err in denying Carlesimo’s motion for a new trial
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to this issue.
Lastly, we find no merit to Carlesimo’s argument that the probate court’s July 2, 2008,
judgment was not properly entered. The record discloses that the judgment was properly entered
in accordance with the seven-day rule in MCR 2.602(b)(3), notice of which was timely served on
Carlesimo.
II. DOCKET NO. 289809
Carlesimo challenges the probate court’s December 17, 2008, order entered after an
evidentiary hearing, holding that clear and convincing evidence showed that the decedent
intended for the second amendment of his trust to accomplish the goal of leaving all of the
decedent’s assets, whether held in trust or not, to Graybill, and to revoke the decedent’s prior
will to the extent that it named Carlesimo as a beneficiary.
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The probate court’s factual findings related to the decedent’s intent are reviewed for clear
error. In re Bem Estate, 247 Mich App 427, 433; 637 NW2d 506 (2001). The probate court’s
ruling regarding the legal effect of the decedent’s second amendment to his trust on his will is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id.
The probate court relied on MCL 700.2503, which provides:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed
in compliance with section 2502 [MCL 700.2502], the document or writing is
treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent
of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute any of the following:
(a) The decedent’s will.
(b) A partial or complete revocation of the decedent’s will.
(c) An addition to or an alteration of the decedent’s will.
(d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent’s formerly revoked will
or of a formerly revoked portion of the decedent’s will.
The second amendment to the decedent’s trust provides that, upon his death,
all the rest residue and remainder of Trust property and estate, including any
accumulations and any estate outright of Grantor Samuel Gentile, shall be
awarded to John Graybel [sic] of Alaska, and any right, claim or interest that John
Carlesimo may have to any of the assets, estate, residue, Trust or accumulations
of any kind attributable to Samuel Gentile, shall be terminated and held for
naught, and all of said property right, title and interest shall be distributed to John
Graybel [sic] of Alaska.
Although this amendment purportedly applied only to the trust, the probate court found
that it was the decedent’s understanding and intent that it applied to all property held by his
estate, whether held in trust or not. This finding is not clearly erroneous. The language of the
trust amendment broadly refers to any “assets, estate, residue, Trust or accumulations of any kind
attributable to Samuel Gentile.” Contrary to what Carlesimo argues, the evidence did not show
that the decedent did not intend to change his will. Rather, it appears that the decedent was
unaware that Carlesimo was also the named beneficiary in his will, or did not understand the
difference between his trust and his will. When the decedent first raised the matter with Nielsen,
he only presented his trust to Nielsen to review. Further, the evidence clearly showed that it was
the decedent’s understanding and intent that when he died, all of his property was to go to
Graybill, whether held in trust or not, and that Carlesimo was not to receive anything. The
evidence showed that the decedent had expressed this intent to Nielsen and to several others
during the previous year and had similarly testified to this understanding and intent in his divorce
proceeding. There was clear evidence of the decedent’s intent to make Graybill the sole
beneficiary of his estate.
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Carlesimo relies on testimony by Nielson that the second amendment to the trust was not
intended to amend or change the decedent’s will. However, Nielsen was referring to his own
understanding of the purpose of the trust amendment, not the decedent’s intent or understanding
of the document. As the probate court properly determined, the critical inquiry under MCL
700.2503 is the decedent’s intent regarding the purpose of the document. The probate court did
not clearly err in finding that the decedent intended for the second amendment of his trust to
change his will, consistent with his prior clearly expressed intent to leave all of his property to
Graybill and for Carlesimo to not receive anything. See In re Smith Estate, 252 Mich App 120,
125; 651 NW2d 153 (2002) (extrinsic evidence is permitted to establish the testamentary intent
of a document).
Carlesimo also argues that the probate court erred in relying on MCL 700.2503 because it
is a “will-saving statute” and, therefore, does not apply to the amendment of the trust. The plain
language of the statute provides that it applies to “a document or writing added upon a
document.” Although we agree that the statute does not apply to a document that is intended to
amend or revoke a trust, the trust amendment qualifies as a “document or writing” that the
probate court properly could rely on to the extent that it was intended by the decedent to alter or
partially revoke the decedent’s will.
For these reasons, we affirm the probate court’s decision holding that the decedent’s
second amendment to his trust was intended by the decedent to alter his prior will by replacing
Carlesimo with Graybill as the sole beneficiary of the decedent’s estate.
Carlesimo also argues that the probate court’s December 17, 2008, order was improperly
entered, because it was not entered in accordance with one of the methods prescribed in MCR
2.602(B)(1) – (3). It is undisputed that the order was not approved by the parties as permitted by
MCR 2.602(B)(2), or entered under the seven-day rule in MCR 2.602(B)(3). Further, although
the order is dated the same day as the evidentiary hearing, the record discloses that the order had
not been prepared at the time the court granted the relief provided by the order. Thus, it appears
the order was not entered in accordance with MCR 2.602(B)(1). However, MCR 2.613(A)
provides that “[a]n error in . . . anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not
ground for . . . disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action is inconsistent
with substantial justice.” Carlesimo has not shown that the order did not comport with the
probate court’s ruling or that he was otherwise prejudiced by the lack of proper notice in entering
the order. Because there is no basis for concluding that any procedural error in entering the order
affected Carlesimo’s substantial rights, appellate relief is not warranted.
III. DOCKET NO. 291938
Graybill challenges the probate court’s January 23, 2009, order directing that he recover
his taxable costs from the trust, rather than from Carlesimo personally.
Matters of procedure in the probate court are governed by the rules applicable to civil
proceedings in general, except as modified in the chapter of the court rules governing probate
courts. MCR 5.001(A). In civil cases, the prevailing party is entitled to recover his costs, unless
prohibited by statute or court rule, or the trial court directs otherwise. MCR 2.625(A)(1). “The
taxation of costs is neither a reward granted to the prevailing party nor a punishment imposed on
the losing party, but rather a component of the burden of litigation presumed to be known by the
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affected party.” North Pointe Ins Co v Steward (On Remand), 265 Mich App 603, 611; 697
NW2d 173 (2005).
The parties do not dispute that Graybill is entitled to costs under MCR 2.625(A), as the
prevailing party in the trust case. However, Graybill argues that the probate court erroneously
directed that the costs be recovered from the trust, rather than from Carlesimo, the nonprevailing
party in the trust case. We agree.
The probate court determined that although Graybill’s costs would ordinarily be
recoverable from Carlesimo under MCR 2.625, this Court’s decision in In re Clarence W Temple
& Florence A Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 122; 748 NW2d 265 (2008), permitted
Carlesimo to avoid personal liability for Graybill’s costs and instead required that Graybill
recover his costs from the trust. In In re Temple Marital Trust, this Court considered a request
for attorney fees that were incurred in a dispute between three brothers who were each
beneficiaries of their parents’ trust. Wallace filed a petition challenging an amendment to the
trust. Wallace’s siblings, Ralph and Dean, were both named as respondents. The parties’ father
had also attempted to change the trust by naming Ralph, rather than Dean, as successor trustee.
Id. at 124-125, 133. Although Wallace successfully challenged the trust amendment, he was not
permitted to recover his attorney fees because his actions did not benefit the trust. Id. at 126.
However, relying on MCL 700.7401(1) and (2),2 this Court held that Ralph and Dean’s attorney
2
MCL 700.7401(1) and (2) provide:
(1) A trustee has the power to perform in a reasonable and prudent manner
every act that a reasonable and prudent person would perform incident to the
collection, preservation, management, use, and distribution of the trust property to
accomplish the desired result of administering the trust legally and in the trust
beneficiaries’ best interest.
(2) Subject to the standards described in subsection (1) and except as
otherwise provided in the trust instrument, a trustee possesses all of the following
specific powers:
***
(w) To employ an attorney to perform necessary legal services or to advise
or assist the trustee in the performance of the trustee’s administrative duties, even
if the attorney is associated with the trustee, and to act without independent
investigation upon the attorney’s recommendation. An attorney employed under
this subdivision shall receive reasonable compensation for his or her employment.
(x) To prosecute, defend, arbitrate, settle, release, compromise, or agree to
indemnify a claim or proceeding in any jurisdiction or under an alternative dispute
resolution procedure. The trustee may act under this subsection for the trustee’s
protection in the performance of the trustee’s duties.
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fees were recoverable from the trust because one or the other would have been the successor
trustee under either version of the trust and, therefore, one or the other had a fiduciary duty to
defend the trust. Furthermore, because Ralph and Dean had used the same attorney to defend the
trust and there was no duplication of legal expenses, there was no concern that attorney fees were
incurred by a non-fiduciary. Id. at 129-137.
We conclude that this case is distinguishable from In re Temple Marital Trust.3 In that
case, this Court determined that the attorney fees in question were incurred by a party acting in a
fiduciary capacity pursuant to MCL 700.7401(1) and (2). Here, however, Carlesimo was never
an acting fiduciary under MCL 700.7401(1) and (2). Although Carlesimo had been named a
successor trustee under the decedent’s first amendment to the trust, the second amendment
removed that designation. Further, although Carlesimo brought this action to challenge the
validity of the second amendment, he was unsuccessful in that challenge. In addition, although
the second amendment to the trust did not name a successor trustee, that omission did not
provide Carlesimo with authority to act as trustee in filing his action. In sum, because Carlesimo
was never an acting trustee, he was not acting pursuant to the authority prescribed in MCL
700.7401(1) and (2). Therefore, MCL 700.7401(1) and (2) did not permit Carlesimo to avoid
personal liability for Graybill’s costs. Accordingly, we partially reverse the probate court’s
January 23, 2009, order to the extent it provides that Graybill’s costs are to be recovered from
the trust. Instead, those costs are recoverable from Carlesimo, as the nonprevailing party.
Graybill also challenges the probate court’s inclusion of language in its April 22, 2009,
order denying Graybill’s motion for reconsideration in which the court suggested that Carlesimo
could recover his own attorney fees and costs from the trust. Graybill contends that it was
inappropriate to include this language in the order because the issue of Carlesimo’s attorney fees
and costs had not been raised by any party, and further, Carlesimo was not legally entitled to
recover his attorney fees and costs from the trust. However, because the probate court later ruled
that Carlesimo was not entitled to recover his attorney fees and costs from the trust, Graybill was
not prejudiced by the probate court’s injection of the issue in its earlier order.4 Thus, any error
was harmless. MCR 2.613(A) (“[a]n error in . . . anything done . . . by the court . . . is not
ground for . . . disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action is inconsistent
with substantial justice”).
IV. DOCKET NOS. 292188 AND 292189
Carlesimo argues that the probate court erred in denying his petition to stay the trust and
estate proceedings while these appeals were pending. A trial court’s decision whether to grant a
3
We note that the probate court later expressed that it had erred in relying on In re Temple
Marital Trust to find that Graybill was required to recover his costs from the trust. But because a
claim of appeal had already been filed from the prior order, the court concluded that MCR
7.208(A) precluded it from modifying its prior order to correct the error.
4
In section V, infra, we conclude that the probate court did not err in finding that Carlesimo was
not entitled to recover his attorney fees and costs from the trust.
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motion for a stay is discretionary and, accordingly, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.5 See
generally MCR 5.802 and People v Bailey, 169 Mich App 492, 499; 426 NW2d 755 (1988). In
this case, the probate court determined that good cause for a stay under MCR 5.802(C) was not
established because the estate proceeding was already subject to court supervision, thereby
requiring court approval before any estate assets could be transferred, and further, the trust was
already subject to a stay that had been issued in the decedent’s divorce case. Given these
circumstances, there was no risk of irreparable harm without a stay. Thus, the probate court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Carlesimo’s motion for a stay.6
Next, Carlesimo argues that the probate court erred by refusing to set aside its February
27, 2009, order appointing Graybill as personal representative of the decedent’s estate.
Carlesimo contends that the order was not entered in accordance with MCR 5.107(A) because he
did not receive notice of the order before it was entered. “This Court reviews for an abuse of
discretion a trial court’s decision to grant relief from an order.” Fisher v Belcher, 269 Mich App
247, 262; 713 NW2d 6 (2005).
Carlesimo challenged the entry of the February 27, 2009, order in a motion in the probate
court, arguing that, contrary to Graybill’s contention, he was still an interested party entitled to
notice because he had filed an appeal from the order partially revoking the decedent’s will. The
probate court ruled that Carlesimo was to be provided with notice of all future proceedings, but
declined to set aside the February 27, 2009, order. Even if Carlesimo was entitled to notice of
the February 27, 2009, order before it was entered, because he later received notice of the order
and had an opportunity to challenge its entry, and because he did not offer a valid reason for why
Graybill was not qualified to serve as personal representative,7 we conclude that the probate
court did not abuse its discretion by declining to set aside the order.
Carlesimo also argues that the probate court erred by awarding Graybill attorney fees of
$1,000 as a sanction for Carlesimo’s filing of frivolous petitions. We review the probate court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App at 128.
5
Carlesimo’s reliance on Szymanski v Brown, 221 Mich App 423, 433; 562 NW2d 212 (1997),
to argue that a de novo standard of review applies is misplaced. In Szymanski, this Court applied
the de novo standard only to the interpretation of a court rule.
6
Carlesimo also requests that this Court order a stay of the proceedings pending appeal.
However, he did not file a motion for a stay pursuant to MCR 7.209(A), and we are denying his
present request as moot.
7
On appeal, Carlesimo inaccurately states that Robert Parker was appointed personal
representative of the estate. Robert Parker was named a successor trustee of the trust. That
appointment had nothing to do with the February 27, 2009, order appointing Graybill as personal
representative of the decedent’s estate. Accordingly, any alleged conflict of interest with respect
to Parker is not a basis for concluding that the February 27, 2009, order should not have been
entered.
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The general rule in Michigan is that attorney fees are not recoverable unless authorized
by statute, court rule, contract, or judicial exception. Id. at 129, 139. Probate courts may impose
sanctions under MCR 2.114. See MCR 5.114 and In re Pitre, 202 Mich App 241, 243; 508
NW2d 140 (1993). MCR 2.114(D) and (E) allow sanctions to be imposed if a document is filed
for “any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.” MCR 2.114(F) also provides that
[i]n addition to sanctions under this rule, a party pleading a frivolous claim or
defense is subject to costs as provided in MCR 2.625(A)(2). The court may not
assess punitive damages.
Carlesimo argues that it was inappropriate to impose a sanction against him because the
probate court awarded him relief when it ruled that he was entitled to notice of future
proceedings. Although the probate court recognized the validity of that request, it noted that
Carlesimo had filed several different petitions, most of which were without merit, resulting in
unnecessary proceedings. In particular, the court stated that the requests for a stay in the estate
case and supervision in the trust case were unnecessary because of the protections that were
already in place. But because the court had granted Carlesimo relief on his request for notice of
future proceedings, it declined to award the full amount of Graybill’s requested costs of $2,000
and instead awarded only $1,000. Under the circumstances, the probate court’s decision reflects
an appropriate exercise of its discretion. Accordingly, we find no error.
V. DOCKET NO. 294015
In this last issue, Carlesimo challenges the probate court’s denial of his petition to
recover his attorney fees and costs from the trust. Carlesimo contends that this Court’s decision
in In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 129-137, establishes that he may obtain
reimbursement of his attorney fees and costs from the trust. We disagree. As previously
discussed in section III, supra, Carlesimo’s entitlement to reimbursement of his attorney fees and
costs depends on whether he was acting in accordance with the authority prescribed to a trustee
under MCL 700.7401(1) and (2). Because Carlesimo was never an acting trustee, this case is
distinguishable from In re Temple Marital Trust and Carlesimo did not have a right to recover
his attorney fees and costs from the trust. Accordingly, the probate court properly denied
Carlesimo’s petition for attorney fees and costs.
On appeal, Carlesimo also relies on MCL 700.7904 in support of this argument, but that
statute was added by 2009 PA 46, effective April 1, 2010. Because the statute did not become
effective until after this matter was decided, it is not applicable. Even if the statute applied,
however, it does not aid Carlesimo’s argument. MCL 700.7904(1) permits a court to allow any
party who “enhances, preserves, or protects trust property” to recover costs and expenses from
the trust. MCL 700.7904(2) also permits a trustee who participates in a civil action in good faith
to recover his expenses, including attorney fees, from the trust, whether successful or not. Here,
Carlesimo was not an acting trustee and he did not enhance, preserve, or protect trust property.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm the probate court’s judgment upholding the
validity of the trust amendment in Docket No. 288690, we affirm the probate court’s December
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17, 2008, order partially revoking the decedent’s will in Docket No. 289809, we partially reverse
the probate court’s January 23, 2009, order to the extent that it allowed Graybill to recover his
costs from the trust rather than from Carlesimo in Docket No. 291938, we affirm the probate
court’s May 4, 2009, order denying a stay, refusing to set aside a stipulated order, and requiring
Carlesimo to pay sanctions of $1,000 in Docket Nos. 292188 and 292189, and we affirm the
probate court’s August 10, 2009, order denying Carlesimo’s request to have the trust pay his
attorney fees and costs in Docket No. 294015.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Henry William Saad
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