PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294141; 297505
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-008993-FH
SHAWN JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV),
MCL 750.520e(1)(b), and acquitted of three counts of third-degree CSC (CSC-III), MCL
750.520d(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant as a habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12, to a prison term of 46 months to 15 years. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm
defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remand for the ministerial task of amending the
presentence report consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was originally charged with three counts of CSC-III and one count of CSC-IV
stemming from an alleged assault of a coworker. On March 17, 2008, defendant and the victim
were working together. Sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., defendant and victim were
alone in the building. According to the victim’s testimony, the following events occurred.
Defendant approached the victim from behind while she was sitting at the desk and began
“feeling all over on” the victim, rubbing her face, shoulders, back, and breasts. The victim
testified that she told defendant “Stop, leave me alone.” Defendant then swiveled the chair until
the victim was facing him. The victim stood up and defendant stuck his hand down the front of
the victim’s work pants and digitally penetrated her vagina. The victim pushed against
defendant’s chest with both of her hands, but she was unable to move him away.
Defendant then removed his hand and pulled down the victim’s pants and panties. In the
victim’s efforts to push defendant away from her, she fell back into the chair. Defendant then
grabbed the victim’s legs and pushed them up against her “in the position as if you were having a
baby,” with his arms “locked on the chair holding [her] legs.” Defendant proceeded to perform
oral sex on the victim for “[l]ess than 10 minutes, probably five.” The victim told defendant to
stop and proceeded to try to hit defendant with her arms, striking his “back, his shoulder,
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whatever I could reach.” The victim did not know why defendant finally stopped, but when he
did, she got up from the chair and bent over to try and pull up her pants. As she bent over,
defendant was behind her and he attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. The testimony
was clear that there was not “full” penetration, but whether there was any penetration was
questionable. The victim testified that she could “feel the head part . . . trying to be put in” and
that she knew it touched her vagina, but she did not know whether it “entered.”
It was uncontested that after leaving the building, the victim informed her co-workers,
her boss, and the police, that she had been raped, and went to the hospital to have a rape kit
taken. DNA evidence found defendant’s saliva on the victim’s panties.
Although defendant originally told police he had never had any sex with the victim, at
trial, defendant’s defense was that the incident was consensual. Defendant presented two
witnesses: his wife and one of his friends.1 Defendant’s wife testified that defendant had been
having an affair with the victim. Defendant’s friend testified that he had witnessed defendant
and the victim together, hugging and holding hands at social gatherings. On cross-examination,
however, when questioned as to when he saw this, he indicated that it occurred in the late
summer or fall of 2008, which was at least four months after the alleged assault.
The jury found defendant not guilty of all three CSC-III charges, but guilty of CSC-IV.
The trial court then sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 46 months to 15 years.
The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s request for resentencing based on errors in the
scoring of his prior record variable (PRV), which would have lowered the guidelines. However,
the OV scores were also recalculated and, based on the rescoring, the same minimum sentence
range resulted, so the trial court imposed the same sentence.
II. INCONSISTENT VERDICT
Defendant first2 argues that his conviction for CSC-IV must be vacated because it is
inconsistent with the jury’s acquittal of the three CSC-III charges. Defendant contends that the
jury’s inconsistent verdict can only be attributed to confusion about the law or compromise. We
disagree.
First, Michigan law permits a jury to reach inconsistent verdicts. People v Vaughn, 409
Mich 463, 465-466; 295 NW2d 354 (1980). Indeed, it may convict a defendant of felonyfirearm while acquitting him of the underlying felony. People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 109 n
13; 341 NW2d 68 (1983).
Juries are not held to any rules of logic nor are they required to explain
their decisions. The ability to convict or acquit another individual of a crime is a
1
The friend was apparently the godfather of the victim’s daughter from another relationship.
2
We have elected to address defendant’s issues in an order different from how they were
presented on appeal.
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grave responsibility and an awesome power. An element of this power is the
jury’s capacity for leniency. Since we are unable to know just how the jury
reached their conclusion, whether the result of compassion or compromise, it is
unrealistic to believe that a jury would intend that an acquittal on one count and
conviction on another would serve as the reason for defendant's release. These
considerations change when a case is tried by a judge sitting without a jury. But
we feel that the mercy-dispensing power of the jury may serve to release a
defendant from some of the consequences of his act without absolving him of all
responsibility. [Vaughn, 409 Mich at 466 (footnote omitted).]
Furthermore, even though the jury could reach an inconsistent verdict, we conclude that this
verdict was not inconsistent. Where there is an interpretation that logically explains the jury’s
findings, the verdict is not inconsistent. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 462-463; 697 NW2d
494 (2005).
Here, the record indicates that there was some dispute as to whether defendant’s penis
ever penetrated the victim’s vagina, which could permit the jury to find reasonable doubt as to
that count of CSC-III. There was also testimony that the victim was wearing a belt on her pants
and that she did not tell her bosses or the police about the digital penetration, such that the jury
might have found reasonable doubt as to that count of CSC-III. Finally, there was some
testimony that the victim said “we had oral sex” and that she told defendant “my body may have
been saying yes, but I was saying no.” Those statements may have led the jury to find
reasonable doubt as to whether the oral sex, for which there was DNA evidence, was consensual.
However, given the multiple witnesses who testified that the victim was upset and immediately
reported the incident to her co-workers, her boss, the police, and went to the hospital to have a
rape kit taken, there was certainly sufficient evidence that defendant had sexually touched the
victim using force and without consent to find him guilty of CSC-IV. Because this assessment
of the evidence logically explains the jury’s verdict,3 it is not inconsistent. Id.
III. SENTENCING
Defendant next claims that offense variables (OV) 4 and 11 were improperly scored and
that the trial court improperly considered evidence related to the three charges for which
defendant was found not guilty when it sentenced him. When scoring the sentencing guidelines,
a trial court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored, provided that
evidence of record adequately supports a particular score. People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414,
417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006). “Scoring decisions for which there is any evidence in support will
3
We note that our ability to construct a logical explanation for the jury’s verdict does not
invalidate the trial court’s conclusion that, by the preponderance of the evidence, the penetrations
did, in fact, occur. Rather, our construction is one of many and is provided only to show that the
evidence could be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the verdict. The trial court’s
construction of the evidence that the penetrations did occur is an equally logical and valid
construction of the evidence.
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be upheld.” Id. Questions involving statutory interpretation or application of the guidelines are
reviewed de novo. People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 123; 771 NW2d 655 (2009).
A. OV 11
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 11, MCL 777.41, at 50
points. OV 11 relates to criminal sexual penetration. Defendant alleges that the trial court could
not score him for penetration because the jury acquitted him of the CSC-III charges. We
disagree.
“A sentencing court is allowed to consider the facts underlying uncharged offenses,
pending charges, and acquittals.” People v Coulter, 205 Mich App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827
(1994) (emphasis added).
Because the prosecution must prove controverted factual assertions underlying the
scoring of the sentencing guidelines by a preponderance of the evidence rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt, situations may arise wherein although the
factfinder declined to find a fact proven beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes
of conviction, the same fact may be found by a preponderance of the evidence for
purposes of sentencing. [People v Perez, 255 Mich App 703, 713; 662 NW2d
446 (2003).]
Thus, so long as the trial court could conclude that the penetrations occurred under the
preponderance of the evidence test, it could properly score them. See id. (concluding that where
the defendant was charged with CSC-I, but found guilty of CSC-II, the trial court properly
scored for penetration because the victim’s testimony provided support for scoring OV 12 as if
penetration occurred).
Under OV 11, fifty points are scored where “[t]wo or more criminal sexual penetrations
occurred.” MCL 777.41(1). “[A]ll sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender arising out
of the sentencing offence” must be scored. MCL 777.41(2)(a). Although points are not scored
“for the 1 penetration that forms the basis of a . . . third-degree criminal sexual conduct offense,”
MCL 777.41(2)(a), because defendant was not found guilty of any of the CSC-III charges, there
need only be evidence of two penetrations.
The prosecutor pointed out that there was testimony of both digital penetration as well as
oral sex during the assault on the victim. We agree. The record reveals that there was DNA
evidence of defendant’s saliva in the victim’s panties as well as the victim’s testimony regarding
what occurred. Additionally, there were multiple witnesses who testified as to the victim’s
statements and demeanor, as well as evidence that the victim promptly reported the penetrations
to her co-workers, her boss and the police, and went to the hospital to have a rape kit performed.
There was the testimony of three witnesses who heard defendant call the victim to
apologize, one who heard the victim say “well, Shawn, I told you I don’t like you like that,”
another who heard the victim tell defendant “my body might have been saying yes, but I was
saying no,” and one who heard defendant say that “he didn’t mean for that to happen. He felt
like an animal.” There was also testimony from the officer who initially questioned defendant
about the incident, who testified that defendant indicated that “nothing” happened between him
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and the victim, denied performing oral sex with the victim on the date of the incident, and denied
having ever had oral or vaginal sex with her at anytime, rather than asserting that the incident
was consensual.
Given that the trial court was in a better position to assess witness credibility, we cannot
say that the trial court erred in concluding that two penetrations occurred by the preponderance
of the evidence. Where the evidence supported the conclusion that two penetrations occurred, 50
points was appropriately scored. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 61; 687 NW2d 342
(2004).
B. OV 4
Defendant also argues that OV 4 was improperly scored at 10 points because there was
no evidence that the victim suffered serious psychological injury. Ten points are scored under
OV 4 where “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a
victim.” MCL 777.34(a). Defendant contends that because the jury found him not guilty of the
three charges of CSC-III, it must have concluded that the conduct between him and the victim
was consensual and, therefore, it could not have resulted in serious psychological injury. We
disagree.
First, there is evidence in the record that the victim sought and received counseling. It
makes no difference the duration of the counseling because, as defendant’s counsel conceded
before the trial court, a victim need not seek counseling for OV 4 to be properly scored at 10
points. See MCL 777.34(2) (“[T]he fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive.”).
Second, as before, defendant’s acquittal on the three CSC-III charges did not preclude the trial
court from concluding, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the incident was
nonconsensual. Finally, defendant was convicted of CSC-IV, which by itself indicates
nonconsensual contact that could result in psychological harm.
As previously noted, a preponderance of the evidence suggested that the incident was
nonconsensual. There was DNA evidence of defendant’s saliva in the victim’s panties, the
victim’s testimony regarding what occurred, and the statements of the multiple witnesses the
victim spoke with immediately after the incident occurred and who indicated that she was clearly
upset, crying, and hysterical. Although defendant’s wife testified that defendant was having an
affair with the victim, other evidence indicated that defendant was having an affair with a
different coworker, not the victim. Defendant’s other witness who testified that defendant and
the victim appeared to be boyfriend and girlfriend testified that he saw them together in the fall
of 2008, which was extremely unlikely given that was at least four months after the assault took
place.
Where the trial court was convinced by the trial testimony that the multiple counts of
CSC-III had occurred, and a preponderance of the evidence in the record supports that
conclusion, the trial court could properly conclude that defendant’s actions caused serious
psychological injury requiring professional treatment to the victim. Because there is evidence to
support the scoring, this Court must uphold the scoring of 10 points for OV 4. Endres, 269 Mich
App at 417.
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C. BLAKELY
Defendant finally argues that having the trial court utilize a preponderance of the
evidence standard violates his Constitutional rights under Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296;
124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). However, our Supreme Court has concluded that
Blakely does not affect Michigan’s sentencing scheme. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 160;
715 NW2d 778 (2006).
IV. PRESENTENCE REPORT
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to strike various inaccurate
information disputed from his presentence investigative report (PSIR). We review a sentencing
court’s response to a claim of inaccuracy in a defendant’s PSIR for an abuse of discretion.
People v Uphaus (On Remand), 278 Mich App 174, 181; 748 NW2d 899 (2008). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a trial court makes a ruling that falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
Defendant complains first regarding information in his employment record. At
sentencing, defense counsel requested that the following language be omitted from pages one
and two of the PSIR because it was inaccurate:
The defendant reported last working at ICON in May of 2007; however,
this contradicts the defendant being employed at ICON at the time of the instant
offense. According to the defendant’s spouse, he has been unemployed since
2008 after he was fired from ICON as a result of the within offense.
Defense counsel also noted that a similar statement appeared on page 7: “He was last employed
at ICON Family Services as a Residential Specialist from 2002 until he was fired in 2008 due to
the within offense. . . . The defendant’s wife has supported him financially after he was fired
from his job.” Defendant indicated that he was not fired “as a result of this offense” and that
after he was terminated, his wife did not financially support him. The trial court responded,
“Okay, I’ll remove that. It has no bearing whatsoever on the sentencing in this case. I’ll take
that out.” Because the trial court agreed to remove it, defendant is entitled to have it removed.
See MCL 771.14(6); MCR 6.425(E). Accordingly, we agree with defendant that the trial court
erred in failing to remove the disputed facts. However, neither statement must be removed in its
entirety. As to page two, only “as a result from the within offense” need be omitted; as to page
7, “due to the within offense” should be omitted, as should the final sentence that “The
defendant’s wife has supported him financially after he was fired from his job.” The remainder
of the statements went undisputed and may remain.
Defendant also challenges the inclusion on page two in the agent’s description of the
offense, any facts related to the CSC-III charges for which he was acquitted. Defendant argues
that because he was acquitted of those charges, it is unfair to include them because they will
form the basis of what he must admit he did to the parole board. It is true that “[c]ritical
decisions are made by the Department of Corrections regarding a defendant’s status based on the
information contained in the presentence investigation report.” People v Norman, 148 Mich App
273, 275; 384 NW2d 147 (1986). However, “the trial court may determine the accuracy of the
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[disputed] information.” Uphaus, 278 Mich App at 182 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because the trial court concluded that these acts did in fact occur, based on a preponderance of
the evidence, and used them in defendant’s sentencing, the trial court’s decision not to remove
the statements was not an abuse of discretion. However, we believe that defendant is entitled to
an explicit statement in this section of the report that he was acquitted of the CSC-III charges.
Accordingly, the trial court shall add a statement somewhere under “Agent’s Description of the
Offense” that clearly states that defendant was acquitted of the three CSC-III charges.
Therefore, we remand for the ministerial task of correcting these errors and forwarding
the corrected presentence report to the Department of Corrections. People v Russell, 254 Mich
App 11, 22; 656 NW2d 817 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 471 Mich 182 (2004); People v
Dilling, 222 Mich App 44, 53-54; 564 NW2d 56 (1997).
Affirmed and remanded for correction of the presentence report. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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