PEOPLE OF MI V CALLEEN ELAINE TATUM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 292736
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 08-009583-FH
CALLEEN ELAINE TATUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her conviction following a bench trial of larceny in a
building, MCL 750.360. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 18 months’ probation. For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Defendant’s conviction stems from the disappearance of a pair of iolite dangles, which
were meant to be worn as attachments to earrings, from the complainant’s jewelry store. At the
time the jewelry went missing, defendant was an employee of the store. The complainant store
owner testified that the dangles were valued at around $400. Defendant argues on appeal that
her conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the great weight of the
evidence.
The elements of larceny in a building are as follows:
“(1) an actual or constructive taking of goods or property, (2) a carrying away or
asportation, (3) the carrying away must be with a felonious intent, (4) the subject
matter must be the goods or the personal property of another, (5) the taking must
be without the consent and against the will of the owner . . . [and] (6) the taking
must be done within the confines of the building.” [People v Mumford, 171 Mich
App 514, 517-518; 430 NW2d 770 (1988), quoting People v Wilbourne, 44 Mich
App 376, 378; 205 NW2d 250 (1973) (alteration by Mumford Court).]
The complainant testified that defendant set out and put away the store’s jewelry the day
before the complainant noticed that the dangles were missing. Defendant’s timecard indicated
that she was at work until closing, although the studio manager testified that she filled in the end
time for defendant. Defendant stated that she had left the store around 4:00 p.m., but the owner
of horse stables where defendant also worked stated that defendant was in the store when she
-1-
was there purchasing earrings for her mother sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. The
complainant further testified that once she discovered that the dangles were missing, she looked
in the tub where the dangles would have been stored and also “in the showcases,” but did not
find them. Additional evidence presented to the trier of fact included testimony from the stable
owner that defendant had asked her to testify that defendant had been in the barn on the day the
dangles went missing, and that defendant had said she could have gotten the earrings the stable
owner had purchased for free. The police found no evidence of a break-in at the store, and the
complainant testified that only she, her father, the studio manager, and defendant had keys to the
store and knew the alarm code at the time the jewelry went missing.
To determine whether defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict
her has merit, “this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 299; 581 NW2d
753 (1998). With respect to defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of larceny
in a building, under, MCL 750.360, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of several witnesses
who pieced together sufficient evidence to prove that defendant committed the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. For instance, the testimony of complainant established that defendant set out
and put away the store’s jewelry the day before complainant noticed that the dangles were
missing. Defendant stated that she had left the store around 4:00 p.m., but the owner of the
stables where defendant had another job, testified that defendant was in the store when she was
there purchasing earrings for her mother sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. The stable
owner also testified that defendant had asked her to give testimony that defendant was at the
stables on the day the dangles went missing, and that defendant had said she could have gotten
the earrings the stable owner had purchased for free. Additionally, about one month after they
spoke, defendant left a message for the stable owner stating that she was going to come over to
her house and talk about the statement she made (presumably to the police). The stable owner
testified that she “felt threatened” by the message and reported it to authorities. As stated, supra,
the police found no evidence of a break-in at the store. This evidence, and the reasonable
inferences arising therefrom, was sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction. People v
Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
Defendant next argues that her conviction should be set aside and she should be granted a
new trial because the guilty verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant
argues that her conviction was based on weak circumstantial evidence that was heavily offset by
compelling evidence of her innocence. We respectfully disagree.
When a defendant asserts that her conviction is against the weight of the evidence, this
Court must determine “whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it
would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v McCray, 245 Mich
App 631, 637; 630 NW2d 633 (2001) (citation omitted). Considering the evidence outlined
supra, defendant’s great weight challenge similarly fails. In addition to the legal conclusions
reached by this Court in rejecting defendant’s first claim on appeal, with regard to her second
claim on appeal, we note that this Court must defer to the trial court’s “special opportunity . . . to
judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and that the trial court’s findings were not clearly
erroneous, MCR 2.613(C), that it would not be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand,
McCray, 245 Mich App at 637.
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald S. Owens
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.