IN RE D R D CONLEY MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
September 28, 2010
In the Matter of SHEPPARD Minors.
No. 296828
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-031210-NA
In the Matter of R. F. ASKEW, Minor.
No. 296831
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-031209-NA
In the Matter of SHEPPARD Minors.
No. 296852
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-031210-NA
In the Matter of S. A. BROWN, Minor.
No. 296855
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-032060-NA
In the Matter of D. R. D. CONLEY, Minor.
No. 296905
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-031208-NA
Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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In Docket No. 296828, respondent-father T. J. Sheppard appeals as of right from the trial
court’s order terminating his parental rights to minor children, T. Sheppard and J. Sheppard
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions of adjudication), (g) (failure to
provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child returns to parent’s
care). In Docket Nos. 296831, 296852, 296855, and 296905, respondent-mother A. Brown
appeals as of right from the same order terminating her rights to T. Sheppard and J. Sheppard, as
well as D. Conley, R. Askew, and S. Brown, all under the same subsections. We affirm.
DOCKET NO. 296828
Respondent-father first argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it
permitted his attorney to withdraw during the termination hearing. We disagree. Having
reviewed the record, we conclude that respondent-father’s rights were not violated by the
withdrawal of counsel.
Respondent-father was represented by counsel prior to the termination hearing. On the
first day of the termination hearing, respondent-father met with his counsel briefly. Counsel then
went for a meeting in chambers. Upon his return, he was informed that respondent-father had
left. Counsel requested to withdraw at that time because he could not represent respondentfather without knowing respondent-father’s position or having his input. The trial court declined
the request at that time, indicating that it would give respondent-father “a little bit of time” to see
if he returned to the proceedings.
Petitioner’s first witness, the children’s foster care worker at Holy Cross Children’s
Services, was called. After her direct examination, the trial court inquired as to whether
respondent-father had returned. Counsel indicated that he had not. The trial court noted that it
had had its staff determine whether respondent-father had been taken into custody for some
reason, and indicated that respondent-father was not in jail. Counsel indicated that his
understanding was that respondent-father “walked away from the building.” The trial court
instructed counsel to cross-examine the DHS worker, which counsel did. The second witness,
the DHS worker, was then called. His testimony was focused solely on respondent-mother,
however, and counsel indicated he had no questions for the witness. After the witness was
excused, petitioner rested. Counsel then renewed his motion to withdraw as counsel for
respondent-father, which the trial court granted, holding:
I will not that we have had—ah—no communication from the gentleman. As
noted, he is not in custody. He was here and voluntarily left. Counsel cannot
represent someone who will not appear and/or assist you. You are herewith
relieved of responsibility. I’m satisfied you’ve made a good effort.
We recognize that a parent in a termination procedure has the right to counsel. In re
Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 121; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). However, parents are charged with
some responsibility under the court rule and statute and the right to counsel may be waived or
relinquished. In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 222; 469 NW2d 56 (1991). This Court has
previously held that a father who “without explanation or effort to contact the court beforehand
of any problems, did not attend the termination hearing and never contacted his appointed
counsel in an effort to prepare a defense” had waived his right to counsel. In re Warren Minors,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 14, 2005 (Docket No.
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260147). See also In re N. A. Ball, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued October 23, 2003 (Docket No. 247822) (“Where respondent failed to contact counsel for
an extended period, and did not attend hearings, respondent effectively terminated the attorneyclient relationship and waived the right to counsel.”) Indeed, even our Supreme Court permits
counsel to withdraw from termination cases where there is a failure to communicate. In re Sours
Minors, 459 Mich 624, 651; 593 NW2d 520 (1999) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, “[T]his Court permitted counsel for [the father] to withdraw on the basis of a
lack of contact with him.”).
Here, where respondent-father came to the hearing, but voluntarily elected to leave before
it began, without notifying or contacting his counsel, we believe he made a choice not to put
forth a defense. Indeed, when respondent-mother testified, respondent-father’s counsel would
have been at a loss of how to cross-examine her without respondent-father’s help, particularly
where respondent-mother accused respondent-father of abuse and he was not there to assist
counsel in his defense. Under these circumstances, we conclude that respondent-father
effectively waived his right to counsel, such that there was no due process violation when the
trial court permitted counsel to withdraw.
DOCKET NOS. 296828, 296831, 296852, 296855, 296905
Both respondent-mother and respondent-father allege that the trial court erred in
concluding that sufficient grounds to terminate their parental rights were established by clear and
convincing evidence. We disagree.
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where petitioner proves at least one ground
for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d
407 (2000). This Court reviews the lower court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard.
MCR 3.977(J); Sours, 459 Mich 624 at 633.
Respondents’ parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j),
which provide:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
***
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age.
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent.
We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of both parents’ parental
rights on each of the above grounds.
Respondent father made little effort to comply with services. Although he did well with
his children when he visited, during the 18 months the children were in care, he missed most
visits and came to one intoxicated. He also failed to address the problems that brought the
children into care. Domestic violence was the reason the children were removed; one of the
children was cut on the arm in an affray between the parents in July 2008. Nevertheless,
respondent father did not attend parenting classes, domestic violence treatment, or individual
counseling. There was evidence that he and respondent-mother were still having physical
altercations (slapping and hitting one another) in front of the children, in October 2009. Thus,
there was clear and convincing evidence that the conditions brining the children into care
continued to exist and that respondent-father had done nothing during the 18 months the children
were in care to remedy the problems.
Respondent-mother alleges that she benefited from services for domestic violence, anger
management, and parenting, and that there was no evidence that respondent-father or any of the
children were cut or injured by her. She contends that if respondent-father had not broken into
her home and assaulted her, the children would have been returned to her ten days later. She
argues that because she had ended her relationship with respondent-father and obtained a new
protection order, there was no risk to the children.
We do not agree with respondent-mother’s recitation of the evidence contained in the
record. The trial court took judicial notice of its files. Contained in these files was evidence that
on July 3, 2008, respondent-father was holding one of the children when respondent-mother
stabbed respondent-father, also injuring the child. The detective who responded to the call
indicated that respondent-mother was telling conflicting stories and was uncooperative. The
records indicated that respondent-mother had already been in counseling since 2007 at this point.
Additionally, at the termination hearing, a police officer testified that when he arrived on the
scene regarding the October 20, 2009 incident, it was respondent-father who was cut and
bleeding and medical records supporting respondent-father’s injuries were admitted. Thus,
contrary to respondent-mother’s contention, there was evidence that respondent-mother cut
respondent-father and one of the children.
Additionally, there was evidence that respondent-mother had not ceased her relationship
with respondent-father as she had been advised. The evidence indicated not only that
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respondent-mother permitted her protection order to expire, but that respondent-mother and
respondent-father were living together at the time of the October 2009 altercation. Two of the
three children old enough to talk with the foster-care workers reported that respondent-father was
living with respondent-mother, as did both respondent-father and his mother. One of the
children reported that respondent-mother and respondent-father were slapping and fighting with
each other when the children were present for unsupervised weekend visits. The security logs at
the apartment also showed respondent-father making multiple visits to the apartment well before
the October 20, 2009 incident where respondent-father was cut. Thus, there was significant
evidence that respondent-father had not broken into respondent-mother’s apartment and
assaulted her, but rather was living there at the time the incident occurred. Additionally, the
record evidence was that respondent-father was injured, not respondent-mother.
Although no children were present for the altercation on October 20, 2009, where the
father was cut with a knife, this would be a very unhealthy and dangerous atmosphere for a child.
As the trial court observed, this occurrence was similar to the one that brought the children into
care. While respondent-mother testified that the parents were not in a relationship, the court
found that her testimony “does not ring entirely true” and that she told Officer Rocha, who was
“absolutely credible,” that respondents “went back to bed” after the incident. The trial court was
in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
We also disagree with respondent-mother’s characterization that she benefited from the
services she received.1 According to her psychological evaluation, respondent-mother had anger
issues and volatility problems. Although she was to receive domestic violence counseling as
both a perpetrator and a victim, she refused any services related to her being a perpetrator.
Although she completed parenting classes, respondent-mother still did a poor job of watching the
children during supervised visitations. She also testified that she was unwilling to retake the
classes because, “why should I go back through it when I did . . . everything?” She summarized
what she learned from anger management classes as, “Just think before you do anything stupid.”
She testified that she was taught to call the police whenever respondent-father came around, but
that she never called them because she did not want to lose her visitation.
More important, she admitted to refusing to report anything to DHS for fear that her
unsupervised visitations would be taken away. She took her children to her sister’s house even
though unsupervised visits were to occur at her own home. She claimed she took the children
there to keep them safe from respondent-father, but admitted that she never informed DHS that
she was doing so, again for fear it would take the visits away. When asked why she never told
DHS she was afraid of respondent-father, she gave the same excuse—she did not want to lose
visitation. She gave the same response when questioned as to why she failed to call the police
when respondent-father allegedly broke in and assaulted her and cut himself, why she failed to
tell her maintenance people that respondent-father has allegedly broken in, and why she lied to
the maintenance people and said she was “okay.” She insisted that she had never needed
services because she had not done anything wrong and that she only participated for her kids.
1
A parent must benefit from services in order to provide a proper home. In re Gazella, 264
Mich App 668, 676-677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005).
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Respondent-mother essentially took the attitude that it was better to lie to DHS to keep her
unsupervised visits, even when it put the children at in harm’s way because DHS remained
unaware of the risk to the children created by respondent-father’s presence. Thus, after more
than 18 months, respondent-mother had received no benefit from services, refused to take any
responsibility for her actions, and admitted to lying to DHS and violating the rules. The trial
court did not clearly err in finding sufficient evidence to prove the statutory grounds as to both
respondents.
Respondents next allege that the trial court erred in concluding that terminating their
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. As before, we disagree.
Once a statutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence,
the trial court must terminate parental rights if termination is in the children’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5). We review for clear error the trial court’s best interests determination.
Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.
Respondent-father argues that he had positive interactions with his children and was able
to redirect them. He contends that he should be given additional time to participate in services
toward reunification. The record reveals that although the children were under the jurisdiction of
the court for 18 months, respondent father participated sporadically and inconsistently in
visitation and services. The record indicated that respondent-father engaged in abusive
behaviors in the presence of the children, but had done nothing to resolve these issues in the 18
months the children were in care. He provided no plan for the children or any evidence that he
could offer the children a stable and safe environment. The trial court did not err in concluding
that termination was in their best interests.
As for respondent-mother, although she participated more regularly in services, she also
could not offer the children a stable, safe environment. While respondent-mother was thought to
have progressed sufficiently for unsupervised and overnight visits, the domestic violence
incident of October 20, 2009 clearly showed that the children would not be safe in her care. Her
coping strategy, to refrain from telling police, security, or caseworkers about the problem, was
the opposite of the appropriate response.
Ultimately, the children would not be safe in either parent’s care, and the court did not
clearly err in its best interests ruling.
Affirmed as to all dockets for both respondents.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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