EXECUTIVE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT LLC V NAUTILUS INSURANCE COMPANY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EXECUTIVE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT,
LLC,
UNPUBLISHED
September 23, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 291368
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 08-088716-CK
NAUTILUS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and MARKEY and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this insurance coverage dispute, the trial court issued an order dated December 29,
2008, granting defendant Nautilus Insurance Company’s motion for summary disposition. The
trial court subsequently issued an order dated March 17, 2009, denying plaintiff Executive
Property Development, LLC’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appeals as of right. We
affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff owns properties known as the Fisher Hotel and Fisher Hotel Annex in Flint,
Michigan. This case arises out of vandalism to the properties that occurred when the properties
were vacant. The properties became vacant as a result of a complaint for abatement of a public
nuisance filed by the state. In November 2005, the trial court ordered that the properties be
closed for business and barred anyone, including plaintiff’s representatives, from entering.
Thereafter, defendant issued policies of insurance for the properties. The first six policies, issued
in three-month intervals, were identical and were collectively effective December 31, 2005
through June 30, 2007. The seventh policy was effective June 30, 2007 through September 30,
2007.
Each of the seven policies issued by defendant contained a “Causes of Loss – Basic
Form,” which stated, in part:
A. Covered Causes of Loss
***
-1-
8. Vandalism, meaning willful and malicious damage to, or destruction of, the
described property.
But, the policies contained limitations to the coverage for vandalism under circumstances of
vacancy. All seven policies contained a “Building and Personal Property Coverage Form,”
which stated, in part:
E. Loss Conditions
***
6. Vacancy
a. Description of Terms
(1) As used in this Vacancy Condition, the term building and the term
vacant have the meanings set forth in (1)(a) and (1)(b) below:
***
(b) When this policy is issued to the owner or general lessee of a
building, building means the entire building. Such building is
vacant unless at least 31% of its total square footage is:
(i) Rented to a lessee or sub-lessee and used by the lessee or
sublessee to conduct its customary operations; and/or
(ii) Used by the building owner to conduct customary
operations.
(2) Buildings under construction or renovation are not considered
vacant.
b. Vacancy Provisions
If the building where the loss or damage occurs has been vacant for
more than 60 consecutive days before that loss or damage occurs:
(1) We will not pay for any loss or damage caused by any of the
following even if they are Covered Causes of Loss:
(a) Vandalism;
(b) Sprinkler leakage, unless you have protected the system
against freezing;
(c) Building glass breakage;
(d) Water damage;
-2-
(e) Theft; or
(f) Attempted theft.
(2) With respect to Covered Causes of Loss other than those listed in
b.(1)(a) through b.(1)(f) above, we will reduce the amount we would
otherwise pay for the loss or damage by 15%.
The first six policies also contained an endorsement entitled “Vandalism Exclusion,”
which stated, in part:
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
CAUSES OF LOSS – BASIC FORM
CAUSES OF LOSS – BROAD FORM
CAUSES OF LOSS – SPECIAL FORM
A. The following is added to the EXCLUSIONS section and is therefore not a
Covered Cause of Loss:
VANDALISM
Vandalism, meaning willful and malicious damage to, or destruction of,
the described property.
But if vandalism results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay for the
loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.
The first six policies also contained an endorsement entitled “Vacancy Permit,” which stated:
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
BUILDING AND PERSONAL PROPERTY COVERAGE FORM
***
STANDARD PROPERTY POLICY
Prem
No.
Bldg.
No.
SCHEDULE
Excepted Causes of Loss
Vandalism
Sprinkler
Leakage
1
1
x
x
12/31/05
3/31/06
2
1
x
x
12/31/05
3/31/06
-3-
Permit Period
From
To
A. The VACANCY Loss Condition does not apply to direct physical loss or
damage:
1. At the locations; and
2. During the Permit Period;
Shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations
B. This Vacancy Permit does not apply to the Excepted Causes of Loss indicated
in the Declarations or by an “X” in the Schedule.
The seventh policy did not contain a “Vandalism Exclusion” or “Vacancy Permit.”
Plaintiff initiated this action in May 2008, asserting that after the trial court barred
anyone from entering its properties, unknown persons trespassed on the properties, broke into the
buildings, and vandalized or otherwise damaged the buildings and other physical property.
Plaintiff did not discover the damage until July 1, 2007, when its representatives inspected the
properties with the court’s permission. Plaintiff asserted that it repeatedly demanded
compensation from defendant, which defendant denied. Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff
informed it of the damage or that it denied plaintiff’s requests for compensation.
After filing its complaint in this case, plaintiff submitted a “Sworn Statement in Proof of
Loss,” which provided in part:
5. State the cause and origin of the loss:
Vandalism. The buildings were vacant. . . .
Defendant rejected plaintiff’s proof of loss and denied its claim in full.
In November 2008, defendant filed its motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that under the terms of the policies, vandalism was not a
covered cause of loss when the damage occurred. Following a hearing, the trial court granted
defendant’s motion. Thereafter, plaintiff filed its motion for reconsideration, which the trial
court denied. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition to defendant.
We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo on the
basis of the entire record to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Defendant moved for
summary disposition under both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Although the trial court did not
state under which subrule it granted defendant’s motion, it is apparent that it granted the motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because it relied on evidence outside of the pleadings. See Spiek v
Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 338 and n 9; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a motion
-4-
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, we must consider
all of the substantively admissible evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Maiden, 461 Mich at 119-120; MCR 2.116(G)(6). Summary
disposition should be granted only where the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden, 461
Mich at 120.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.
Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 605; 766 NW2d 903 (2009). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the principled range of outcomes.
Id. at 605-606. A motion for reconsideration may be granted when the court has made “a
palpable error by which the court and parties have been misled,” and when correction of that
error would have led to a different disposition of the motion. MCR 2.119(F)(3).
As indicated, pursuant to a November 15, 2005, trial court order entered in a related
nuisance action, plaintiff’s properties were closed for business. The court barred anyone from
entering. Plaintiff asserts that on July 1, 2007, its representatives entered the properties and
discovered that they had been vandalized or otherwise damaged. Plaintiff reported the damage
to defendant and submitted requests for compensation, which defendant denied. Because it is
unclear when the damage actually occurred, it is necessary to consider all seven of the insurance
policies issued by defendant between December 31, 2005 and September 30, 2007 in
determining whether plaintiff was entitled to coverage.
Insurance policies are interpreted according to the principles of contract construction.
Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 353-354; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). An
insurance policy should be read as a whole, Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 50 n 11;
664 NW2d 776 (2003), and should be construed so as to give effect to every word, clause, and
phrase, Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 468; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).
Exclusions to coverage should be read with the insuring agreement and independently of every
other exclusion. English v BCBSM, 263 Mich App 449, 471; 688 NW2d 523 (2004). If any
exclusion applies to a claim, coverage is precluded. Brown v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 273
Mich App 658, 661; 730 NW2d 518 (2007). Exclusions are strictly construed in favor of the
insured, but clear and specific exclusions must be enforced as written. Id. An insurance policy
is clear if it fairly admits of but one interpretation. Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Nikkel, 460 Mich
558, 566; 596 NW2d 915 (1999). The construction and interpretation of an insurance policy and
whether the policy language is ambiguous are questions of law that we review de novo.
Henderson, 460 Mich at 353.
All seven of the insurance policies issued by defendant contained a “Causes of Loss –
Basic Form,” which stated that vandalism was a covered cause of loss. But the first six policies
also contained an endorsement entitled “Vandalism Exclusion,” which modified the coverage
provided in the “Causes of Loss – Basic Form.” It added vandalism to the “Exclusions” section
of the policy, indicating that vandalism was, therefore, not a covered cause of loss. The
endorsement contained an exception stating that “if vandalism results in a Covered Cause of
Loss, we will pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.” But plaintiff
does not assert on appeal that the vandalism in this case resulted in a separate covered cause of
loss. The first six policies also contained an endorsement entitled “Vacancy Permit.” The
permit specifically stated that it did not apply to vandalism. Plaintiff acknowledges these
-5-
provisions and does not dispute that, on their face, the first six policies precluded coverage for
vandalism.
Plaintiff asserts, however, that the seventh policy issued by defendant provided coverage
for vandalism because it did not contain the “Vandalism Exclusion” or “Vacancy Permit”
included in the first six policies. Thus, according to plaintiff, it is at least entitled to
compensation for vandalism that occurred between June 30, 2007 and August 30, 2007, being
the first 60 days of the seventh policy. Plaintiff asserts that the amount of damage that occurred
during that time period, if any, is a question of fact. We note, however, that the coverage
available for vandalism under the seventh policy was limited by the policy’s plain language.
Although the policy stated in its “Causes of Loss – Basic Form” that vandalism was a covered
cause of loss, the seventh policy, like the first six policies, also contained a “Building and
Personal Property Coverage Form,” which stated that if “the building where the loss or damage
occurs has been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days before that loss or damage occurs,”
defendant would not pay for loss or damage caused by certain otherwise-covered causes of loss,
including vandalism. Plaintiff argues that when the damage to the properties was discovered on
July 1, 2007, less than 60 days had passed since the effective date of the policy, June 30, 2007.
But, plaintiff’s argument ignores the plain language of the policy. The provision at issue
specifically refers to buildings being vacant for “60 consecutive days before th[e] loss or damage
occur[ed],” not 60 consecutive days since the policy took effect, and contractual language must
be given its ordinary and plain meaning. Royal Prop Group, LLC v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc,
267 Mich App 708, 715; 706 NW2d 426 (2005). Plaintiff has repeatedly admitted that its
properties were closed for business and that no one was permitted to enter pursuant to the trial
court’s order issued in November 2005. Thus, the properties had been vacant for well over 60
consecutive days when the damage allegedly occurred, and there was, therefore, no coverage
available under the seventh policy.
Plaintiff also argues that the insurance policies were ambiguous because defendant was
aware that the properties were vacant and included a “Vacancy Permit” in six of the seven
policies, yet all of the policies included various limitations to coverage for vacant properties.
The policies also listed vandalism as a covered cause of loss, but then limited that coverage in
various provisions. “A provision in a contract is ambiguous if it irreconcilably conflicts with
another provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.” Id. While
plaintiff is correct that the insurance policies issued by defendant contained multiple forms and
provisions, those forms and provisions must be read and construed as a whole. Wilkie, 469 Mich
at 50 n 11. Plaintiff has not pointed to any provision that irreconcilably conflicts with another or
is equally susceptible to more than one meaning. See Royal Prop Group, LLC, 267 Mich App at
715. Rather, when the provisions at issue are read together, they admit of but one meaning, as
explained above. See Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 460 Mich at 566. The fact that defendant was
aware that the properties were vacant when it issued the policies is irrelevant. The parties were
free to agree to limited coverage for vacant properties and the “judiciary is without authority to
modify unambiguous contracts or rebalance the contractual equities struck by the contracting
parties.” Royal Prop Group, LLC, 267 Mich App at 715 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the alternative, plaintiff argues that the vacancy provisions at issue were not applicable
in this case because at the time the vandalism occurred, the properties were not vacant. Rather,
the properties were under renovation. Plaintiff points to the description of the term “vacancy” in
-6-
the “Building and Personal Property Coverage Form,” which stated that “[b]uildings under
construction or renovation are not considered vacant,” and claims that, as part of the related
nuisance action, it was required to renovate the properties and that renovation would commence
as soon as permitted by the court. But even assuming that plaintiff was required to renovate the
properties and that defendant was so aware, as plaintiff claims, it has not established that the
properties were actually under renovation at the time the vandalism occurred. Plaintiff merely
asserts that renovation would commence at some point in the future and has repeatedly
admitted—in its complaint, sworn statement, motion for reconsideration, and elsewhere—that
the properties were closed for business, padlocked, and no one was permitted to enter without
court permission, even to perform renovations. Thus, there is no merit to plaintiff’s argument
that the properties should not be considered vacant for purposes of insurance coverage.
The trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant and, therefore, did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.