ANNIE L MCCOY V FARM BUREAU INSURANCE CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANNIE L. MCCOY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MICHIGAN,
No. 291049
Sanilac Circuit Court
LC No. 08-032637-CZ
Defendant-Appellant,
and
CASEY JAHN, d/b/a FARM BUREAU LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
ANNIE L. MCCOY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendant,
and
CASEY JAHN, d/b/a FARM BUREAU LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 291214
Sanilac Circuit Court
LC No. 08-032637-CZ
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MARKEY and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Farm Bureau Insurance Company of Michigan and Casey Jahn appeal by
leave granted the trial court’s order denying their motion for change of venue. Because we
conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for change of venue, we affirm.
The present dispute arises from Farm Bureau’s denial of plaintiff Annie McCoy’s claim
for life insurance benefits following the death of her estranged husband Joshua McCoy. Joshua
McCoy purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy through Jahn. Farm Bureau issued the policy
on August 4, 2005. He later obtained a second policy from Jahn that Farm Bureau issued on
November 28, 2007. The second policy replaced the first policy, which was canceled effective
February 4, 2008. Annie McCoy was the beneficiary under both policies.
On August 20, 2008, Joshua committed suicide.1 Annie McCoy requested payment of
the life insurance benefits, but defendant Farm Bureau denied the request because the policy
precluded payment in the event that the insured commits suicide within two years of the policy’s
issuance. After Farm Bureau refused to pay benefits, Annie McCoy sued both Farm Bureau and
Jahn in Sanilac County seeking benefits under the first policy. She alleged both breach of
contract and negligence claims. Jahn moved for a change of venue and Farm Bureau joined in
that motion. The trial court denied the motion.
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to change venue for clear error.
Dimmitt & Owens Financial, Inc v Deloitte & Touche, LLC, 481 Mich 618, 624; 752 NW2d 37
(2008). “Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Massey v Mandell, 462 Mich 375, 379; 614 NW2d 70 (2000).
This Court also reviews de novo the proper interpretation of the statutes governing venue.
Dimmit & Owens Financial, Inc, 481 Mich at 624.
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court clearly erred in determining that MCL
600.1621, the statute governing venue for contract claims, controls in this case. Farm Bureau
and Jahn contend that, under MCL 600.1641(2), the trial court had to determine venue by
applying MCL 600.1629, which is the statute that governs venue for tort claims.
MCL 600.1641 addresses proper venue in cases where there is more than one type of
claim raised in a complaint:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), if causes of action are joined, whether
properly or not, venue is proper in any county in which either cause of action, if
1
We note that Annie McCoy does not concede that her husband committed suicide; rather, she
contends that he might have accidentally shot himself in the chest.
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sued upon separately, could have been commenced and tried, subject to separation
and change as provided by court rule.
(2) If more than 1 cause of action is pleaded in the complaint or added by
amendment at any time during the action and 1 of the causes of action is based on
tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death, venue shall be determined under rules applicable to
actions in tort as provided in section 1629 (emphasis added).
In Provider Creditors Committee v United American Health Care Corp, 275 Mich App
90, 95-96; 738 NW2d 770 (2007), this Court determined that MCL 600.1641(2) did not control
venue, even though the plaintiff’s complaint included both tort and contracts claims. The Court
concluded that this was the case because the plaintiff was not seeking damages for personal
injury, property damage, or wrongful death. Id. at 96. Similarly, in this case, although Annie
McCoy alleged both tort and contract claims, she has not sought damages for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death. Accordingly, under the holding stated in Provider
Creditors Committee, MCL 600.1641(2) is inapplicable. Consequently, “venue is proper in any
county in which either cause of action, if sued upon separately, could have been commenced and
tried.” MCL 600.1641(1). Sanilac County was a proper venue for Annie McCoy’s contract
claim if sued upon separately. The trial court did not clearly err in denying the motion for
change of venue.
In reaching this decision, we are not unmindful of Holton v A+ Ins Assoc, Inc, 255 Mich
App 318, 323-324; 661 NW2d 248 (2003), in which this Court interpreted identical language in
the comparative negligence statutes, MCL 600.2957 and MCL 600.6304, and held that the trier
of fact must apportion liability among those at fault in all tort-based actions, not merely those
tort actions seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death.
Nevertheless, because Provider Creditors Committee interpreted the statute specifically at issue
here, we must follow it. MCR 7.215(J)(1). We are also aware that in Dimmit & Owens
Financial our Supreme Court assumed—without analyzing the relevant statutory language—that
MCL 600.1629 governed venue where the plaintiff had both tort and contract claims and where
the tort claims did not seek damages for personal injury, property damage, or death. See Dimmit
& Owens Financial, Inc, 481 Mich at 623-625. However, absent more specific guidance from
our Supreme Court, we conclude that we must follow Providers Creditors Committee.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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