GEORGE P ASKER V WXZ RETAIL GROUP GREENFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE P. ASKER and CHARLOTTE ASKER,
UNPUBLISHED
August 5, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 290234
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-625093-CZ
WXZ RETAIL GROUP GREENFIELD,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and SAAD and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting in part and denying in
part the parties’ cross motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this
action to enforce deed restrictions in a 1964 deed. The trial court held that a restriction requiring
plaintiffs’ approval of any improvements on defendant’s property was no longer enforceable, but
that plaintiffs could enforce a restriction requiring free traffic flow between the parking lots on
defendant’s property and plaintiffs’ adjoining property. We reverse.
As a preliminary matter, we note that in addition to arguing that the trial court properly
declined to enforce the deed restriction requiring approval of any building plans, defendant also
argues that the trial court erred by enforcing the parking lot restriction. Although a cross appeal
is not necessary to argue an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s decision, an appellee
may not seek relief more favorable than that rendered by the trial court without filing a cross
appeal. MCR 7.207; In re Herbach Estate, 230 Mich App 276, 284; 583 NW2d 541 (1998).
Because defendant’s argument regarding the parking lot restriction seeks to enlarge the scope of
relief it received below, and defendant did not file a cross appeal, the issue involving the
enforceability of the parking lot restriction is not properly before this Court. Thus, we decline to
consider it.
Plaintiffs argue in their appeal that the trial court erred in determining that the 1964 deed
restriction requiring approval of any improvements on defendant’s property was no longer
enforceable. We agree.
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
the court must examine the documentary evidence presented below and, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 361-362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). A trial
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court’s grant of summary disposition is reviewed de novo, on the entire record, to determine
whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood,
461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
This case involves the meaning and enforceability of a deed restriction. A deed
restriction is a contract between a buyer and a seller of property. Bloomfield Estates
Improvement Ass’n v City of Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 212; 737 NW2d 670 (2007).
“[U]nambiguous contracts are not open to judicial construction and must be enforced as written,”
unless contrary to law or public policy. Id. (emphasis in the original). Courts are not free to
modify or disregard portions of a contract based on notions of fairness or the public good. Id. at
212-213. Thus, a court will enforce an unambiguous deed restriction as written, unless it
contravenes law or public policy, or has been waived by acquiescence to prior violations.1 Id. at
214.
“In interpreting a contract, [a court’s] obligation is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties.” Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 375;
666 NW2d 251 (2003). “[A]n unambiguous contractual provision is reflective of the parties’
intent as a matter of law.” Id. “[C]ourts must . . . give effect to every word, phrase, and clause
in a contract and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or
nugatory.” Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 468; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).
“[I]f the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its construction is a question of law for
the court.” Michigan Nat’l Bank v Laskowski, 228 Mich App 710, 714; 580 NW2d 8 (1998)
Conversely, a “contract is ambiguous when its provisions are capable of conflicting
interpretations.” Klapp, 468 Mich at 467. “[T]he meaning of an ambiguous contract is a
question of fact that must be decided by the jury” or other trier of fact. Id. at 469. In
determining the meaning of an ambiguous contract, the trier of fact may consider extrinsic
evidence. Id. at 469-472. In Klapp, the Supreme Court explained that, “[i]n interpreting a
contract whose language is ambiguous, the jury should also consider that ambiguities are to be
construed against the drafter of the contract.” Id. at 470. “This is known as the rule of contra
proferentem.” Id. at 471. However, “[t]he rule of contra proferentem is a rule of last resort
because . . . [it] does not aid in determining the parties’ intent.” Id. at 473. Thus, it should be
applied only as a tie-breaker, i.e., “merely to ascertain the winner and the loser in connection
with a contract whose meaning has . . . [remained unclear] despite all efforts to apply
conventional rules of [contract] interpretation,” including the consideration of extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 472-474.
The deed restrictions at issue in this case provide, in pertinent part:
1
In this case, defendant’s waiver and estoppel arguments based on prior violations are directed
only at the parking lot restriction. As previously indicated, that issue is not properly before this
Court.
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This deed is also subject to the following restrictions which are covenants
running with the land and not conditions, which restrictions shall be binding upon
the Grantor and Grantee herein, their respective successors and assigns:
1. The Grantee shall within two (2) years from the date hereof cause to be
erected and fully completed upon said premises a brick building adopted for and
which shall be used for a bank building.
2. No improvements shall be placed upon said property until the site plan
and architectural plans for the building or buildings to be erected thereon have
been approved in writing by Grantor, which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
3. That portion of the premises which is to be devoted to a parking area
shall be improved in a manner similar to and compatible with the parking area
already established by Grantor on contiguous property and shall be so constructed
that traffic may flow freely between the respective parking areas of the parties, it
being the intention of the respective customers and invitees of the parties may
conveniently use the two parking areas.
The first restriction requires the grantee to construct a bank on the property within two
years. As plaintiffs observe, the second restriction requires the grantor’s2 approval of any
buildings constructed on the property. The second restriction provides that “no improvements
shall be placed upon said property until . . .” Defendant contends that this language presumes
that there has been no prior construction on the parcel and that when the second restriction is
read in context with the first restriction, it is apparent that the disputed building restriction refers
only to approval of the site plan and architectural plans for the intended bank. This is a
reasonable interpretation, taking into consideration the reference to “no improvements.”
However, the second restriction specifically provides that no improvements shall be placed upon
the property until the plans for the building or buildings erected thereon have been approved in
writing by the grantor. The first restriction contemplated that “a brick building” would be built
on the property to be used as “a bank.” Use of the language “building or buildings” in the
second restriction and of the singular “a” in the first restriction indicates that the second
restriction was not necessarily intended to be applicable only to the originally contemplated
bank. Given the ambiguity in the interplay between the first and second deed restrictions,
whether the building restrictions required plaintiffs’ approval of defendant’s proposed
improvements on defendant’s property presented a question of fact. The original parties’ intent
in the drafting of the provisions at issue cannot be ascertained from the language of the deed
itself. Because the meaning of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact that must be decided
by the jury or other trier of fact, Klapp, 468 Mich at 469, summary disposition was inappropriate.
2
Plaintiffs are successors in interest to the original grantor.
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Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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