IN RE FORD MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2010
In the Matter of C. FORD, N. FORD, G. FORD,
and T. FORD, Minors.
No. 295938
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-121680-NA
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and FITZGERALD and DAVIS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent A. Woods appeals as of right from the order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) [conditions leading to adjudication
continue to exist], (g) [failure to provide proper care], and (j) [reasonable likelihood of harm to
child if returned to parent’s home]. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
A trial court may terminate parental rights if it finds that a statutory ground for
termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(G); In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 355, 360; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “If the court finds that there are grounds for
termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for
reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(c)(i) had been proven by clear
and convincing evidence. The children came into care in September 2006 because of
respondent’s problems with substance abuse, criminal activity, inadequate and unstable housing,
and domestic violence. The initial dispositional order was entered in February 2007. The
supplemental petition was filed in July 2009, almost 2-1/2 years later. At that time, respondent
had not yet completed substance abuse treatment and had tested positive for cocaine as recently
as March 2009. Further, respondent had just been released from a residential re-entry program
because of new criminal charges. Within two weeks, respondent was back in jail awaiting trial
on yet other criminal charges that were not due to be resolved until January 2010. Although
respondent participated in substance abuse classes while in jail, her continued incarceration
prevented her from demonstrating that she benefited from the instruction by being able to refrain
from drug use while in the community. Given that respondent’s criminal behavior and substance
abuse issues were still interfering with her ability to parent after more than two years, the trial
court could properly find that the conditions that led to the adjudication were not likely to be
rectified within a reasonable time given the children’s ages.
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In addition, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) had been proven
by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent was unable to provide the children with proper
care because of her substance abuse and criminal activity. She also left the children with their
father, who was an unfit custodian. Respondent did little to comply with the service plan apart
from visiting the children until she was sent to prison at the end of 2007. She completed
parenting classes and domestic violence classes in prison, and allegedly completed substance
abuse classes as well, but the substance abuse classes apparently had little impact because
respondent tested positive for cocaine within a month of her release. Consequently, she was not
permitted to continue in the Mustard Seed program, which would have assisted with housing and
employment. Given these failures, hopes of speedy reunification vanished. Respondent then
committed new criminal offenses, which resulted in her placement in a residential re-entry
program and subsequently in jail. While respondent completed substance abuse classes in jail,
she continued to deny that she had relapsed despite a positive drug test, and had yet to prove that
she could refrain from drug use when outside of a restricted facility. Because the children had
been out of respondent’s care for over three years by the time of the hearing and respondent was
once again incarcerated, the trial court could properly find that respondent was unlikely to be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time given the children’s ages.
The trial court also did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(j) had been proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Respondent had a serious substance abuse problem. She took no steps
to address it until she went to prison at the end of 2007. Although she completed substance
abuse classes, she never participated in a substance abuse evaluation and thus it was not known if
such classes were sufficient to treat her addiction needs. Presumably they were not because
respondent relapsed within a month of leaving prison and then, despite completing additional
classes in December, she denied relapsing. The substance abuse problem contributed to the
neglect that brought the children to the attention of CPS and finally into foster care. Because
respondent failed to demonstrate that she had overcome her addiction, the trial court could
properly find that the children were likely to be harmed if they were returned to respondent’s
custody.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the children’s
best interests. Respondent loved the children and was able to maintain a relationship with them
until the court terminated her visitation pending respondent’s participation in drug screens and
treatment, a condition respondent never met. There was testimony that the children needed
permanency and respondent’s actions indicated that she could not fulfill this need. One of
respondent’s children had been out of respondent’s care the majority of her young life and, given
respondent’s circumstances at the time of the hearing, was no closer to reunification than she had
been when the initial petition was filed. There was also testimony elicited indicating that the
three older girls had expressed a preference to move on with their lives, presumably meaning that
they favored termination because they were discouraged and frustrated by respondent’s failure to
overcome her addiction and assume her parental responsibilities. Therefore, the trial court did
not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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