PEOPLE OF MI V JASON LEE HUNT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 29, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289694
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-009804-FC
MATTHEW JAMES ALBERT LUJAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289708
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-009804-FC
JASON LEE HUNT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ZAHRA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and FITZGERALD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 289694, defendant, Matthew James Albert Lujan, appeals as of right from
his jury trial convictions of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(a) (person under 13 years of age) (CSC I), one count of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (person under 13 years of age) (CSC II), and two counts of
third-degree sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (person at least 13 years of age and under 16
years of age) (CSC III). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 148 months to 35 years
for each CSC I conviction, 6 to 15 years for the CSC II conviction, and 6 to 15 years for each
CSC III conviction. We vacate one of Lujan’s convictions of CSC I and otherwise affirm.
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In Docket No. 289708, defendant, Jason Lee Hunt,1 appeals as of right from his October
28, 2008 jury trial convictions of two counts of CSC I (person under 13 years of age), one count
of CSC II (person under 13 years of age), and two counts of CSC III (person at least 13 years of
age and under 16 years of age). Hunt was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 148 months to
35 years for each CSC I conviction, 6 to 15 years for the CSC II conviction, and 6 to 15 years for
each CSC III conviction. We affirm.
Defendant Matthew James Albert Lujan
Lujan first argues on appeal that his right to due process was violated by the victim’s
testimony at trial to more acts of misconduct than he was charged with in the information. Lujan
contends that his convictions may have been based on allegations not found in the information,
amounting to an improper de facto amendment of the information. Lujan additionally argues
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on this ground. The decision of
whether to grant a new trial is in the trial court’s discretion and is, therefore, reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 127; 755 NW2d 664 (2008); People v
Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 271; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).
The information charges Lujan with three counts of CSC I—“penis in genital opening,”
“fellatio,” and “cunnilingus,” with a child under 13 years old; one count of CSC II—sexual
contact with a child under 13 years old; and two counts of CSC III—“penis in genital opening,”
and “fellatio,” with a child at least 13 years old but less than 16 years old. With respect to the
CSC I counts, the victim testified specifically regarding multiple acts of vaginal intercourse and
one act of cunnilingus with Lujan while she was 12 years old.2 With respect to the CSC II count,
the victim testified that Lujan kissed her on her breast while she was 12 years old. With respect
to the CSC III counts, the victim testified specifically that she engaged in fellatio and vaginal
intercourse with Lujan during the event that included both defendants, while she was 13 years
old; she also testified that she had sex with Lujan more than once after she turned 13 years old
but could not remember any other specifics. We find no evidence on the record of alleged acts
not found in the information. Moreover, Lujan does not give any indication in what way his
defense would have differed if not for this alleged de facto amendment. We find there were no
charges added to the information and no attending due process violation.
Lujan next argues that there was a separate due process violation resulting from the
possibility that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous. He argues that because the victim testified
to more acts than he was charged with, there was a danger that the jurors convicted him without
unanimously agreeing with respect to which acts supported which convictions. In order to
preserve an issue of instructional error, a party must object before the jury deliberates. MCR
2.516(C); People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 225; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). Lujan did not
object to the jury instructions until his motion for a new trial. This unpreserved issue is reviewed
1
Defendants were tried together before one jury. This Court consolidated defendants’ cases on
appeal. People v Lujan, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 23, 2009
(Docket Nos. 289694 & 289708).
2
We will address the lack of evidence in support of the CSC I (fellatio) conviction infra.
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for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
[W]hen the state offers evidence of multiple acts by a defendant, each of which
would satisfy the actus reus element of a single charged offense, the trial court is
required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the same specific
act if the acts are materially distinct or if there is reason to believe the jurors may
be confused or disagree about the factual basis of the defendant’s guilt. [People v
Cooks, 446 Mich 503, 530; 521 NW2d 275 (1994).]
Further, alternative acts are materially distinct “where the acts themselves are conceptually
distinct or where either party has offered materially distinct proofs regarding one of the
alternatives.” Id. at 524. Multiple identical acts may amount to a “continuous course of
conduct,” supporting a single charge. Id. at 522, 528. The Court in Cooks also indicated that
alternative acts could be rendered materially distinct if the defendant offers a “separate defense
or materially distinct evidence of impeachment regarding any particular act.” Id. at 528.
The victim in this case testified to multiple instances of vaginal intercourse with Lujan,
both while she was 12 years old and 13 years old, but Lujan was charged with one count of CSC
I (vaginal penetration) and one count of CSC III (vaginal penetration).3
The victim testified in detail regarding the first time she had sex with Lujan at his house,
while 12 years old. She further testified that they had sex from “two times a week” to “a few
times a month” over the next several months. Details were not elicited regarding this testimony.
She briefly testified to one instance of sex with Lujan at Hunt’s house while she was 12 years
old. Lujan’s defense, generally, was that the victim was fabricating the entire story, as a fantasy.
Lujan’s father testified that he did not remember the victim being at Lujan’s house, and that there
was no furniture in the basement where the victim testified that she had sex with Lujan.
The victim’s testimony was clearly regarding a course of conduct on the part of Lujan.
Her testimony did not present materially distinct evidence of multiple instances of vaginal
intercourse with Lujan; she described two specific instances and added that there were many
additional times. The details of the two specific instances were not different; it was unforced
vaginal intercourse with no other person present. Lujan presented specific impeachment
evidence regarding the victim’s presence in his house, and additionally tried to impeach other
components of her testimony as inconsistent with her prior statements. Nevertheless, the
purpose of both courses of impeachment was to establish that the victim was lying about
everything. “[T]he sole task of the jury was to determine the credibility of the victim with
respect to the pattern of alleged conduct.” Cooks, 446 Mich at 528. There was no need for a
specific unanimity instruction regarding the CSC I (vaginal penetration) charge.
The victim also testified in detail regarding the incident when she engaged in sexual acts
with both defendants, including vaginal intercourse with Lujan, after she turned 13 years of age.
3
We find no evidence of multiple acts corresponding to the other charges against Lujan.
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Additionally, she testified that she had vaginal intercourse with Lujan after she turned 13 “more
than once,” but that she did not remember “every specific time in exact detail.” Lujan did not
present any specific evidence to rebut this testimony, relying entirely on the theory the victim
fabricated the entire relationship.
Because the incident involving both defendants is significantly different from the
ongoing course of conduct with Lujan, there is some danger that the jury could consider these
acts separately and not reach a unanimous verdict with respect to this count. Nevertheless, this
danger is significantly undermined by the fact that Lujan did not present any specific defense to
either piece of testimony. See Cooks, 446 Mich at 528. Further, there was testimony regarding
only one specific instance of vaginal intercourse while the victim was 13; no details whatsoever
were elicited regarding other acts of intercourse during this time. Finally, the only evidence of
an act of fellatio with Lujan while the victim was 13 years old was during the same event
involving both defendants. The jury convicted Lujan of this charge of CSC III (fellatio) as well,
dramatically decreasing the chance that the jury was confused about which testimony supported
the conviction for vaginal penetration. Lujan has not come forward with any evidence from
which to conclude that the jurors could have disagreed or been confused by the evidence in
support of the CSC III (vaginal penetration) conviction.
Lujan next argues that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. A
trial court’s grant or denial of a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Unger, 278 Mich App
210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence only if
the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice
to allow the verdict to stand. Id.
Lujan argues that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence because
the victim’s credibility was impeached to the point of holding no probative value. Lujan
primarily bases his argument on the contention that the trial court should have properly
considered the victim’s credibility when considering his motion for a new trial because of the
extent to which her testimony was impeached, citing People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 576
NW2d 129 (1998).
As noted by the Court in Lemmon, a trial judge cannot sit as a thirteenth juror. Lemmon,
456 Mich at 645. Only in “extraordinary circumstances” should the trial court set aside a jury
verdict. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 41 n 4; 755 NW2d 212 (2008), citing Lemmon, 456
Mich at 645-646. Further, contrary to Lujan’s reading of Lemmon, issues of witness credibility
“must remain with the jury.” Lemmon, 456 Mich at 645. A trial court is only invited to overturn
a jury verdict when there is a “real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted.”
Id. at 644 (internal quotation omitted). In order to disregard testimony in support of a verdict, it
must contradict indisputable physical facts or law, or be patently incredible. Id. at 647.
Lujan strenuously argues that the victim’s testimony was patently incredible. He argues
that defense counsel’s impeachment of her testimony was so thorough that a reasonable juror
could not have believed her testimony. It is true that the victim’s testimony was impeached on
several occasions. Primarily, defense counsel questioned the victim regarding inconsistencies in
detail between her testimony at trial, her testimony at the preliminary examination, and her
statement to the police. These details pertained mostly to the exact time and date of certain
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events, and how many instances of sexual contact she had with each defendant. The strongest
direct evidence against the victim’s credibility was that she invented a story about a bubble bath
in her original statement to the police. However, the victim herself corrected this false story and
gave an explanation to the jury regarding why she fabricated it. Similarly, Lujan cites to his
father’s testimony that he did not see the victim at his house during the time in question.
Contrary to Lujan’s argument, that the cumulative effect of this impeachment evidence
renders the victim’s testimony incredible, this is precisely the type of credibility issue for the
jury. Impeachment evidence concerning the details of testimony does not directly undermine the
factual plausibility of the testimony. Rather, it raises a mere question of credibility, against
which the jury must measure all other evidence. Lemmon, 456 Mich at 645. Likewise, a direct
conflict in testimony is to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. at 646.
Nevertheless, we note that there was no evidence presented at trial that the victim and
Lujan engaged in fellatio while the victim was 12 years old, in support of one of the CSC I
charges. She testified that she engaged in fellatio with Lujan at Hunt’s Cherrygrove house, and
that Hunt moved to the Cherrygrove house after she turned 13. She further testified that there
was “[never] a time where [Lujan] put his penis in [her] mouth any place other than at [Hunt’s]
Cherrygrove house.” Lujan does not raise this issue, but in the absence of any evidence of such
an act, it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow this conviction to stand. See Unger, 278
Mich App at 232. Therefore, this conviction is vacated. As discussed above, there was evidence
presented with respect to all other counts against Lujan. Thus, the jury’s verdict was not against
the great weight of the evidence, with the exception of the CSC I (fellatio) conviction.
Lujan next argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the victim was under 13 years of age at the time of events charged. This Court
reviews claims of insufficient evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecutor, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508,
515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Further, this Court must defer to
the fact finder’s role in determining the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 562; 679 NW2d 127 (2004). “[C]onflicts in
the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” Id.
“A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in
sexual penetration with another person and . . . that other person is under 13 years of age.”
People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 774; 614 NW2d 595 (2000), quoting MCL 750.520b(a)(1).
Sexual penetration means “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 750.520(a)(p);
People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 738-739; 705 NW2d 728 (2005).
The elements of CSC II are (a) sexual contact, (b) with a person under 13 years of age.
MCL 750.520c(1)(a); People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 253; 562 NW2d 447 (1997). Sexual
contact is defined as the intentional touching of the victim’s intimate parts or the clothing
covering the victim’s intimate parts if the “touching can reasonably be construed as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.” People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 645; 567 NW2d
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483 (1997), quoting MCL 750.520a(q). Intimate parts “includes the primary genital area, groin,
inner thigh, buttock, or breast.” MCL 750.520a(e).
The victim specifically testified that Lujan had vaginal intercourse with her on October
22, 2005, and kissed her on her breast shortly before that, when she was 12 years old. She stated
that she remembered that it was right before Halloween because it is “one of [her] favorite
holidays.” On cross-examination, it was brought out that the victim told the police that the first
instance of intercourse happened after school, around 4:00 p.m., or about an hour after she got
out of school. Defense counsel established that October 22, 2005, was in fact a Saturday. The
victim then testified that the first encounter must have happened after a “Saturday detention.”
On redirect examination, the prosecutor elicited a clarification from the victim that she knew that
it happened before Halloween 2005, but got the date wrong.
The victim also testified on direct examination that she was regularly visiting Lujan’s
house and making out with him in the days and weeks leading up to October 22, 2005. She
testified that she would usually go over in the afternoon, after school. Further, she testified that
this relationship started shortly after Hunt’s wedding, which took place in August, 2005. The
victim did not turn 13 years of age until the following July, 2006. The victim’s mother testified
that she told the police the relationship started in 2006, but that she did not question her daughter
very carefully. Further, Lujan’s father testified that the victim was only at his house during this
period of time a handful of times.
There was no indication that the victim was confused regarding the year Lujan’s conduct
began, or how old she was at the time, despite her possible confusion over the exact date and
time of certain events. No reasonable juror could interpret her testimony—on direct and crossexamination—as confusion over whether she was 12 years old at the time of the incident. To the
extent that there was a credibility determination to be made to resolve conflicts in the testimony,
that is the role of the jury. Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 562. Lujan has not demonstrated that,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, there was insufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was 12 years old at the time of
Lujan’s criminal conduct.
Defendant Jason Lee Hunt
Hunt argues on appeal that the trial court improperly limited the victim’s testimony by
excluding evidence, pursuant to MCL 750.520j(1), of the fact that the victim originally visited
her school counselor—to whom she eventually disclosed defendants’ behavior—because she
feared she might be pregnant, by someone other than defendants.
A party must object to a trial court’s evidentiary ruling at trial in order to preserve the
issue for appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 669; 625 NW2d 46
(2000). The ground for the objection on appeal must be the same as at trial. MRE 103(a)(1);
People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 177-178; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). On appeal, the
prosecutor argues that Hunt did not preserve this issue for review because Hunt’s defense
counsel stated that he had “no position” on the question during trial. While Hunt’s counsel did
not address this question before the trial court, Lujan’s counsel objected and argued with respect
to this issue. This Court has previously held that where a codefendant raises an objection and the
trial court’s ruling affects both defendants, this Court may “decline to regard the technicality of
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[a] defendant’s lawyer failing to join in the objection as failing to preserve [the] issue.” People v
Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 41 n 4; 597 NW2d 176 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by
People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146 (2007). Further, this Court may consider a claim of
constitutional error where the error could have been decisive of the outcome. Id. Thus, we elect
to address this issue because it bears on Hunt’s constitutional rights and the objection and ruling
at trial pertained equally to both defendants in this case.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 615; 741 NW2d 558 (2007). Constitutional questions and
questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo. People v McCuller,
479 Mich 672, 681; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). A court abuses its discretion when it selects a course
outside the range of principled outcomes. People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 460; 751 NW2d
408 (2008).
On appeal, Hunt first contends that MCL 750.520j(1) was inapplicable because the
proposed testimony was evidence of the victim’s reason for disclosure rather than evidence of a
specific instance of sexual conduct. Hunt neglects to consider the possibility that the testimony
could be evidence of both. Clearly, evidence of a suspected pregnancy is evidence of, at least, a
specific instance of sexual conduct.
Alternatively, Hunt argues that the exclusion of this evidence was a violation of due
process because the prosecutor took advantage of the exclusion and argued to the jury that the
victim’s disclosure came as a result of pent-up feelings regarding defendants’ conduct and that
she suddenly felt compelled to confide in someone and told the counselor. Hunt argues that the
jury should have been permitted to know that the victim only made disclosures regarding
defendants after coming back to the counselor on a second day. Hunt argues that danger of a due
process violation outweighs the applicability of MCL 750.520j(1) in this case.
The victim testified that she disclosed the events pertinent to defendants to the counselor
because she had come to realize that Lujan did not really love her and that what he had done with
her was wrong. She said that not telling anyone was “eating her on the inside.” This was the
proferred explanation for why the victim did not disclose for more than two years. The
prosecutor argued directly from this evidence that the victim realized defendants’ actions were
wrong and felt compelled to finally disclose the events to her counselor.
The crux of Hunt’s argument on appeal is that the testimony, as presented, might permit
the jury to draw the mistaken impression that the victim told the counselor about the sexual
incidents only because she was internally struggling with them. Hunt argues that, “she may have
instead, after thinking overnight, gotten back at Lujan.” We observe, however, that there is no
necessary logical connection between the victim’s testimony and her motivation, to be
illuminated by the testimony in question. She could have been equally “getting back” at Lujan
or Hunt by coming independently to the counselor or thinking of it after her first meeting with
the counselor. There were no unspoken implications or intimations to be filled in by the jury
about the victim’s motivations created by the missing information regarding the first visit.
Rather, the victim testified directly that her motivation for disclosing was that she realized the
conduct was wrong and wanted to get it off her chest. The jury was free to disbelieve this
testimony, but there was no hole in the testimony that invited unreasonable speculation by the
jury. Therefore, we find Hunt’s argument to be unavailing.
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Hunt also briefly argues that he was denied the opportunity to fully confront the victim as
a witness. He argues that because evidence of her original disclosure was relevant and material,
it was a constitutional violation to exclude that evidence, despite the fact that it was excluded
pursuant to statute. Hunt cites People v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133; 497 NW2d 546 (1993), in
which this Court stated that the defendant’s right of confrontation trumped the psychologistpatient privilege where defense counsel sought to impeach the victim with statements she made
that seemed to exonerate the defendant. Adamski, 198 Mich App 137-138. However, Hunt has
not demonstrated that the evidence he sought to have presented to the jury bore on the victim’s
credibility or motivation. There is no claim of direct impeachment, as in the Adamski case. This
argument is also unavailing.
Affirmed with respect to Hunt. With respect to Lujan, affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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