GEORGE MADLEY V CENTEX REAL ESTATE CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE MADLEY and DOREEN MADLEY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 292497
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000542-NZ
CENTEX REAL ESTATE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and MARKEY and DAVIS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition and granting plaintiffs’ motion to file a first amended complaint. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
This action arises from plaintiff George Madley’s fall at defendant’s construction site.1
Defendant was the owner and general contractor of a residential housing development in Sterling
Heights. Defendant did not perform any construction work itself; it hired several subcontractors
to do all the necessary work, including subcontractor A. Buttazzoni & Sons to perform interior
trim work in the homes. A. Buttazzoni & Sons in turn subcontracted the work to plaintiff, a trim
carpenter. On October 30, 2007, plaintiff received a call from his employer, A. Buttazzoni &
Sons, directing him to go to a particular house in the development to complete “shoe and
hardware” installation (the final phase of construction involving completion of minor odds and
ends such as installing shoe molding, door knobs, etc.). Plaintiff had been to the house a few
weeks before to install a handrail along the stairs to the basement. On October 31, 2007, plaintiff
arrived at the house at about 6:40 a.m.; no one else was present. It was dark inside the house,
although there was some illumination from the rising sun and the streetlights. Plaintiff attempted
to turn on the lights, but none of the several light switches that he tried turned them on. Plaintiff
1
All references to “plaintiff” refer to George Madley. Count one of the complaint alleges
negligence and it is brought by plaintiff alone. Count two is for loss of consortium and it is
brought by plaintiff’s wife, Doreen Madley. Doreen’s derivative claim is not at issue on appeal.
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concluded that the power was off, so he decided to go to the basement where the breaker was and
turn on the power.
Plaintiff made his way to the basement door and faintly made out that there was some
blue tape on the door. Plaintiff testified that, in his line of work, blue tape typically signaled to
the carpenter that the item on which the tape was placed was not working properly and required
his repair. Plaintiff opened and shut the door a few times in order to see if it was working
properly. He did not notice anything wrong with the door, so he proceeded to the stairs. He took
one step and fell straight down eight feet to the concrete basement floor. Unbeknownst to
plaintiff, another subcontractor had removed the stairs to access and fix a crack in the foundation
wall. As a result of the fall, plaintiff sustained a fractured right foot, a torn rotator cuff, and
injury to his right hand. His injuries required surgery and ongoing medical care. He alleges that
he is permanently disabled from performing carpentry work. Plaintiffs filed a two-count
complaint against defendant alleging negligence and loss of consortium.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
disposition on plaintiff’s common work area claim. We agree.
This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition. Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). A motion
brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v Purcell,
246 Mich App 244, 246; 631 NW2d 760 (2001).
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a negligence claim pursuant to the common work area
doctrine. To establish a claim under the common work area doctrine, a plaintiff must prove the
following: “(1) that the defendant contractor failed to take reasonable steps within its
supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against readily observable and avoidable
dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen (4) in a
common work area.” Ormsby, 471 Mich at 57. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges: “Defendant
Centex, as a general contractor, had a duty to assure that reasonable steps within its supervisory
power and coordinating authority were taken to guard against readily observable, avoidable
dangers in common work areas, which create a high degree of risk to a significant number of
workers.” Plaintiff further asserted that defendant breached its duty by removing the basement
stairs, failing to have the power turned on, failing to barricade or lock the basement door, and
failing to post signs that the stairs were removed. In their motion to amend, plaintiffs conceded
that “[t]he complaint purports to state a claim for liability based on the ‘common work area
doctrine,’ an exception to the common law rule that owners and general contractors were not
normally liable for the negligent acts of a subcontractor.”
As defendant aptly points out, plaintiffs have never disputed the fact that the hazard did
not create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen. Plaintiff was the only
person at the construction site at the time of the injury. Plaintiff was unaware of any other
person even being scheduled to work on the house that day. According to plaintiff, the house
was “almost 100 percent done” at the time that he arrived, but for installation of the doorknobs,
which he was there to perform. The stairs were removed at some point in the three weeks before
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the accident. The missing stairway undoubtedly presented a dangerous condition; however, there
is no evidence that a significant number of workmen had been, or would be, exposed to the
hazard. On these facts, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a common work area claim. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the common work
area claim.2
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion to file a first
amended complaint. We disagree. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s
decision regarding a motion to amend a complaint. Tierney v University of Michigan Regents,
257 Mich App 681, 687; 669 NW2d 575 (2003).
MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides, in pertinent part: “a party may amend a pleading only by
leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” A motion to amend ordinarily should be granted, and should be denied only
for the following particularized reasons: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility. Weymers v
Khera, 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647 (1997).
Defendant first argues that allowing plaintiff to assert a premises liability claim is futile
because the only way for plaintiff to recover under these circumstances is to prove a common
work area claim, which plaintiff cannot do. Although “a landowner is [generally] not
responsible for injuries caused by a carefully selected contractor to whom he has delegated the
task of erecting a structure . . . an owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees
from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition that the owner knows or
should know the invitees will not discover or protect themselves against.” Hughes v PMG Bldg,
Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 9; 574 NW2d 691 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
Caselaw is inconsistent regarding whether a premises liability claim is viable where a
construction worker is injured on a construction site. In Butler v Ramco-Gershenson, Inc, 214
Mich App 521, 537; 542 NW2d 912 (1995), this Court indicated that an injured construction
worker could pursue a premises liability claim against the owner of the construction site where
there was evidence that the owner knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. This
Court reaffirmed that principle in Hughes. Additionally, our Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that a construction worker’s premises liability claim was viable in Perkoviq v Delcor
Homes-Lake Shore Pointe, Ltd, 466 Mich 11, 16, 19-20; 643 NW2d 212 (2002), where it
analyzed the merits of the plaintiff’s premises liability claim but ultimately denied the claim
2
This conclusion is not undermined by plaintiff’s assertion that he need not satisfy the elements
of the common work area doctrine as other theories of negligence provide for recovery, nor is it
undermined by the trial court’s decision to permit plaintiffs to assert additional theories of
negligence in their amended complaint. Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment, however, would do
nothing to cure the defects in the common work area claim – the claim that, mistakenly or not,
plaintiffs actually asserted in their original complaint.
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because the hazard (ice on a roof) was open and obvious and lacked any special aspects
rendering it unreasonably dangerous.
But, a ruling seemingly inconsistent with the aforementioned cases was recently issued in
Banaszak v Northwest Airlines, Inc, 485 Mich 1034; 776 NW2d 910 (2010),3 where the Court
upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s premises liability claim and stated that the
defendant-landowner “did not have a duty to protect the plaintiff, an employee of an independent
contractor hired to perform construction work on the owner’s premises, from the construction
site hazardous condition that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Banaszak, 485 Mich 1034. In
support of its conclusion, the Court cited Perkoviq, which involved a construction worker who
was injured when he slipped on an icy roof at a job site. The Perkoviq Court held that because
the icy roof was an open and obvious danger, the plaintiff’s premises liability claim failed
because there were no special aspects rendering it unreasonably dangerous. Perkoviq, 466 Mich
at 16-20. The premises liability claim failed solely because the danger was open and obvious,
not because premises liability claims are allegedly barred in the construction site injury context.
The Perkoviq Court provided no statement that could reasonably be interpreted to mean that
construction workers injured on the job are precluded from ever asserting premises liability
claims. The Perkoviq opinion implicitly acknowledges that a premises owner owes invitees,
including construction workers, a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from an
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition that the owner knows or should
know the invitee will not discover or protect himself against. Because the relevant case law
appears to be in conflict and acknowledging the long-standing rule that premises liability claims
have been permitted in the context of a construction site accident, we decline to find that a
premises liability claim under the facts of this case would be futile.4
Next, defendant contends that allowing plaintiff to assert a claim for breach of an
assumed duty is futile because, again, the only way for plaintiff to recover is to prove a common
work area claim. “A party may be under a legal duty when it voluntarily assumes a function that
it is not legally required to perform.” Zychowski v AJ Marshall Co, Inc, 233 Mich App 229, 231;
590 NW2d 301 (1998). “Once a duty is voluntarily assumed, it must be performed with some
degree of skill and care.” Id. Defendant asserts that it was subcontractor WRW Carpentry that
negligently removed the stairs and then failed to secure the doorway. But, defendant does not
dispute plaintiff’s contention that it was defendant who directed the subcontractor to remove the
stairs. Defendant also admits that it placed tape on the door warning of the missing stairs and
also placed a sign against the door that stated that the stairs were missing. That defendant took it
upon itself to warn or protect others from the hazard presumably made it less likely that the
3
A Supreme Court order is binding precedent where the underlying rationale can be understood.
Evans & Luptak, PLC v Lizza, 251 Mich App 187, 196; 650 NW2d 364 (2002).
4
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the cases of Ormsby, supra, and Ghaffari v Turner
Construction Co, 473 Mich 16; 699 NW2d 687 (2005), do not support its position. Those cases
do not hold that premises liability claims are barred in the context of a construction site accident.
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subcontractor that removed the stairs would take action itself to warn about the missing stairs or
barricade the stairwell. Indeed, defendant hired a safety officer specifically for the purpose of
daily overseeing the project from a safety standpoint and intervening to cure safety hazards
created by subcontractors. We are persuaded that plaintiff’s position that defendant assumed a
duty to properly warn or barricade the stairwell is plausible.
Furthermore, an argument can be made that defendant breached its duty of due care when
undertaking to warn about or protect from the hazard. Because defendant knew or should have
known that the area of the missing stairs would present a high degree of risk to anyone working
in the area, a genuine issue of fact exists whether under the conditions at the time of plaintiff’s
fall, the safety measures defendant took were adequate. On the day of his injury in October,
defendant arrived at the work site at around 6:40 a.m., while it was still dark. The power was off
in the house, so plaintiff experienced difficulty seeing. Given the lack of visibility, the tape on
the door and the sign that was alleged to have been propped against the door did not constitute
sufficiently adequate warnings of a danger as serious as a missing stairway. Additionally, the
effectiveness and appropriateness of the tape as a barrier was undermined by plaintiff’s
testimony that in his industry, blue tape signified that the area needed his attention for repair.
Also, reasonable measures existed that defendant could have readily undertaken to adequately
guard against the danger, e.g., locking the basement door, blocking the door with a piece of
wood nailed across the doorway, or ensuring that the electrical power was on, coupled with
blocking the door. Significantly, defendant’s own agents confirm the danger posed by the hazard
and the inadequacy of the measures taken to warn or protect against it. Defendant’s project
superintendent, Tim Holmes, stated “due to the lack of light there was no possible way to see
that the steps were removed from the basement.” Defendant’s safety officer, Matt Barton,
admitted that the writing on the tape could not be read in the dark; there was no sign at the
accident site when Barton inspected the scene after the accident; the door was “poorly” marked
with blue tape; and, in standard practice, blue tape was not used to warn of a danger as serious as
a missing stairway. Barton’s corrective action consisted of counseling Holmes and another
individual “on establishing proper barricades and warning signs.” In sum, we cannot conclude,
as a matter of law, that defendant did not breach an assumed duty to properly warn of or protect
against the missing stairs. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in permitting plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to add a negligence theory of breach of an assumed duty.
Finally, defendant asserts that it will suffer prejudice by allowing the amendment. The
amended complaint does not assert new factual allegations. It adds two new theories of
negligence (premises liability and breach of an assumed duty), and it omits the theory that was
pleaded in the original complaint (common work area). Defendant’s claim that it will suffer
prejudice because witnesses have left the state is unsubstantiated. Defendant does not elaborate
regarding the witnesses to whom it refers or what information the witnesses would provide.
Likewise, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice concerning the indemnification issue. It
does not provide any information regarding the identity of additional parties that might allegedly
be responsible for indemnification, nor does it explain how plaintiffs’ original complaint failed to
provide defendant with notice that additional parties might be implicated. Should defendant
believe that a non-party bears responsibility for plaintiffs’ injuries, it is free to implead that party.
In the event that the trial court denies defendant’s attempt to join an additional party, defendant
may seek recourse through an appeal. Therefore, we find defendant’s prejudice argument to be
unpersuasive.
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We affirm in part and reverse in part. The trial court’s decision to grant plaintiffs’
motion to amend their complaint is affirmed, and the court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion
for summary disposition on the common work area claim is reversed. We remand this case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs
pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in full.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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